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We shall not cease from exploration. 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
 
T.S. Eliot 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A consistent pattern of results indicates that from an early age humans are 
competent to represent objects and characterize them in terms of their properties, their 
behaviors, as well as their involvement in actions and events. Thereby, infants’ event 
knowledge not only consists of static information regarding the structure and form of 
objects but also includes dynamic components. The comprehension of the dynamic 
aspects of an event is essential in making decisions about the number of objects 
involved or in judging whether a particular object seen at one time is the same object 
as one viewed at a previous time. This problem is referred to as object individuation. 
The study of object individuation demonstrates that infants employ a variety of 
sources of information in this process. Despite its great importance in early infants’ 
perceptual and cognitive abilities, one particular source of dynamic information has 
been unexplored in the occurrence of object individuation. The present work is 
concerned with the role domain-specific motion plays in infants’ understanding of 
events and its impact on object individuation. 
The following four experiments investigated 10- and 12-month-old infants’ 
ability to recall how many objects were involved in a motion event by means of 
domain-specific motion cues (animate-inanimate) the objects provided. Using an 
adapted version of the Xu and Carey (1996) paradigm, 10- and 12-month-old infants 
saw an animate and an inanimate object repeatedly travel from behind a screen. It was 
predicted that the distinct motion characteristics would facilitate object individuation 
by activating underlying conceptual knowledge about the animate-inanimate 
distinction and thus, generating the expectation of different kinds of objects. 
In the current set of studies infants of both age groups did not show evidence 
that they were able to apply such knowledge to the individuation task. Infants did not 
demonstrate object individuation on the basis of domain-specific motion information 
by looking longer to an unexpected outcome. It remains to be tested whether it is a 
question of inability or whether motion information activates different concepts that 
are employed in the present task. The discussion offers theoretical as well as 
methodological explanations for the absence of object individuation in the 
experiments on hand.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
 
THE NATURE OF OBJECT REPRESENTATION 
 
 
One of the most fundamental cognitive capacities humans possess is the 
ability to represent the world in terms of objects. Coherent objects, which have a 
continuous existence over time and space, enable us to perceive the world 
surrounding us as stable and unified. The more over, distinct objects (individuals) 
provide the basis for many perceptual and cognitive processes and determine how we 
think about and act upon them. The knowledge about the appearance and the 
properties of objects as well as the laws that determine how objects move and interact 
allows adults to group units into three-dimensional objects and consequentially 
enables them to organize and parse visual displays in meaningful ways. However, we 
not only have to represent objects as permanent and be able to separate bounded 
figures from a background. In addition, because we live in a dynamic world in which 
the perceptual input constantly changes, the ability to track those objects over time 
and space is just as essential for human thinking. We constantly make use of all these 
processes in everyday life. For instance, adults establish effortlessly the relative 
location of objects in the environment, which is critical when moving around. Little 
thinking is necessary for this. Instead adults register objects in space often without 
particularly being aware of the process. The same applies to the tendency to segregate 
and group things in the environment. Adults tend to segregate visual scenes into 
figure and background (figure-ground organization) and group objects to the degree 
of their similarity or depending on their proximity. In regard to perceptual grouping 
and perceiving form, gestalt psychologists proposed organizational principles that 
guide mental processing. Alongside the just mentioned characteristics such principles 
additionally include the tendency to connect contours that are not quite closed and to 
group items that move in the same direction or at equal speed. With the help of these 
cues adults form units that are maximally simple and homogeneous (Wertheimer, 
1958). In sum, human adults have no difficulty experiencing objects as entities that 
persist over time even when the encounters have been brief and intermittent. Thereby 
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principles of continuity, solidity, smoothness of motion, and the contact rule guide 
adults’ apprehension of identity (Spelke et al., 1995).  
Principles of identity from a philosophical standpoint are provided by the 
concepts of a ‘sortal’ (Geach, 1962; Wiggins, 1967; Hirsch, 1982; Macnamara, 1987; 
Lowe, 1989). According to philosophical reflections on ‘sortals’, these concepts 
describe representations used for individuation and identity. They tell us what to 
count as an instance of something and whether something is the same as what we 
have encountered before (Hirsch, 1982; Macnamara, 1987; Wiggins, 2001). For 
example, ice cube represents a ‘sortal’ whereas water does not. “Identity criteria are 
sortal-specific, in the sense that the same property difference may or may not indicate 
a change in identity” (Xu, 2007, p. 400). This in turn depends in the kind of object in 
question. Size might be an indicator for an identity change of a furniture item or a 
vehicle but it is not a predictor of change in a person, animal, or plant.  Hence, ‘sortal’ 
concepts are closely related to issues about identity, persistence, and change. In order 
to answer questions regarding “how many?” or “ is this the same?” a ‘sortal’ has to 
specify what is talked about, that is, the exact item of a kind (Xu 1997, 2007). One 
would derive at different answers if the ‘sortal’ in question referred to a book or pages 
of a book regarding the question “how many?”. The same problem applies to the 
second question. Whether something “is this the same black?” has only a definite 
answer when related to an object or the shade of the color. This explains why ‘sortals’ 
are linguistically defined as count nouns in languages with a count-mass noun 
distinction. Neither adjectives like “black” nor verbs like “reading” or mass nouns 
like water map onto kinds of individuals. This grammatical distinction implies a 
related conceptual structure. All concepts define their content, but not every concept 
provides criteria for individuation and identification (e.g., colors or traits such as 
good). ‘Sortal’ concepts allow enumeration and identity tracking over time (Xu, 
2007). For example when we watch children at the playground. Adults perceive the 
child standing on top of the slide and the one who arrives at the bottom as the same 
person even when he/ she was occluded while going through a tube in the meantime. 
In case the child at the bottom looks different however, adults would conclude that 
another child must have hidden in the tube and continued to slide while the first child 
hides there now. Or when observing a ball that rolls behind a pile of sand where a 
couple seconds later a toy truck comes out from behind, adults would probably 
describe the scene as a ball rolling behind a pile of sand, laying there, followed by an 
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appearance of a toy truck, which presumably stood behind the sand pile to begin with 
and then got hit by the ball which caused it to move. These examples show how 
important the representation of objects of various kinds is in order for us to 
understand the world. Older children and adults have no problem in making sense of 
such complex scenes. How about infants’ understanding of such scenarios? Is their 
picture of the world a “blooming and buzzing confusion” as William James (1890, p. 
488) described it or are we talking about sophisticated creatures with adult like 
abilities? 
Developmental psychologists concentrate on the evolution of capabilities that 
make us uniquely human and are interested in how a “seemingly helpless and 
cognitively deficient baby grows into an adult who processes a vast amount of 
knowledge and impressive cognitive skills” (Xu, 2003, p. 161). In order to achieve 
such an understanding the infant’s conceptual system has to be specified through 
investigations on how and at what age certain skills develop (e.g., Baillargeon, 1993; 
Piaget, 1954; Spelke, 2003; Pauen, 2003 for an overview). Even half a century after 
James’ remark concerning infants’ perception and understanding of their environment 
infants were still thought to be “reflex bundles” whose world is fundamentally 
different compared to the one adults experience (Xu, 2003). Psychologists and 
philosophers like Piaget (1954) and Quine (1960) thought, for example, that for 
young infants no persisting objects exist. According to Piaget and his followers, 
infants do not possess true object permanence until the end of their second year of 
life. Even though he acknowledged that infants are able to successfully retrieve 
hidden objects at the age of 8 or 9 month, he believed that they lack criteria that allow 
them to decide whether an object seen in one occasion is the same as or distinct from 
an object seen on a different occasion (Xu, 2003). If those assumptions were true 
infants would indeed have difficulties to make sense of the environment surrounding 
them. But with the development of more sensitive methods (e.g. habituation-
dishabituation paradigm) to study infant cognition the view on infants’ perceptual and 
cognitive abilities has changed. Since then, the great deal of research on how infants 
perceive the objects in their environment convinced most developmental psychologist 
that infants are far more competent then once assumed. Work on early perceptual 
abilities demonstrated that infants discriminate between visual forms, are able to 
perceive partly occluded objects (Kellman & Spelke, 1983) and by the age of 8 
months they use a variety of perceptual cues and types of information such as 
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common motion, spatial separation between surfaces, object shape, color, and pattern 
for organizing displays (Johnson, 2000; Spelke, 1990). Besides the relevance to 
organize certain units into bounded objects and making use of perceptual information, 
having conceptions about objects is equally important. When thinking about objects 
various contents come to mind. Objects can be characterized in terms of their 
properties, their behaviors, or their involvement in actions and events. They can be 
assigned to categories and conceptualized as different kind of things (Mandler & 
McDonough, 1993). The capacity to analyze objects enables infants to structure their 
environment and form representations of the characteristics objects have. 
Additionally, it facilitates the assessment of physical, psychological, and biological 
principles of objects. Research on physical reasoning in infants (see Baillargeon, 
1994, and Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992, for reviews) showed 
that infants as young as 4 months of age share many of the basic beliefs adults hold 
about the behavior of objects. For instance, infants expect objects to collide with other 
entities rather than pass through them (Leslie & Keeble, 1987), fall when their 
supports are removed (Baillargeon et al., 1992), and continue to exist when hidden 
(Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985).  
Related to the last assumption is the question of how infants decide that a 
particular object seen at one time is the same object as one viewed at a previous time. 
This problem regarding the object concept is referred to as object individuation. 
Research provided evidence that once infants have grouped surfaces into three-
dimensional objects and segregated these from the background they also keep track of 
these objects through space and time. In addition to object permanence, infants as 
young as 2.5 months are able to establish representations of individuated objects, even 
when occluded (Xu, 2003). Under what conditions do infants decide that they are in 
the presence of one, two, or more distinct objects? How do they decide whether the 
objects they have encountered on different occasions are the same or different objects 
seen at different times? What criteria do infants employ in making such decisions?  
 
This dissertation project is concerned with infants’ object individuation as one 
aspect of the ability to represent objects in the first year of life. It investigates the 
question of how infants arrive at representations of multiple moving objects and how 
they trace their identity through time and space. Thereby, the focus lies on the types 
of information infants use to establish representations of separate and distinct entities 
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in their environment, i.e. the sources of information employed in the process. One 
specific kind of information that seems to be very important in early infancy is motion 
information. Research along these lines reveals that from early on infants rely on 
motion to make perceptual and conceptual inferences. They use movement to make 
inferences about object unity, reason about continuity and are able to represent object 
motion over temporary occlusion. Not only do infants use motion information, 
though, they also depend on it, for example, to register the form of an object 
(Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 1986), to separate an object from its background (Kellman 
& Spelke, 1987), for the detection of coherent structures (Bertenthal et al., 1987), or 
to distinguish between animate and inanimate objects (Mandler, 2004). The present 
work looks at the role domain-specific motion information may play in an object 
individuation task and questions if motion information about living and non-living 
objects helps infants to solve this task at a younger age by using property/ kind 
information. In order to do so this research builds on experiments by Xu and Carey 
(1996) and explores the impact of motion cues on object individuation in infants 10 
and 12 months of age. Thus, this project aims to provide insights into how motion 
aids infants in going about building object representations and how it supports 
infants’ ability to retrieve and use their object representations. Simultaneously, it 
gives information about the nature and the content of such representations.  
The present thesis will begin with an overview of what is known about the 
abilities and complex cognitive processes infants embody that ultimately lead to a 
unified model of object representation in infancy (Wilcox et al., 2003). Thus, Chapter 
1 includes sections on object segregation, object permanence, object individuation, 
and object identification defining important terms. The following Chapter 2 gives a 
literature review on object individuation covering psychological accounts regarding 
this topic. At the same time it will include empirical evidence concerned with infants’ 
ability to individuate objects as well as procedures used to access this ability with an 
emphasis on the information that is given in an individuation task, and the 
characteristics that are applied in the individuation process. In Chapter 3 the second 
line of research theoretically related to the present work will be outlined. The section 
on domain-specific motion characteristics will concentrate on the development of the 
distinction between animate-inanimate information types and experimental 
investigations. Based on those reviews, a connection between the two fields of study 
in cognitive development is established in Chapter 4, which concludes with the 
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hypotheses to be tested in the following studies. Thereafter, the methodology and the 
procedure used in the current work will be explained in Chapter 5, followed by the 
presentation of the results (Chapter 6 – 9). The discussion part (Chapter 10) will focus 
on the development of object individuation and offers some thought on the 
implications the use of motion information might have. Issues that might occur with 
the method and open questions that might lead to new ones will be discussed. The 
dissertation ends with a prospect of how the results enrich our understanding of object 
individuation and possible interesting questions for future research. 
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II THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
ASPECTS OF OBJECT REPRESENTATION IN INFANCY  
 
 
The study of object representation in infancy refers to questions concerning 
the development of registering object and event components, retaining them in 
memory, integrating them across space and time as well as forming associations 
between them. As infants experience and learn about the environment they observe 
many different types of physical events which involve various objects. In the course 
of development infants build mental representations of these objects and events, 
which in turn are used in many cognitive processes (Baillargeon, 1998; Leslie, 1994; 
Mandler, 1997; Spelke, 1991). It is the goal of developmental psychologists to shed 
light in the nature of these representations. Thereby, some researchers have been 
concerned with specifying possible innate constraints on infants’ object 
representations (e.g. Leslie, 1994, 1995; Spelke, 1994; Spelke, Breinlinger, 
Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992) whereas others make learning mechanism responsible 
for the development of infants object representations. Instead of determining innate 
principles these investigators focus on the changes that take place within infant’s 
object representations as they accumulate knowledge and experience (e.g. Baillargeon 
& Aguiar, 1998; Baillargeon, 1998, 2004a; Mandler, 1997; Needham, Baillargeon, & 
Kaufman, 1997). According to their view, when learning about physical objects, 
infants identify increasingly more variables evermore accurately over time that enable 
them to predict outcomes in events these objects are part of. In contrast, Spelke and 
her colleagues have proposed a number of physical principles (i.e. cohesion, 
boundedness, rigidity, and no action at a distance) that confine how objects move and 
interact within infants’ event representations (e.g., Spelke, 1994).  
Primary to the reasoning about physical objects, however, is the perception of 
three-dimensional entities. Therefore, it is necessary to separate regions of visual 
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space that constitute visible surface fragments. Research on early object perception 
provides evidence that the ability to segregate objects is present in infancy. 
 
 
1.1 Object Segregation 
 
Object segregation is the capacity to organize visual arrays of surfaces into 
individual, unitary, and bounded objects. It permits the apprehension of physical 
objects as persisting bodies with internal unity and stable boundaries (Spelke, 1990; 
Xu et al., 2004). In contrast to Gestalt theory after which perception tends to organize 
visual arrays into maximally simple and regular units, surface motion and spatial 
arrangements rather than static Gestalt properties1 determine how infants perceive 
object unity and boundaries (Spelke, 1990). Even though infants tend not to comply 
with Gestalt principles, they are still sensitive to them but it is not until later that 
Gestalt relations influence object perception (Bornstein, Ferdinandsen, & Gross, 
1981; van Giffen & Haith, 1984; Spelke, 1990). Before, infants anticipate object unity 
when perceptual arrays move as connected wholes (cohesion), move separately from 
one another (boundedness), and when they act upon each other only on contact 
(rigidity, no action at a distance) (Spelke, 1990). 
The most explicit evidence for the existence of several objects is when they 
are simultaneously visible and separated in space. One way to address the question 
how infants assign surfaces to distinct objects is by applying object segregation tasks 
involving partly occluded displays. Under conditions where perceptual or 
spatiotemporal continuity is lost, infants must judge whether the parts simultaneously 
visible on either side of an occluder constitute of one or two objects (Craton, 1996; 
Johnson, 1997; Kellman & Spelke, 1983; Slater et al., 1990; Spelke, 1990; Wilcox & 
Baillargeon, 1998b). Using this method, Kellman and Spelke (1983) were the first to 
systematically investigate how infants segregate objects. In their study they explored 
the sources of information required to perceive the visible portions of a partly 
occluded object as belonging to a single entity. They concluded that at 4 months of 
                                                
1 The Gestalt theory proposes several principles that determine the arrangement of surfaces into 
objects. The principle of similarity states that units homogenous in color and texture are perceived as 
one entity. Under terms of the principle of good continuation even contours contribute to this 
perception. Objects more regular in shape and uniform in their motion are observed according to the 
principle of good form and the principle of common fate as coherent (Spelke, 1990).  
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age infants use common motion, but not common features to connect visible surfaces 
and perceive a single object. Aside from occlusion, problems of object segregation 
arise in case of shared boundaries. The conceptual formulation infants have to 
complete in tasks that consist of displays with diffuse object boundaries is parsing a 
display into two distinct objects and tell were one object ends and another begins (Xu 
et al., 1999). In order to address this issue, investigators employ non-occlusion tasks 
in which infants are familiarized to a stationary display composed of three-
dimensional objects and then presented with move-apart or move-together events2 
(Needham, 1997; Needham & Baillargeon, 1997; Xu et al., 1999). This research put 
forth that infants use a variety of different sources besides object motion and spatial 
separateness as cues for object boundaries. Needham and her colleagues (Needham & 
Baillargeon, 1997; Needham, 1999) revealed that by 8 month of age infants use 
physical (support relations, solidity, spatial arrangements) and featural (shape, color, 
pattern) information to form an interpretation of a display and assign surfaces to 
distinct objects. When both types of information are available infants consider 
physical information to be the more accurate source of information about object 
boundaries even if the interpretations implied by featural and physical information 
create a conflict (Needham & Ormsbee, 2003). That is, shown stationary displays of a 
box and an adjacent cylinder that were either suspended in mid air or on the floor, 
infants used their physical knowledge about support to segregate the display. In the 
cylinder-up condition infants looked longer at the move-apart compared to the move-
together event whereas infants in the cylinder-down condition showed longer looking 
toward the move-together event. This indicates that infants viewed the box and the 
cylinder in the cylinder-up condition as belonging to one object and that infants 
perceived two objects in the cylinder-down condition. Thus, if features suggest 
separate objects and physical information indicates a single unit, infants chose the 
interpretation consistent with the physical information (Needham & Baillargeon, 
1997). If only featural information is present infants mostly rely on object shape. 
Needham (1999) explored this possibility by presenting adjacent objects sharing a 
                                                
2 These test events showed a gloved hand that moved one part of the display. The other portion of the 
display either remained stationary (move-apart condition) or the two parts moved as a whole (move-
together condition). The logic used in interpreting infants’ reaction to the events is as follows: If infants 
apprehended the stationary display as a single unit they should show surprise in the condition in which 
the object brakes into pieces when pulled. In case the infants perceived the display consisting of more 
than one unit, their expectation should be rather violated in the move-together condition (for review see 
Needham & Ormsbee, 2003). 
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boundary but being dissimilar in their object features. Shape, color, and pattern lead to 
different interpretations regarding object unity. They found that infants use shape, 
rather than color and pattern to segregate objects in the displays presented to them. 
The studies noted so far were mainly concerned with the ability to segregate objects 
by means of physical knowledge or perceptual differences. Xu et al. (1999) add to the 
findings presented yet a series of studies concerned with object kind information3 as 
variable for object segregation. In their task infants were habituated to a display 
consisting of a toy duck perched on top of a toy car. In the test trials, a hand either 
lifted up the top object leaving the bottom object standing on the stage floor or lifted 
up the top object in conjunction with the bottom object as if it were a single object. 
Xu et al. (1999) expected the infants to react with longer looking to the latter if they 
separated the display into two distinct objects. The results indicate that 12-month-old 
infants successfully segregate by making use of the kind distinction between duck and 
car whereas 10-month-old infants failed to do so. The authors take these findings to 
conclude that there is a developmental change in representing object kinds. The last-
mentioned studies go beyond the mere perception of objects and the assignment of 
boundaries because for infants to draw on object kind information when separating an 
ambiguous array, they have to represent functionally relevant and inductively rich 
knowledge about the objects involved in the event (Xu et al., 1999). In order to 
acquire such knowledge it is required to perceive and represent objects as permanent.  
 
 
1.2 Object Permanence  
 
One necessary step infants have to make from perceiving objects to reasoning 
about them is to mentally remember them, i.e. perceive them as permanent. Thus, the 
ability to perceive objects is related to the ability to reason about them and their 
behavior (Spelke, 1988).  
Piaget (1954) was the first investigator who examined the question if infants 
are able to represent occluded objects. In research with young infants Piaget found 
that they typically do not search for objects they have observed being hidden. When 
                                                
3 Kind information is explained as information “derived from classifying the stimuli according to 
antecedently represented categories in long-term memory” (Xu et al., 1999, p. 140). See also section 
1.5 for further explanation. 
Theory  11 
 
presented with a manual search task in which a toy is covered with a cloth infants 
ages 5 to 7 months made no attempt to lift the cloth and grasp the toy, even when 
capable of performing these actions. Infants at this age believe that objects 
discontinue to exist when they become invisible. Hence, Piaget concluded that 
infants’ event representations include only those objects they can perceive directly 
and it is not until about 8 months of age that infants begin to represent the continued 
existence of occluded objects (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002). However, this 
representation of permanence is still limited because although infants now search for 
hidden objects, they only do so at a particular place, namely where they found the 
object first. Piaget (1954) interpreted this as a tie between action and location. In case 
the object is hidden in a new location, infants younger than 12 months of age repeat 
the act that was successful before. By the end of the first year, infants begin to 
represent visible displacements of objects and assume that occluded objects are 
located wherever they have been hidden before (Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). 
Nevertheless, a representation of invisible displacements is still missing. Hence, 
according to Piaget and his followers, infants do not possess true object permanence4 
signalized by the capacity of representational or symbolic functioning until the end of 
what he called the sensorimotor period around 18-24 months of age.  
This long-standing conclusion began to change when evidence was obtained 
with novel more sensitive tasks, which employed visual rather than motor 
measurements (see Chapter 2, p. 20). The reason behind this is the consideration that 
young infants fail Piaget’s search tasks because they require the coordination of 
separate actions on separate objects. Therefore, infants might not lack the concept of 
object permanence but instead they have a limited capability to plan means-end search 
sequences (Baillargeon, 1987). Perceptual factors such as the separation between 
object and occluder or the relationship between an object and its cover appear to 
affect searching behavior and yield a problem for infants to deal with certain types of 
disappearances (Bremner, 1994). Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wassermann (1985) were 
among the first researchers who applied the habituation/ dishabituation task to test this 
concern. The authors found that, contrary to Piaget's theses, 5-month-oId infants 
understand that an object continues to exist when occluded. Later experiments 
                                                
4 At this stage infants are thought of possessing full object knowledge, which means for one thing that 
they are completely aware of the predictable patterns of objects’ appearance and disappearance 
(Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). For another thing this signifies the understanding that occluded objects 
follow the same physical rules as visible ones. 
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applying the drawbridge paradigm reduced the starting age at which infants have this 
kind of knowledge to 3.5 months (Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). In 
addition, Baillargeon (1986) provided evidence that 6.5 month old infants are able to 
not only reason about the existence but also about the location and trajectory of 
occluded objects. Later experiments revealed that these young infants already include 
object properties such as height in their reasoning about occluded objects (Baillargeon 
& Graber, 1987). 
Today there is consistent evidence from various laboratories that infants as 
young as 2.5 months believe that a stationary object continues to exist and retains its 
location when occluded and that a moving object continues to exist and pursues a 
continuous path when occluded (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999, 2002; Baillargeon, 
1991; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990; 
Goubet & Clifton, 1998; Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001; Hespos & Rochat, 1997; 
Hofstadter & Reznick, 1996; Koechlin, Dehaene, & Mehler, 1998; Newcombe, 
Huttenlocher, & Learmonth, 1999; Rochat & Hespos, 1996; Simon, Hespos, & 
Rochat, 1997; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Wilcox, 1999; 
Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b; Wilcox, Nadel, & Rosser, 1996; Wynn, 1992). In 
agreement with Piaget, experiments point likewise to a clear developmental change 
young infants’ reasoning about occluded objects undergoes (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 
1999; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; Spelke & Kestenbaum, 1986; Spelke, 
Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein, 1995). These experiments show that infants solve 
some object-hiding tasks before others. For example, ten-months-olds search for an 
object placed on a table and covered by a cloth before they seek an object that a hand 
deposited underneath the cloth (Moore & Meltzoff, 1999). The latter task, which 
involves the inference that the hand put the object under the cloth, is not worked out 
until 14 months of age. This emphasizes that searching for an object is a true 
cognitive advantage. Therefore, the ability to perform coordinated actions such as 
search tasks has to be distinguished from the capability to perceive objects as 
permanent. 
Once infants see an entity, which they had segmented from the background, as 
permanent, they can go about building object representations in specific events (e.g. 
Oakes, 1994; Oakes & Cohen, 1995; Spelke & Kestenbaum, 1986; Spelke, 
Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein, 1995; Xu & Carey, 1996). One fundamental issue in 
the course of this is that of object individuation – the ability to determine how many 
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objects are involved in an event (Spelke & Kestenbaum, 1986; Spelke et al., 1995; Xu 
& Carey, 1996). 
 
 
1.3 Object Individuation 
 
In object individuation processes segregated entities seen on different 
occasions are assigned to a single or multiple objects (Xu et al., 2004).  The issue of 
object individuation arises under conditions where perceptual access to boundaries 
and spatiotemporal continuity is lost (Xu et al., 1999). Thus, in order to individuate 
objects one has to determine the participating objects and establish corresponding 
object representations. It is a necessary ability whenever one makes decisions 
regarding object’s numerical identity (Kojgaard, 2004). The more over, individuation 
is a prerequisite for being able to decide whether objects present in the here and now 
are identical to the ones encountered before or thereafter. On many occasions we 
represent distinct objects and track them through time and space. In order to do so 
certain references are necessary. Human adults are able to rely on several sources of 
information to solve an individuation task and to establish representations of distinct 
objects over space and time. They include spatiotemporal information, property 
information, and kind information. Most research in infancy has likewise focused on 
the kind of information infants use to individuate objects. These individuation criteria 
are explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
Spatiotemporal information 
 
The first source for the establishment of numerical identity is spatiotemporal 
information. Spatiotemporal criteria derive from certain universal constraints that 
apply to solid objects and provide information about an object’s location, its path of 
motion, and its speed of motion (Xu, 1999). For instance, since a single object cannot 
be in two different places at the same time and two distinct objects cannot occupy the 
same space at a given time, this information indicates the number of objects in an 
event (Spelke, 1988). Furthermore, because objects travel on spatiotemporally 
connected paths, the representation of two distinct objects arrives from the detection 
of spatiotemporal discontinuity, i.e. there is no spatiotemporally continuous path that 
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unites the objects (Spelke, 1990). Likewise, a single object is assumed if 
spatiotemporally connected paths are noted. 
From a very early age, infants interpret spatiotemporal discontinuities as 
indices for the presence of distinct objects. When shown an event in which an object 
disappears behind the first of two spatially separate screens, and then emerges from 
behind the second screen without appearing between the two screens, infants as young 
as 3.5 months are led by the discontinuity in path to conclude that two distinct objects 
are involved in the event (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002; Spelke, et al., 1995). In 
addition, Wilcox, Schweinle, and Chapa (2003) found that a discontinuity in speed 
signals the presence of two distinct objects. In their study they presented infants 4.5 
months of age with an event in which an object disappears behind one edge of a wide 
screen and immediately reappears at the other edge. In case of a single object on the 
platform when the screen was lowered infants responded as if they expected two 
objects involved in the event and thus, present behind the occluder. The authors 
concluded that speed of motion is essential to the individuation process as well. In the 
absence of spatiotemporal information infants turn to a second source of information 
for the individuation of objects – featural information. 
 
Featural information 
 
Featural or perceptual property information refers to perceptual features of 
objects such as color, size, shape and texture (e.g., a red ball and a green ball seen on 
a different occasion are two distinct objects). Adults conclude that the perceptual 
difference in object properties is indicative of separate objects (Xu et al., 2004). They 
just compare the features (e.g. shape, size, color, and pattern) of the objects seen on 
different occasions and typically conclude that two objects are present when the 
features are different and one object is in place when the features are identical 
(Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998). There is disagreement about the role featural 
information plays in infants’ individuation processes (Wilcox et al., 2003). Whereas 
some researchers have claimed that young infants are incapable of using featural 
information to individuate objects until the end of the first year of life (Xu & Carey, 
1996; Xu, Carey, & Welch, 1999), others have suggested that this ability emerges 
much earlier, by at least 4.5 months of age (Wilcox, 1999; Needham & Baillargeon, 
2000; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a; Wilcox & Schweinle, 2002; Needham, 
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Baillargeon, & Kaufman, 1997). In order to resolve this discrepancy Xu and Carey 
(2000) pointed out that their task requires access to another source of information, 
namely the one of kind concepts. According to the authors were the results obtained 
in their studies based on the use of kind representations rather than perceptual 
property representations, as they play distinct roles in object individuation. Therefore, 
kind information represents an additional criterion for individuation. 
 
Kind information 
 
Kind information bears on our knowledge about categories of objects. It 
specifies conceptual knowledge of objects united by functional or causal as well as 
perceptual features (Xu et al., 1999). Adults reason that a bottle and a cup seen on 
different occasions are two distinct objects or the dog that went behind the bush 
cannot be the same individual as the cat that turned up thereafter (Xu & Baker, 2005). 
The relevance of perceptual property differences, however, is thereby kind relative 
(Xu, 2003, p. 163):  
 
“A puppy may be the same creature as a large dog a month later, but a 
small cup cannot be the same object as a large cup a month later. 
Similarly, color differences do not signal distinct individual 
chameleons, but they do signal distinct individual frogs.” 
 
These examples make clear how our knowledge about the kinds of things there are in 
the world influences the answer to the question how many objects are involved in an 
event. In addition it shows how such information helps us to establish representations 
of distinct objects in a visual scene despite their appearance (Xu et al., 1999). 
Consequently, changes in appearance like the size of a growing living organism does 
not necessarily lead to the perception of multiple creatures over time. In contrast, 
when it comes to inanimate things size variations are a clear sign for several 
exemplars. In contrast to featural information, kind information derives from stable, 
accessible, and long-term kind representations that pick out functionally relevant 
categories (Baldwin et al., 1993; Mandler, 1992). Studies by Xu, Carey, and Quint 
(2001) provided evidence that kind representations and featural information play 
different roles in object individuation at 12 months of age. In a series of studies they 
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presented one year olds objects of the same kind (e.g. balls) that differed in the 
features size, color, and pattern or a combination of the three found no indication for 
object individuation. Infants also failed when a within-basic-level-kind shape contrast 
(e.g., a regular cup with one handle compared to a sippy cup with two handles) was 
given. Only when infants viewed a cross-basic-level-kind shape contrast like a cup 
and a bottle did they expect two individual objects. Control conditions ensured that 
infants were able to perceive the color and size variations and that they were equally 
sensitive to the shape contrasts. Together these results lead to the conclusion that kind 
representations rather than perceptual property representations underlie object 
individuation at 12 months and thus, they are distinct forms of information (Xu, 
Carey, & Quint, 2001). 
Taken together, the previous remarks reveal that a variety of information (e.g. 
spatiotemporal continuity, shape, texture, kind and so on) drives object individuation. 
For the purpose of this work, I adopt the distinction of spatiotemporal, featural, and 
kind information even though Wilcox and her colleagues (1998b, 2003) as well as 
Meltzoff & Moore (1998) propose additional properties (mechanical/ physical 
characteristics and functional attributes), which may be represented within the context 
of physical events.5 However, one could argue that mechanical as well as functional 
information are part of kind information. In any case, young infants employ many 
strategies to detect the numerical identity of objects in everyday events and even 
integrate different sources of information. In the course of this spatiotemporal 
information is fundamental to the individuation process and seems to be superior 
compared to perceptual property as well as kind information. That is, in cases where 
several sources are in place spatiotemporal criteria can even override other types of 
information, i.e. certain spatiotemporal parameters yield the representation of a single 
object despite perceptual property differences (Xu, 2003). For instance, when faced 
with the phenomenon of apparent motion, adults view objects in consecutive displays 
under certain conditions, like a short interstimulus interval between two displays, as 
turning into each other rather than as separate entities. Similar impressions occur 
under conditions of occlusion, as in the tunnel effect (Burke, 1952). Here, given a 
                                                
5 In their view, mechanical or physical information is important in events in which more than one 
object is involved (e.g. objects that are on top of each other, are underneath, inside or pass behind one 
another) and designates the relation between these objects. Adults bear on sophisticated knowledge 
about the lawful ways in which objects move about in the world and the nature of their interactions 
when evaluating how many objects are included in occlusion events. Functional information, in 
addition, defines what objects do and how they can be used (Wilcox et al., 2003). 
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certain range of speed and occlusion time, adults perceive an object, which disappears 
in a tunnel and one that appears thereafter with different properties as a single item 
that changed its properties but persisted through occlusion (Xu, 2003). The same 
accounts for the relation of object kind information and spatiotemporal information. 
Thus, although featural and kind information are most definitely useful in object 
individuation processes they are not always necessary (Xu et.al., 1999).  
Following individuation another task occurs, that of object identification 
which is the competence to use information stored in an object representation to 
decide which previously individuated object is being encountered (Kaldy & Leslie, 
2003; Leslie et al., 1998; Tremoulet et al., 2000). Whereas object individuation is 
concerned with the number of objects, object identity answers the question of the 
objects’ nature. 
 
 
1.4 Object Identification 
 
When identifying an object one has to make a decision about what kind of 
objects are present in an event. Therefore, object identification is seen as a process 
that follows object individuation (Kaldy & Leslie, 2003; Leslie & Kaldy, 2001; 
Tremoulet et al., 2000). Tremoulet et al. (2000) as well as Kaldy and Leslie (2003) 
addressed the question of object identification. Following the experimental paradigm 
of Xu and Carey (1996) they familiarized 12-month-old infants to a disk and a 
triangle, which appeared from behind a screen one after the other. Instead of 
presenting two distinct objects in test, though, Tremoulet et al. (2000) showed two 
objects that were exactly the same. The authors reasoned that this would still be the 
expected outcome from an individuation point of view. However, in the case of object 
identification this could represent an unexpected outcome as well, since one object’s 
appearance changed even though the number of objects remained the same. Hence, in 
their study, Tremoult et al. (2000) presented one group (identification-by-shape 
group) of 12-month-old infants with two objects that were alike (disks) after they had 
been familiarized with two distinct objects (disk and triangle) and another group 
(control group) with the two objects (disk and triangle) they had been familiarized 
with. The looking times revealed that infants who belonged to the identification-by-
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shape group looked longer compared to the control group. These results indicate that 
12-month-old infants were able to identify the objects by shape. However, when 
Tremoulet et al. (2000) applied the same paradigm but used color as the 
distinguishing object feature, they were not able to replicate the results stated above. 
This time infants 12 month of age did not show any surprise as indicated by longer 
looking when the objects in question changed color in test. Thus, infants did not set 
the objects apart by color. Nevertheless, even though infants failed to identify object 
by color, they succeeded in individuating objects by color at this age (Tremoulet et 
al., 2000). In addition, when Kaldy and Leslie (2003) showed 9-month-olds 
differently shaped and colored objects each moving behind spatially separated 
screens, infants of this age group were able to use shape but not color information to 
identify objects, too. In applying an alternation procedure in which the objects 
changed location with each trial, the authors ensured that infants did not simply 
associate shape and location and that both objects were represented. Based on these 
behavioral findings Leslie and his colleagues constructed a cognitive model in which 
individuation is seen as the establishment of an object representation and 
identification as the use of information stored in the object representation (Leslie et 
al., 1998; Kaldy & Leslie, 2003; Tremoulet et al., 2000). According to their model 
information has to be bound to an object representation in order to be available for 
declaring, which previously individuated object the representation bears on (Kaldy & 
Leslie, 2003; for further details see Chapter 2.4).  
 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
Setting up an object representation is a complex process involving several 
steps. Once infants have segregated objects from the background, they face the 
problem of keeping track of these objects. In order for infants to decide whether a 
single or multiple objects are present and whether the objects they have encountered 
on various occasions are the same or distinct objects seen at different times they have 
to perceive them as permanent. Aside the impact of object motion on infants’ 
perception, it also plays a role in infants’ reasoning about object boundaries, occluded 
objects, and object identity.  
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The present work focuses on one aspect of object representations, namely the 
issue of object individuation and the questions how do infants arrive at representations 
of multiple objects and what sources of information do they employ in this process. 
Several theoretical accounts have been proposed on the development of the ability to 
determine how many objects are involved in a present event. These are outlined in 
detail in the subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE INFANTS’ SYSTEM OF OBJECT 
INDIVIDUATION 
 
 
Through Bower’s (1971, 1979, 1982) investigations of early cognition the 
understanding of infants’ object identity became a central topic for cognitive 
psychologists. Following Michotte’s (1963) work with adults, Bower presented 
infants with similar tasks and evaluated their response with various non-motor 
measures6 (Kojgaard, 2004). When examining infants’ tracking of objects that 
disappear behind screens, he discovered that infants as young as 5 months of age were 
able to trace objects which emerged from and vanished behind an occluder. In 
particular, after habituation to a sequence in which a rabbit disappeared into a tunnel 
and then reemerged out the other side, the infant saw an event in which the rabbit 
went behind a screen, but a different object (a shiny ball) showed up on the other side. 
Bower (1974) claimed that 5 month-olds’ looking behavior was disrupted which he 
interpreted as surprise due to their realization that the object that emerged from 
behind the screen was a different one from the object that entered. However, the 
question whether infants perceived one or two objects behind the screen remained 
unanswered at the time mainly due to the lack of adequate methods that were sensitive 
to infer mental states from nonlinguistic behavior. The habituation-dishabituation 
paradigm pioneered by Fantz (1961, 1963, 1964) and further enhanced by Spelke and 
her colleagues (Kellman & Spelke, 1983; Spelke, 1985) represents such a method. In 
this paradigm looking times are simply monitored as the infant watches what is 
happening. Therefore, this method taps spontaneous representation of objects and 
events without requiring any training (Carey & Xu, 2001). Day and Burnham (1981) 
used habituation-dishabituation measures in their tasks and found those to be a 
reliable and useful method to investigate not only object discrimination but also 
recognition of moving objects. 
One procedure that was generated from the original habituation method and 
has proven its worth in studying amongst other things individuation processes of 
                                                
6  Such measures included eye gaze, facial expressions, and heart rate. 
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preverbal infants is the violation-of-expectation paradigm (Bogratz, Shinskey, & 
Speaker, 1997; Haith, 1998, 1999; Haith & Benson, 1998; Baillargeon, 1999; Spelke, 
1998). In this method infants are presented with displays that either confirm or violate 
their expectations.  Based on the fact that infants have a preference for novelty after 
being familiarized or habituated (e.g. Bornstein, 1985; Spelke, 1985), the rational is as 
follows: If infants understand a phenomenon they will react with surprise indicated by 
longer looking toward certain scenes or objects when exposed to outcomes violating 
the phenomenon in question (Baillargeon, 1994, 1998, 1999). Therefore, after 
familiarization or habituation they are typically presented with an expected and an 
unexpected test event on alternating trials. An expected outcome is consistent with the 
phenomenon in question and an unexpected outcome is constructed in a way to 
violate it. In the later case it is assumed that infants’ behavior will be affected 
accordingly. Thus, it was not until the violation-of-expectation paradigm was 
developed that the key question regarding the number of objects could be addressed. 
The violation-of-expectation paradigm provides the foundation for the methods 
applied in individuation studies. 
Spelke, Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein (1995) as well as Xu & Carey (1996) 
were the first researchers using the violation-of-expectation paradigm to investigate th 
question how many objects are present in an event. In both lines of studies infants had 
to visually track objects in order to judge the number of objects. Besides numerical 
identity, Xu and Carey (1996) were concerned with another central question regarding 
object individuation. They, as well as others (Wilcox, 1999; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 
1998b; Wilcox & Schweinle, 2002; Xu, Carey, & Quint, 1997), asked about the 
impact of kind concepts on early individuation judgments and looked at the criteria 
employed for individuating objects, i.e. spatiotemporal information, featural 
information, or kind information. The first study that investigated this question during 
infancy was by Xu and Carey (1996). At the present time, different lines of research 
(which will be explained in detail in the next chapter) suggest that although infants 
typically succeed at individuating objects when given spatiotemporal information, the 
same does not always hold for property and kind information, respectively. Xu and 
Carey (1996) were the first to uncover this in several experiments addressing the 
hypothesis that young infants may represent only a general concept that provides 
criteria for individuation and construct more specific concepts later (dubbed the 
Object-first Hypothesis). To test this idea they had developed a task (later referred to 
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as event-mapping task) in which 10- and 12-month-old infants repeatedly watched an 
occlusion event involving two perceptually different objects such as a duck and a ball. 
The results obtained in this set of experiments suggest a developmental trend in the 
hypothesized direction. Infants seem to use general characteristics like spatiotemporal 
information before they include more specific ones like object property information to 
individuate objects. Against the assumption that infants younger than 12 months are 
not able to fulfill this task by means of featural information, speak findings provided 
by categorization research, which conveys that infants form categories not only of 
objects (Mandler, 2004; Pauen, 2002) but also of physical events (Baillargeon, 1995, 
2000, 2002, 2004a). Part of this framework is the methodological distinction between 
event-mapping and event-monitoring. As will be described in more detail later, results 
derived from event-monitoring tasks provide evidence for successful object 
individuation in infants as young as 4.5 months. 
 In addition to these two main theoretical accounts, several other approaches 
on how principles for object individuation are acquired and how the process evolves 
exist. For instance, Xu as well as Bonatti and colleagues refined the Object-first 
Hypothesis with their approaches to object individuation, namely the Theory of 
Different Kinds of Information (Xu, 2003, 2007) and the Human-first Hypothesis 
(Bonatti et al, 2002), respectively. Leslie and colleagues developed the indexing 
model to account for the way objects come to be represented as belonging to object 
kinds and thus, can be referred to by the cognitive system (Leslie & Kaldy, 2001; 
Leslie et al., 1998). From a neuropsychological perspective Leslie et al. (1998) reckon 
that different pathways (ventral and dorsal) are responsible for the processing of 
information regarding objects (“what system”) or location (“where system”) and thus, 
brain maturation leads to the age difference discovered in several studies. Meltzoff 
and Moore (1992, 1998, 2001) on the other hand proposed the identity theory stating 
that it is representational persistence present at birth coupled with spatiotemporal 
criteria, which enables to keep track of the numerical identity of perceived objects 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1998).  
The adjacent chapters describe these accounts incorporating the 
methodological realization of each approach. In addition, empirical findings will be 
listed to provide a better understanding of the nature and content of the early 
individuation system. This report is accompanied by conceptions on how such 
systems develop. 
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2.1 The Object-first Hypothesis 
 
Theory 
 
The Object-first Hypothesis by Xu and Carey (1996) incorporates the 
philosophical notion of sortal7, a concept which makes principles of individuation and 
identity available and thus, permits the selection of individuals. In addition, the theory 
builds on Bower’s (1974) conjecture that infants use spatiotemporal criteria for 
individuating and tracing identity of objects before they can use other property 
information. Consequently, the presumption of this theory is two-folded: 
Corresponding to the sortal concept, Xu and Carey (1996) proposed that infants hold 
general sortal objects before they have more specific sortals such as basic level 
objects (e.g. ball). Based on their findings, the authors claim that infants younger than 
12 month possess only the most general concept that provides criteria for 
individuation, namely the one of “physical object” as formulated by Spelke (1990)8. 
Such criteria include that one object cannot be at two places at the same time, that two 
objects cannot occupy the same place at once, and that objects travel on 
spatiotemporally connected paths9. The Object-first Hypothesis combines these 
principles into the spatiotemporal criteria for individuation (see chapter 1.1 for 
elaboration). With regard to the usage of different criteria, the studies by Xu and 
Carey (1996) give rise to the assumption that 10-month-old infants can only use 
spatiotemporal cues for object individuation and thus, lack the representation of object 
kinds (see also Xu, 1997, 1999). That is, because in order to hold property/ kind 
criteria, one has to be able to infer that there are two numerical distinct entities upon 
viewing a member of a kind at one time (e.g. a duck) and a member of a different kind 
at a later time (e.g. a truck). The research conducted by the authors implies that only 
by 12 months of age are infants able to do so. 10-month-old infants fail to use 
property/ kind information to establish representations of numerical distinct objects 
                                                
7 As elaborated in the introduction, philosophers of language introduced the term sortal to denote a 
concept that provides criteria of numerical identity. For an object to be a sortal one should be able to 
use the differences between objects to set up representations of numerical distinct individuals (Xu, 
1999, 2003). 
8 Spelke (1988, 1990) describes physical object as a unitary, coherent, bounded, three-dimensional 
entity that moves as a whole. 
9 This means that objects move continuously from point A to point B. People perceive two or more 
objects in an event in which the path an object traveled appears spatiotemporally disrupted. 
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under a variety of conditions (e.g. unfamiliar and familiar objects). Only when given 
spatiotemporal information or verbal cues were infants of this age group able to 
succeed in Xu and Carey’s original experiments. In contrast 12-month-olds master the 
task, which might be due to maturational changes underlying the developmental 
accomplishment. Hence, the Object-first Hypothesis suggests a developmental 
conceptual change between 10 and 12 month of age with regard to the kind of 
information infants rely on when individuating objects.  
Three learning mechanisms were proposed in the original version of the 
Object-first Hypothesis to explain this difference in performance. First, infants learn 
through spatiotemporal criteria how properties fluctuate within individuals and the 
predictions that come along with certain properties (Xu & Carey, 1996). A second 
possibility would be that infants possess the concept of more specific kinds in the 
absence of any examples and it is not until they are able to comprehend words that 
they demonstrate object individuation based on property/ kind information. It might 
be that word comprehension and individuation is correlated. Several recent studies 
speak for this alternative. Naming each object as it emerged from behind a screen 
(e.g. duck or ball) helped infants at 9 month of age to individuate the objects in Xu 
and Carey’s original task (Xu, 2002). This was even the case when two unfamiliar 
objects were labeled with nonsense words. However, 9-month-old infants failed the 
task when the same label was given to both objects. These findings have been 
replicated and extended. For instance, Rivera & Zawaydeh (2006) submitted results 
indicating that 10- and 11-month old infants exhibit looking behavior consistent with 
object individuation when they comprehend the words of both objects in place. 
Hence, it seems like learning count nouns plays a causal role in acquiring basic-level 
sortal objects (Xu, 2007). The third possibility proposed by the authors is that learning 
the function of objects might facilitate the construction of kinds and in return helps 
infants to predict kind distinctions (Xu & Carey, 1996). It is not ruled out that these 
three learning procedures play a combined role in the change of the infant’s 
representational system, which by 12 months of age begins to distinguish kinds from 
properties. 
Taken together, the theory argues for a primacy of spatiotemporal information 
relative to property/ kind information in object individuation. This implies that infants 
younger than 12 months of age rely almost exclusively on spatiotemporal information 
when individuating (Xu, 2003). Because spatiotemporal principles apply regardless of 
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kind membership to all physical objects in the same way this seems plausible. Tracing 
identity under more specific criteria, however, requires kind-relative information 
about types of objects and which of their properties change over time and which stay 
the same (Xu & Carey, 1996). For example, spotting a small cup on the coffee table 
now and a large cup there later implies two numerical distinct cups. However, seeing 
a tall candle on that table at some point and a short one at a later time does not 
necessarily infer two different candles but rather indicates a candle that burned down. 
Thus, certain property changes signal a change in identity only within specific kinds 
of objects (Xu, 1997). The ability to take such information into account emerges at 
around 12 months of age with the development of the kind-based system of 
individuation (Xu, 2003, 2007).  
 
Method: Event-mapping tasks - object disappearance 
 
In order to address the question when the kind-based individuation system 
develops during infancy, the paradigm had to be designed so that spatiotemporal 
information would be ambiguous. Xu and Carey (1996) implemented this by (1) 
presenting only a single screen occluding the objects and (2) showing the objects 
asynchronous during familiarization in the property kind condition. Therefore, in this 
condition Xu and Carey’s (1996) task gave no clear spatiotemporal evidence that 
there are two distinct objects. At no point during the course of the experiment were 
both objects visible together at the same time. Thus, to solve the task, which required 
the construction of a representation of two objects, infants had to rely on knowledge 
about object kinds. They had to know that ducks and balls are two different kinds of 
objects, which typically do not turn into each other behind screens. Such 
understanding would then lead to the conclusion that there must be two distinct 
objects. Xu and Carey (1996) tested this assumption by presenting the following order 
of events: at first infants viewed an empty stage. The experimenter taped on the ends 
of the stage to emphasis its blankness. Then a screen with objects concealed behind it 
was lowered onto the stage floor. Four introductory trials came next. In those infants 
were taught that there are objects located behind the screen, sometimes one and 
sometimes two (e.g. bunny; bunny and basket; toy truck; toy truck and toy camel). 
With a different set of toys (a ball and a bottle or a cup and a book) and a new screen 
infants were familiarized to the following event: One object (e.g. a ball) was moved 
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from behind the left edge of the screen to the left wall of the apparatus and then was 
returned behind the screen. Thereafter a different object (e.g. a bottle) was moved 
from behind the right edge of the screen to the right apparatus wall and then was 
returned behind the screen. This sequence was repeated until the infant had watched 
four emergences of each toy. On the fourth trial each toy was left stationary in view 
for a couple of seconds before returning behind the occluder to show infants that the 
toys could be stationary. Thereafter the screen was turned aside revealing either one 
(e.g. a ball; unexpected outcome) or two distinct objects (e.g. a ball and a duck; 
expected outcome). After the infant looked away for two continuous seconds the 
screen was turned back to its original position and the stage was cleared (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the procedure employed by Xu and Carey (1996).  
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A different screen masking the same two objects was lowered to the stage floor and 
infants were again familiarized to the successive reappearance of the objects. This 
time, however, they just saw two appearances of each toy before the screen was 
removed to the side and the opposite outcome was revealed. The entire sequence was 
repeated with two new objects. 
The rational behind this method is as follows: whereas the looking times to the 
images will be either equally long or signify a preference for the two-object display 
during introduction, a change in preference toward the one-object display is expected 
for the test trials. This is, at first both displays are new and therefore should be 
similarly interesting to the infants. However, because the two-object display contains 
more material to observe, it actually could attract more attention. Either way this 
should change in test. The exposure to two successively appearing objects differing in 
their features and/ or kind in familiarization should build up an expectation that there 
are two distinct objects involved in the event. Due to this infants should show surprise 
indicated by longer looking when the screen is removed to reveal the one-object 
display (unexpected outcome) instead of the two-object display (expected outcome) in 
test compared to baseline. When presented with this task, this was exactly the case for 
12-month-old infants. They had an intrinsic preference for two objects during 
introduction, which resulted in initially longer looking toward the two-object display. 
During test trials they overcame their intrinsic preference for two objects, which led to 
equal looking times for both test displays. Younger infants, however, kept their 
favoritism revealed during introduction in test. Thus, the younger infants did not find 
the one-object test display surprising. It was not until spatiotemporal information was 
provided that younger infants were able to infer the numerical identity of the objects 
involved in the event. Only when infants saw both objects simultaneously on the left and 
right side of the occluder before the start of the movement sequence (spatiotemporal 
condition) did they look longer at the unexpected event, too. Taken together these 
results, the Xu and Carey (1996) concluded that only by 12 months of age did infants 
encode the objects on the basis of property/kind information. In contrast, younger 
infants did not recognize two distinct objects being involved in the occlusion event 
provided this information. They showed the expected pattern solely in the 
spatiotemporal condition, indicating that they could individuate objects based on distinct 
locations but not on the basis of their identifying features. These conclusions led to the 
Object-first Hypothesis (see previous section). 
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Another line of convergent evidence for this developmental change comes 
from work with a manual search procedure (Van de Walle et al., 2000). In these 
studies 10- and 12-month-old infants were trained to reach into an opaque box to 
retrieve objects. Infants were taught that there could be one or two objects hidden10. 
Instead of looking time as dependent measure, patterns of search were examined. The 
question was: how many times would the infant reach into the box to extract objects 
from it?  The authors expected that if infants had established a representation of two 
objects based on kind contrasts, they should search more persistently in the event of 
two objects being hidden (Van de Walle et al., 2000). The findings were completely 
consistent with those of previous looking time studies (Xu & Carey, 1996; Bonatti et 
al., 2000; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a, Experiments 1 & 2). Twelve-month-old, but 
not 10-month-old infants, showed the hypothesized pattern of results (Van de Walle et 
al., 2000; Xu 2003, 2007). Again, only in the case of presenting both objects 
simultaneously during familiarization (spatiotemporal evidence), did 10-month-old 
infants search more for two objects on contingent trials (Van de Walle et al., 2000; 
Xu, 2003, 2007).  
Contrary to the evidence provided by Xu and Carey (1996) as well as Van de 
Walle et al. (2000) are the results obtained by Baillargeon, Needham, and Wilcox. 
They presented findings that challenge the claim that infants less than 12 months of 
age are not capable to use featural information to individuate objects (see for example 
Baillargeon & Wang, 2002; Needham & Baillarageon, 2000; Wilcox, 1999; Wilcox & 
Baillargeon, 1998a, Experiments 3 & 8; Wilcox & Schweinle, 2002). Besides the 
interpretation that younger infants are fundamentally unable to apply featural 
information in the process of individuation, these authors argue that the original task 
has been to demanding at the younger age. An alternative explanation of the failure of 
younger infants to individuate objects obtained in event-mapping tasks could be 
information-processing requirements. In each of Xu and Carey’s (1996) studies, 
infants saw an event in which one or two objects emerged successively to each side of 
a screen, the screen was removed, and then infants viewed a display containing either 
one or two objects. In line with this reasoning, the procedure applied by Xu & Carey 
                                                
10 When one object was concealed the experimenter extracted the object (e.g., a toy telephone) and 
placed it back into the box. In case of two objects the experimenter pulled the first one out (e.g., a toy 
telephone) and put it back. Afterwards he/ she took out the second object (e.g., a toy car) and then 
placed it back into the box. On two-object test trials the experimenter surreptitiously removed the 
second object through an opening in the back box. 
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(1996) is an event-mapping task (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a). It not only requires 
infants to react to a violation of their expectation but also to retrieve a representation 
of the familiarization or habituation event, map it onto the test event, and judge 
whether they match (Wilcox & Chapa, 2002). Thus, Baillargeon, Needham, and 
Wilcox argue that this paradigm entails too high information processing demands for 
young children. Derived from empirical findings these authors come to the conclusion 
that design characteristics play an important role when investigating object 
individuation. When a simplified version of the design assembled by Xu and Carey 
(1996) is used, infants as young as 4.5 month of age, who were only given featural 
information accomplished object individuation (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a). The 
following chapter outlines their approach to the investigation of the development of 
object individuation. 
 
 
2.2 Event Categorization 
 
Theory 
 
Event categorization is a framework on how infants form and use 
representations of physical events. Baillargeon, Wilcox, Needham and their 
colleagues see individuation as one specific problem of infant’s event categorization 
across different physical domains (e.g. Baillargeon & Wang, 2002; Needham & 
Baillargeon, 2000; Wilcox & Schweinle, 2002). Investigators holding this view 
assume that infants assign physical situations to broad categories including occlusion, 
support, arrested-motion, and containment and build up a mental representation of the 
physical event watched with respect to spatial, temporal, and mechanical information 
(Baillargeon, 1998; Leslie, 1994; Xu and Carey, 1996). Thus, not only do infants have 
to categorize the available information into a simple structure that makes up the event. 
In addition, they have to consult already stored information about the specific kind of 
event and confine it from other kinds of events (Arguiar & Baillargeon, 2002; 
Baillargeon & Wang, 2002; Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001; Wilcox & Schweinle, 
2002). According to the model of infants’ acquisition of physical knowledge 
(Baillargeon, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000; see Figure 2), a specialized learning 
mechanism is held accountable for the formation of physical categories, which 
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correspond to distinct ways in which objects behave and interact. When learning 
about a physical category, infants first establish a “preliminary, all-or-none concept” 
that captures only the core of the category (Baillargeon, 1994). Typically this includes 
only basic spatial and temporal information as specified in principles of continuity 
and solidity (Baillargeon, 2004). During the course of development the initial concept 
is progressively elaborated and refined. With further experience, infants identify more 
variables that are relevant to an event category11 and incorporate this additional 
knowledge into their reasoning. As a result infants are able to make increasingly 
accurate predictions and interpretations over time (Baillargeon, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The physical reasoning account. From Baillargeon (2004). 
 
 
For instance with respect to object individuation, Baillargeon and her colleagues 
provide evidence that precursors of this competence are found in infants as young as 
2.5 months. However, even though infants at this age expect that an object continues 
to exist after it becomes hidden (Aguia & Baillargeon, 1999; Spelke et al., 1992; 
Wilcox et al., 1996), their knowledge about occlusion events is still incomplete and it 
takes the identification of relevant variables such as shape or color to improve the 
ability to individuate. Therefore, the acquisition of knowledge about occlusion events 
follows the same developmental trend as observed in other physical categories 
showing that the range of violations, infants solve, increase with age (Baillargeon, 
                                                
11 Learning occurs separately for each event category since these variables are not transferred between 
relevant categories (Baillargeon, 2004). 
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1999). Whereas infants at 3.5 months of age identify height as an occlusion variable it 
is not until 7.5 months of age that infants include transparency in their judgments 
(Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; Luo & Baillargeon, 1994).  
From the event categorization perspective, occlusion events confront infants 
with a special problem. In order to be able to individuate the objects which are part of 
an occlusion event, infants not only must decide whether the entities successively 
seen on either side of an occluder constitute one or two distinct objects, they also have 
to determine if the sequence they view consists of one or more events (Baillargeon, 
2004, Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998). Wilcox and Baillargeon (1998) contended that in 
Xu and Carey (1996), the infants were confronted with a task that involved two 
separate categories of events. Whereas during familiarization they saw an occlusion 
event in which objects moved back and forth behind a screen, they viewed a non-
occlusion event in which objects rested on a platform in test with no screen being 
present. According to the event categorization approach, the presence or absence of 
the screen creates a crucial difference between familiarization and test events and 
produces a change in event category. As a consequence, instead of viewing the 
screen’s removal as a change in an ongoing situation, infants may view it as the start 
of a separate physical situation. Such being the case infants reclassify and initiate a 
new event representation. Further, when presented with two different physical 
situations infants not only have to establish two separate event representations, they 
also must form a link between them (Baillargeon, 2004). This linking or event-
mapping requires several processing steps. In order to follow and make sense of 
categorically distinct situations infants need to remember what occurred in one event, 
map this information onto the ongoing in a second one and compare the two events. 
The more complex an event sequence, the more difficult this process becomes. Xu 
and Carey’s event-mapping task involved featurally distinct objects that follow 
complicated trajectories. Thus, infants had to judge whether the objects’ movements 
and interaction are consistent with their existing knowledge (Wilcox et al., 2003). The 
familiarization event is supposed to build up an expectation that is tested in the events 
during test. This can only be done if the two events are perceived as belonging 
together. Proponents of the event-categorization approach doubt that infants perceive 
a single continuous situation in event-mapping tasks on which the ‘Object-first-
Hypothesis’ is based on. Thus, the failure to respond correctly in an event-mapping 
task at 10 months of age could be attributed to the inability to complete the mapping 
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process during test. That is, infants were not able to judge whether the event seen 
during familiarization mapped onto the one seen during the test phase. So it could be 
that infants successfully individuate objects at this age, but they were simply not able 
to reveal this ability within the context of an event-mapping task. Therefore, event-
mapping is seen as a limitation that results from infants’ bias to form distinct physical 
categories and to reason and learn in terms of these separate categories (Wilcox and 
Baillargeon, 1998). It alters infants’ categorization of the physical situation presented 
to them. What speaks for this hypothesis are results maintained by tasks explained in 
the proceeding paragraphs. 
 
Method: Event-monitoring tasks - object changes 
 
Evidence for this presumption that infants under the age of 12 months are able 
to individuate objects comes from studies concerned with event categorization 
showing that infants group physical events into different categories (Baillargeon, 
1995, 1998; Hespos and Baillargeon, 2001). Based on the assumption that the main 
difficulty with event-mapping is the retrieval of a clear representation of the occlusion 
event, Wilcox and Baillargeon’s (1998b) designed a new procedure, namely event-
monitoring task. In order to aid infants in accessing an event representation they 
showed a continuous occlusion event in which infants see only one event involving 
one or two objects. By doing this, infants do not need to engage in event mapping and 
thus do not have to compare an earlier familiarization or habituation event with a test 
event but focus on the test event itself (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b). Therefore, the 
only task infants have to solve is monitoring whether the event is consistent in itself. 
This makes event-monitoring tasks less cognitive demanding in comparison to event-
mapping tasks, because event-monitoring involves only one processing step whereas 
event-mapping incorporates multiple ones. Empirical findings suggest that it is 
presumably easier for infants to monitor the internal consistency of one event 
compared to the mapping of one event representation to another (Aguiar & 
Baillargeon, 2002; Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001; Leslie et al., 1998; Wilcox, 1999; 
Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b; Wilcox & Schweinle, 2002). In a large number of 
studies that applied an event-monitoring task the ability to use featural information to 
individuate objects was demonstrated with infants aged 4.5 to 11.5 months (e.g. 
Wilcox, 1999; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a, b; Wilcox & Chapa, 2002). Three 
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general approaches can be divided: (1) “the single-trajectory experiments,” (2) “the 
narrow/ wide screen experiments,” and (3) “the opaque/ transparent occluder 
experiments”. 
 
The single-trajectory experiments 
 
In the single-trajectory experiments Wilcox & Baillargeon, (1998b, 
Experiments 8) used a simplified version of the Xu and Carey (1996) task. For one 
thing this was done by making the events shorter. During familiarization the objects 
just moved from left to right without reversing their trajectory (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 
1998b). For another thing this was accomplished by using only one test display that 
contained a single object. Instead of checking looking times to a one-object test 
display against a two-object test display, they compared infants’ reactions to a one-
object test outcome. Therefore, they randomly assigned infants to one of two 
conditions: the box-ball condition or the ball-ball condition. In the box-ball condition, 
infants were familiarized to a sequence of a box moving from one side of the stage 
and disappearing behind a screen, followed by a ball emerging from the other side. In 
the ball-ball condition on the other hand, infants saw a ball going behind an occluder 
and the same ball coming out the other side. The screen was then lowered to reveal a 
single ball on the stage in both conditions. Infants looked longer at the single ball 
outcome in the box-ball condition than in the ball-ball condition. Wilcox and 
Baillargeon (1998b) concluded that the infants must have used perceptual property 
information to establish a representation of two distinct objects. Therefore, the single 
ball outcome was unexpected in the box-ball condition. Thus, the authors were able to 
show that infants at 9.5 months of age individuate objects by means of object 
properties alone when the number of object trajectories involved in the introduction/ 
familiarization sequence was lessened and the experimental procedure was simplified. 
Later work by Wilcox & Schweinle (2002) suggests that the age in which the ability 
to individuate object could be shown reduced to 5.5 and 7.5 months in the case of just 
a single trajectory. Thus, when the task is sufficiently simple, infants younger than 10 
months of age appear to be able to individuate objects on the basis of their perceptual 
features. Wilcox et al. (2003) present evidence that young infants are able to use 
featural information as the basis for object individuation. 
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The opaque/ transparent occluder experiments 
 
Wilcox and Chapa (2002) proposed another way of tailoring the procedure to 
the information processing capacity of younger infants. In their version of the event-
monitoring paradigm they made the task simpler and more traceable by employing a 
transparent occluder in the test events. Thus, 9.5-month-old infants viewed either one 
object (i.e. a ball) or two objects (i.e. a box and a ball) emerge successively to 
opposite sides of an opaque occluder. When the screen was lowered a single ball 
behind a transparent screen was revealed. This was compared to a condition without 
an apparent screen standing behind the occluder. Only the infants who saw the ball in 
the transparent screen condition correctly judged that the one-ball display was 
inconsistent with the box–ball sequence. The authors’ interpretation of the results was 
that infants categorize events involving opaque and transparent occluders as the same 
kind of physical situation (i.e. occlusion). Thus, infants only had to engage in event-
monitoring of a single event, which according to Wilcox and Chapa (2002) enabled 
them to solve the object individuation task. For this reason the findings support the 
notion that infants are more likely to give evidence of object individuation when they 
need to reason about one kind of event (i.e. occlusion) than when they must retrieve 
and compare categorically distinct events (i.e. occlusion and no-occlusion). 
 
The narrow/ wide screen experiments 
 
Besides simplifying the task demands Wilcox and Baillargeon (1998b) 
thought of an additional way to assess infants’ interpretation of occlusion situations 
with an event-monitoring task. They presented 9.5-month-old infants with a sequence 
in which a red ball disappeared behind a screen and after a brief interval a blue box 
emerged at the other side of the occluder. Subsequently, the box reversed its trajectory 
and vanished behind the screen followed by the ball appearing on the other side. This 
event was presented without interruption for the time the infants kept their attention 
on the stage area. In order to keep a continuous event even during test the screen was 
not removed to reveal one or two objects. Instead of lowering the occluder in test 
trials, infants had to judge whether the screen was sufficiently wide to hide the two 
objects simultaneously (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b). Two conditions were checked 
against each other: a narrow-screen condition in which the screen was too small to fit 
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both objects behind side-by-side and a wide-screen condition in which the screen was 
broad enough to fit both objects simultaneously (Xu, 2003). The hypothesis was that 
if infants were led by the perceptual property differences between the ball and the box 
to conclude that there were two distinct objects, they would look longer at the narrow-
screen event because the two objects could not fit behind the small screen at the same 
time. Wilcox and Baillargeon (1998b) obtained this result and concluded that when 
the experimental task was modified in this way, 9.5-month-old infants were able to 
use perceptual property/ featural information for object individuation. This finding 
could be extended to younger infants of 7.5 and 4.5 months (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 
1998a, b). Using the same methodology, Wilcox (1999) investigated the features 
(shape, size, pattern, and color) infants were sensitive to. Infants 4.5 to 11.5 months of 
age were tested on displays in which the objects differed only in one perceptual 
property (e.g., size or color) at a time. Results indicate a developmental trajectory: 
Infants 4.5 months of age looked longer at the narrow-screen event when shape or 
size alone changed, but they did not look longer when surface pattern or color were 
manipulated solely. At 7.5 months, infants used the change in surface pattern to 
reason about the number of objects involved in an occlusion event and it was not until 
11.5 months that infants included the color change in their judgment. Wilcox (1999) 
interpreted these results as evidence that infants at various ages use different types of 
perceptual properties for object individuation.  
 
Three examples of event-monitoring tasks provided evidence that infants, 
much younger than 10 months of age, are capable of individuating occluded objects 
by means of featural information. Thereby these studies show that when infants must 
rely on property information as opposed to spatiotemporal information, event-
mapping tasks in which infants are asked to relate an occlusion event with a no-
occlusion event are more challenging for infants than event-monitoring tasks in which 
they have to reason about only an occlusion situation (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999; 
Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). The more over, these experiments yielded detailed 
information about the timetable and hierarchy for the development of this 
competence. When given an occlusion event in which infants can only draw on 
featural information to individuate the objects in an occlusion situation they succeed 
in case the same objects are involved at some point between the ages of 2.5 to 10 
months (Baillargeon, 2004a; Spelke et al., 1995; Xu & Carey, 1996). In occlusion 
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events in which different objects are involved infants succeed between 10 and 12 
months of age (Xu & Carey, 1996). Despite her original claims, Xu has meanwhile 
acknowledged that younger infants are able to successfully include featural 
information in the process of individuation under certain conditions such as a 
simplified experimental procedure (Xu, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2007). Nonetheless, 
the author maintains the conception that spatiotemporal information is primary 
compared to featural information and that older infants make use of more references 
for individuation. Her advanced account on the development of object individuation is 
delineated next. 
  
 
2.3 Theory of Different Kinds of Information 
 
Theory 
 
In their original study Xu and Carey (1996) distinguished two types of 
information that are available for the individuation process. The two information 
types are spatiotemporal and property/ kind information. Based on their work they 
concluded back then that infants are not able to use property/ kind information until 
the end of the first year of life. In contrast to the ‘Object-first Hypothesis’, Xu 
meanwhile distinguishes featural and kind information, which was claimed 
confounded in the seminal study (Needham & Baillargeon, 2000). More recent work 
concerning the early use of kind information supports the idea that kind 
representations are distinct from featural representations implying that the initial 
success of 12 month olds was due to the kind difference of the objects rather than 
their feature contrast (Xu, Carey, & Quint, 2001). Consequently, Xu and her 
colleagues maintain the view that it is not until the end of the first year of life that 
infants are able to include kind information in their judgments regarding numerical 
identity. However, Xu (2003, 2007) concedes that featural information can be used at 
a younger age and further developed her theory subsequently.  
Based on her ‘Theory of Different Kinds of Information’, Xu (2003, 2007) 
distinguishes between three types of information used for object information: 
spatitemporal, featural/ property, and kind information. Further, the author proposes 
two systems (the object- and the kind-based system) responsible for object 
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individuation in adults. According to Xu (2003), the essence of the object-based 
individuation system is the concept object (i.e. a bounded, three-dimensional entity 
that moves as a whole). Within this system spatiotemporal as well as perceptual 
property (featural) information play a role in setting criteria used for individuation 
(Xu, 2003). Thereby spatiotemporal criteria take primacy because they are rather 
broad and hold for any physical object regardless of its kind or category membership. 
For example, the child who jumped off the diving board a second ago and disappeared 
under water cannot be the same as the one who buys ice cream at the ice cream stand 
next to the pool. One would even come to this conclusion that there are two children 
involved in the absence of featural information (e.g. the children are twins). This 
illustrates that spatiotemporal information is sufficient to make inferences about how 
many objects are in an event. In contrast, perceptual property information comes only 
into play when spatiotemporal information is absent and therefore, it takes a 
secondary role (Xu, 2003). Another characteristic of this system is that spatiotemporal 
information can override featural information (Xu, 2003). Examples for this 
phenomenon in adults are apparent motion and the tunnel effect (cf. Chapter 1, p. 16). 
After Xu (2003, 2007), representations of object kind do not matter in this system. 
Instead they are part of a second system, the kind-based system. The nature of the 
kind-based system is conceptual with object kind concepts such as dog, truck, ball, or 
person at its core (Xu, 2007; Xu and Carey, 1996). These concepts correspond to 
“basic-level categories”. Hence, Xu (2003, 2007) suggests that this system derives 
from learning count nouns that map onto kinds of objects. The author refers to studies 
in which the original event-mapping task was applied and the objects were distinctly 
labeled on each emergence. Only a few repetitions of these labeled events lead 9-
month-old infants to look longer at the unexpected outcome of one object than to the 
expected outcome of two objects. Thus, they showed the same looking pattern as 12-
month-old infants in the original study (Xu, 2002).  When spatiotemporal information 
is missing or misleading this system draws on kind information in order to individuate 
objects (Xu, 2003). This would be the case whenever we decide if objects we saw in a 
particular place before are the same ones we find there later. Although perceptual 
property information is kind relative in this system, i.e. not all perceptual property 
differences are treated equally as in the object-based system. Spatiotemporal 
information can override kind information just as it can override perceptual property 
information. The difference between the object-based individuation system and the 
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kind-based system lies, for Xu (2003), in the way these systems track objects. 
Whereas the object-based individuation system makes use of spatiotemporal 
continuity, the kind-based system uses kind membership as the basis for its decision 
on how many individuals are present in an event (Xu, 2003). Thus, it can happen that 
the two systems settle on different solutions. 
Under the terms of the ‘Theory of Different Kinds of Information’, the object-
based individuation system is present at 4-months of age. At this age it represents the 
sortal object and it employs spatiotemporal information such as spatiotemporal 
discontinuous paths for object individuation (Xu, 2007). Toward the end of the first 
year infants start to represent other sortal concepts in addition to the sortal concept 
object. At 10 months of age infants include the sortal person to determine how many 
objects an event consists of. It is not until 12 months of age that infants conceptualize 
basic-level sortal concepts such as duck and ball that aid them in establishing a 
numerical identity (Xu, 2007). They can only do so, however, if the objects’ 
difference is indicative of a sotal distinction and thus, goes beyond mere property 
variations. For instance, two objects are inferred when one object seen at one time 
(e.g., a green plastic spoon at dinner) falls under one sortal concept and a second 
object seen at another time (e.g., a green toothbrush after dinner) belongs to a 
different sortal concept. The expectation that objects do not change kind membership 
underlies this reasoning. Xu (2007) concludes from that, that sortal distinctions 
underlie the success at 12 months. The adjoining theory gives a different explanation 
for the underlying mechanisms of object individuation. 
 
Method 
 
 Xu’s Theory of Different Kind of Information tries to incorporate several lines 
of empirical work on object individuation and the study of object-based attention. 
Thus, her theory is not based on a specific type of methodology. 
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2.4 The Indexing Model 
 
Theory 
 
The object indexing theory by Leslie and his colleagues is a model of object 
representation, which has its origin in the theoretical approach to object-based visual 
attention in adults (e.g., Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Phylyshyn, 1989). 
Furthermore, it comprises considerations regarding a neurological differentiation of 
the “what-“ (ventral) and the “where-” (dorsal) neural system of visual processing 
(e.g. Haxby et al., 1991; Mishkin et al., 1983, 2000). The key notion of the object-
indexing model implies that the development of the object concept is related to the 
development of mechanisms of object-based attention. It is reckoned that, indexing 
forms the basis for the infant’s object concept through its role in individuation and 
identification of physical objects. Individuation in this context concerns the notion of 
a single versus more than one object and identification establishes if the same or a 
different object is present. Thus, the model draws a conceptual distinction between the 
two mechanisms. 
The central idea is that an index12 points at an object in a specific location 
(Leslie et al., 1998; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). The index then is bound to an object and 
follows it by means of the objects’ location without representing any properties of the 
objects referring to. In other words the object index is an internal representation that 
reveals the existence of an object but does not describe it or the feature it contains. 
Such information must be specifically bound to the index (Leslie et al., 1998). 
However, an object index makes an association of featural information through 
examination of the properties possible. Thus, once an object is afflicted with an index 
other information about this particular object is easily accessible (Scholl & Leslie, 
1999). Nevertheless, indexes are assigned to objects before feature binding occurs. 
According to this apprehension, indexing is the mechanism underlying object 
individuation whereas feature binding facilitates object identification (see Figure 3 for 
illustration).  
 
 
                                                
12 In Leslies’ model of object representation an index signifies a mechanism of selective attention. It 
represents a mental icon, which functions as a pointer to an object (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). 
Object Individuation 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The object indexing system. From Leslie et al. (1998). 
 
 
As aforementioned an object index serves various purposes including 
individuation of items based on spatiotemporal criteria such as motion and spatial 
gaps, continuing identity tracking of objects as they move about in the environment, 
and enumeration of objects (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). Thereby the object indexing 
system is subject to certain regulation. Because object indexing is a mechanism of 
selective attention, it is resource-limited, i.e. only a small number of object indexes 
are available. Leslie and his colleagues assume that there are four object indexes. 
Furthermore, the association of an index with an object takes place based on the 
object’s location. Yet, no relationship between index and the location is formed. The 
association of an index with an object happens by means of basic principles. These 
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include the following characteristics. Each definite object receives only one object 
index. The assignment of multiple indexes to a single object is not feasible due to the 
limiting number of object indexes. In contrast, several objects could be substituted 
under one index in conditions where object arrangements engage in the same motion 
or where multiple spatial arrays cannot be differentiated by additional spatiotemporal 
information. In case all indexes are placed with an object, an index can only be 
assigned to a new object when an already indexed object dismisses its index. Once an 
index is ascribed to an object it stays with that object even when it occluded. In the 
case where one object disappears behind an occluder and another one emerges, both 
could be tracked by the same index, because indexes point to objects regardless of 
object features. Indexes follow objects on the basis of separate motion and spatial 
gaps between objects. Hence, only when several objects are visible simultaneously in 
different locations at some point, separate indexes are automatically assigned to them. 
This makes independent tracking of the objects possible (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). 
Leslie et al. (1998) linked the development from feature-blind to feature-
driven object indexing to the increased integration of the “what” and “where” systems 
of visual processing in the brain. These systems describe neural circuits involved in 
the representation of objects. The “what” system processes the kind of objects present 
regardless of their locations and the “where” system manages the locations of objects 
without referring to the object identities (Sagi & Julesz, 1987; Mishkin et al., 1983, 
2000). Thus, information regarding objects and their features (“what system”) and 
locations (“where system”) seem to be processed by distinct anatomical brain 
pathways (ventral and dorsal). Leslie et al. (1998, p. 11) specify them as follows: 
 
“Featural information is processed mainly in circuits linking primary 
visual cortex, through extrastriate cortex, to the inferior temporal 
cortex, while information about the location of visual objects is 
processed mainly in a stream running from striate to partial cortex.”  
 
Authors in favor with such neuropsychological explanations (e.g. Leslie, 1998; 
Mishkin et al., 1983, 2000) the authors argue that the different results with 10 and 12-
month-olds derive from the development of the connection between the two neural 
systems. In 10-month-old infants the object system and mechanism of object indexing 
are not fully connected yet. Therefore, infants are not able to use property information 
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for object individuation at the younger age. Even though there is still work to be done 
regarding how these neural systems relate to the object-based attentional mechanism, 
the maturation and integration of these circuits may account for the changes in infant 
object cognition (Leslie et al., 1998; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). 
 
Method 
 
Besides reinterpreting results on infants’ initial knowledge in the context of 
object indexing, Leslie and colleagues carried out studies employing an event-
mapping task (Figure 4) to test their theory. The general paradigm proceeded like this: 
Infants were familiarized with an event in which two distinct objects were 
sequentially drawn from behind one side of an occluder. Each object was replaced 
behind the screen before the other one was brought out. Thus, the two objects were 
shown in the same location but never at the same time. In test trials the screen was 
lowered revealing either both objects shown during familiarization (expected 
outcome) or two identical objects from either kind of the familiar objects (unexpected 
outcome). Implementing this procedure Tremoulet, Leslie, and Hall (2000) 
investigated the distinction between object individuation and object identification. 
After consecutive presentation of a circle and a triangle infants were exposed to both 
objects (circle and triangle) side by side or to two objects of the same shape (two 
circles or two triangles). Longer looking to the unexpected outcome indicated that at 
12 months of age infants indexed two distinct objects on the basis of shape during the 
familiarization phase. When color rather than shape was the differentiating feature in 
familiarization trials, same aged infants did not look longer at the unexpected 
outcomes. However, infants did expect one object after repeated exposure to same-
colored objects suggesting that they attended to color and used it for individuation. 
Together, these results provide evidence that 12-month-old infants use shape to 
individuate and to identify objects through occlusion but only use color under certain 
conditions for object individuation (Tremoulet et al., 2000). 
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Figure 4. Infant Object Indexing by Shape: A Circle and a Triangle Are Shown 
Sequentially. From Leslie et al. (1998). 
 
 
Using the same method, Leslie and Chen (2007) recently examined whether 11-
month-old infants are able to individuate pairs of objects by means of object shape. 
Instead of single geometric shapes pairs composed of a circle and a triangle were 
displayed. The experiments provide evidence for individuation of two sequential pairs 
of objects at 11 months of age (Leslie & Chen, 2007). On top of it, the findings speak 
for an early competence of forming object pairs based on featural information as well 
as of representing and tracking sets. Considering the indexing theory, one explanation 
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for such performance is that the property information for two individuals is bound to 
one index. This would yield two indexes tracking four objects, which in turn would 
reduce processing demands and make the representation of two pairs possible. 
The following stance on object individuation is as complex as the object 
indexing theory. However the model differs from all other approaches concerned with 
individuation processes in respect to the impact, which it awards the meaning of 
object permanence.  
 
 
2.5 The Identity Theory 
 
Theory 
 
While the major concern of the identity theory is the development of object 
permanence it also makes predictions about the numerical identity of objects. In this 
theoretical approach Meltzoff and Moore (1992, 1998, 2001; Moore & Meltzoff, 
1999, 2008) take a different stand on the development of object representation. 
According to their model of the early representational system for maintaining object 
identity, infants’ competence to represent hidden objects originates from the ability to 
signify an object’s identity (Moore & Meltzoff, 1999). In order to develop the notion 
that objects continue to exist during an occlusion interval, infants first have to 
interpret the object involved in an occlusion event as a single entity (Moore & 
Meltzoff, 2004). That is, only when infants are able to re-identify an object, which 
disappeared and reappeared, as the same are they able to derive object permanence. 
Once the concept of permanence is developed it is then used to interpret events visible 
and occluded (Moore & Metlzoff, 2008). Thus, under the terms of the identity theory, 
object identity precedes object permanence. This implies that object permanence is 
not innate but rather develops during infancy out of a prior understanding of object 
identity (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998). Instead of possessing object permanence infants 
start out with what the authors call ‘representational persistence’. That is, 
representations of objects persist and are accessible even when the object is absent 
from the perceptual field. In contrast to object permanence, which concerns the 
continued existence of a physical object in the external world, representational 
persistence implies that such understanding is nonessential for representations to exist 
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in mind (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998). In other words, infants are able to possess a 
permanent inner image of an object without the assumption that this object persists in 
the environment (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998). Thus, with regard to occlusion events, 
infants do not necessarily expect the objects they observed disappearing behind an 
occluder to exist at any position thereafter.  
Representational persistence derives from an evolutionary preparedness to 
represent and interact with objects (steady-state representations). Infants are apt to 
perceive middle-sized objects that comply with the inertia principle (i.e. stationary 
objects remain on their position and objects in motion pursue the initiated track). This 
capacity allows setting up representations of objects and events from perception alone 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1998). In addition, representational persistence facilitates the 
determination of how many objects are encountered and if the same or different 
objects are involved. Hence, once object representations are established the question 
of identity arises. Meltzoff and Moore (1998, 2001) proceed on the assumption that 
the primary criteria for identity (also for numerical identity) are spatiotemporal ones. 
Specifically, such determinants include location for stationary objects and trajectory 
for moving entities. In their view infants interpret occlusion events based on an 
object’s trajectory. The authors propose that infants are able to infer the initiated path 
of an object. In relation to occlusion events this again implies that infants anticipate 
where and when the object will appear on the other side of the screen. The entity that 
dissolves behind the occluder on one side and emerges on the other side is perceived 
as one if the visible trajectory is the same (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998).  
Even though Meltzoff and Moore (1998, 2001) represent the view that 
numerical identity is determined by spatiotemporal information, the authors still do 
not think that features are completely irrelevant in this process. Around 5 months of 
age infants make additional use of qualitative criteria in form of functional and 
featural object properties. At this point the goal is to combine these different parts of 
information about a perceived object to set up a representation of its identity. The 
following general model on object identity can be taken from this (Figure 5). Every 
time infants encounter an object in the visual field and have to make a decision on its 
identity they compare the discovered entity to already existing stead-state 
representations. If a match exists between a steady-state representation and the 
detected object, the object is considered identical to the represented one. A new 
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representation is established in case of a mismatch (see Meltzoff & Moore, 1998 or 
2001 for a detailed description). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Model on how infants determine numerical according to the Identity Theory 
by Meltzoff & Moore (1998). The bold boxes indicate the five major components. 
 
 
Method 
 
The identity theory draws on conclusions from studies dealing with deferred 
imitation and manual search (e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 1992; Moore & Meltzoff, 2008). 
The task in the manual search paradigm was to remove a screen in order to retrieve an 
object after watching the occluder move in front of the object in question. Two 
conditions were compared, one in which the object was partially visible and another 
where the object was completely hidden. The results showed that infants by the end of 
8 months age indeed uncovered the object when partly occluded by removing the 
screen. However, same aged infants did not search for the object when it was 
completely occluded. This effect remained even in case another perceptual (auditory) 
cue to the object’s hiding location was given (Moore & Meltzoff, 2008). Only at 10 
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months of age were infants able to make use of this hint. The authors concluded that 
partial occlusions help infants in learning about total occlusions and in establishing an 
identity of an object. Unless this can be done reappearing objects will be understood 
as new and different. Partial occlusion teaches infants through the spatial identity 
criterion (i.e. the location of disappearance and reappearance is the same continuously 
existing place) that the object continues to exit in a particular hidden location 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1998). Thus, infants experience that the object continues to reside 
at that invisible place in the disappearance event. 
Studies that look at deferred imitation are usually concerned with memory 
capacities of infants. Meltzoff and Moore (1992), however claim that deferred 
imitation13 is not only a measure to test memory abilities but it also indicates whether 
they possess rules of object identity When used as a dependent variable, this kind of 
imitation behavior was taken as evidence that infants are able to represent actions that 
are no longer visible as well as people when they become unseen (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1992). The authors concluded that identity plays a fundamental role in young infants’ 
understanding about people and their actions. They further suggested that imitation 
subserves the identification of people by verifying their identity. Hence, imitation 
bears upon the object concept in a broader sense (Meltzoff & Moore, 1992). 
Another theoretical formulation related to the importance of the people 
concept is the Human-first Hypothesis by Bonatti et al. (2002), which the following 
paragraph encapsulates. 
  
 
2.6 The Human-first Hypothesis 
 
Theory 
 
Even though Bonatti et al.’s (2002) theoretical approach describes no 
comprehensive theory of the development of individuation, it still yields an 
explanatory framework for their results, which are hard to integrate in one of the 
existing models. Only Xu’s theory on different kind of information meets this 
requirement. Bonatti et al.’s (2002) proposal of the Human-first Hypothesis is based 
                                                
13  This describes infants’ ability to re-enact a behavior previously observed without prior engagement 
in the behavior and without the presence of the initial model. 
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on the assumption that objects belonging to ones own species are of particular 
importance. Hence, the authors argue that 10-month-old infants are able to use 
property information for object individuation when it involves typical characteristics 
for members of their own species. Category specific attributes are thought to enable 
the discrimination of various kinds. The reason for this is seen in the fundamental 
importance of identifying and telling member of ones species from other kinds of 
objects in the environment apart. In order to do so, Bonatti et al. (2002) speculate that 
humans are endowed with mechanisms for detecting human properties such as face 
and body schema (property method). To promote this presumption, Bonatti et al. 
(2002) draw on evidence from brain research showing that dedicated cerebral tissue 
handles these properties and that members of our own species, animals, and other 
objects are processed in different brain areas (e.g., Bertenthal et al., 1987; Kanwisher 
et al., 1999; Martin et al., 1996). In addition, work on infants’ ability to discriminate 
properties suggests that complex features are singled out from early on (Bertenthal et 
al., 1985; Morton & Johnson, 1991; Meltzoff & Kuhl, 1994). Thereby, infants go 
beyond pure discrimination. They also apply different principles to various kinds of 
objects and such being the case, their expectations of the kinds of objects surrounding 
them differ (Bonatti et al., 2002). As a result, the Human-first Hypothesis claims that 
these cognitive mechanisms make individuation of humanlike objects in young infants 
possible. Due to an early representation of humans, animals, and inanimate objects, 
infants can use the properties of conspecifics to keep them separate from other objects 
(Bonatti et al., 2002). Whereas Xu and Carey (1996) claimed that infants younger 
than 12 months of age possess only the general sortal “physical object”, Bonatti et al. 
(2002) in contrast suggest that at least 10-month-old infants have a more extensive 
knowledge of sortals. 
 
Method 
  
Bonatti et al. (2002) tested this prediction in a series of studies implementing 
Xu and Carey’s (1996) event-mapping task with 10- and 12-month-old infants (cf., 
Chapter 2.1). In contrast, however, Bonatti et al’s (2002) stimuli consisted of dolls 
with realistic human faces and objects deprived of humanlike features (Bonatti et al., 
2002). During familiarization a doll head and an inanimate object emerged from and 
vanished behind an occluder interchangeably. Infants looked longer at the one-object 
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display compared to the two-object display when the occluder was removed. The 
results indicated successful object individuation by 10 months of age. Thus, infants 
younger than 12 months were capable individuating diverse object kinds by means of 
their properties as long as they specified characteristics of conspecifics. When 
exchanged with geometric shapes infants failed to apply the property method. In 
addition the humanlike objects had to be contrasted with other non-human ones 
(animal or inanimate objects) in order for infants to of establish a mental model of 
two objects and display the effect in test. Under circumstances where all of the objects 
had humanlike features 10-month-olds were unsuccessful. Taken together, the 
findings speak for the Human-first Hypothesis providing evidence that infants are 
sufficient in making use of properties common to humans for object individuation. 
Theoretically, Bonatti et al., (2002) took these results as evidence for the concept 
human being to be the underlying sortal rather than physical object, because 10-
month-old infants seem to have more knowledge than the Object-first Hypothesis 
suggested. Consequently, the Human-first Hypothesis speaks against the claim of the 
Object-first Hypothesis that infants under the first year are unable to identify object 
on the basis of non-spatiotemporal properties. For this reason the Human-first 
Hypothesis lines up with the event categorization approach in granting infants more 
proficiencies. 
 The Human-first Hypothesis ends the chapter on theoretical and 
methodological approaches concerned with the development of object individuation. 
Within this area of investigation researchers came to partly conflicting results and 
ideas explaining how this development occurs and what object properties infants 
include in their judgment. How can these be theoretically reconciled? 
 
 
2.7 Resolution of Disputes 
 
This section attempts to specify overlaps und contrasts of the particular 
theories presented in the last chapter with the purpose to find a common ground for 
the present work. 
Xu and Carey (1996) explored when and on what basis infants comprehend 
the existence as well as the number of objects behind a screen introducing infants to 
an event-mapping task. In a typical experiment, infants were habituated to sequences 
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in which two objects, differing in their perceptual properties and in their categorical 
kind, were taken from and then replaced behind an occluder one at a time. Following 
these events, the occluding screen was removed to reveal either one object 
(unexpected outcome) or both objects (expected outcome). Under conditions of event-
mapping (see p. 25) only 12-month-old infants showed surprise when one object was 
visible in the outcome display. The authors concluded that the failure to individuate 
objects on the basis of property/ kind information at a younger age results from an 
inability to represent and use this information and formulated the Object-first 
Hypothesis.  
Although the negative finding, Xu and Carey obtained with 10-month-old 
infants, has been confirmed in additional experiments (e.g. Van de Walle et al., 2000; 
Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998; Wilcox & Chapa, 2002, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2003), their 
interpretation of this finding has been questioned. Researchers who applied simpler 
event-monitoring tasks to investigate the use of featural information in individuation 
cast doubts upon the conclusion that infants under the age of 12 months incorrectly 
interpret the different-object occlusion events (Kaldy & Leslie, 2003; Needham & 
Baillargeon, 2000; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998 a, b). Following these authors, the 
occlusion task carried out by Xu and Carey (1996) was too demanding to test this 
ability at the younger age, because infants had to compare the representation of an 
event that contained an occluder with the representation of an event in which the 
occluder was missing. Thus, Wilcox and Baillargeon (1998b) as well as their 
colleagues made task difficulties responsible for the failure of the 10-month-old 
infants. In their view, instead of a conceptual deficit at that age, event-mapping 
hinders younger infants to succeed. That is because it involves the representation of 
the familiarization trials as an event and the evaluation of its progress in test trials 
(Wilcox & Chapa, 2002). In studies in which infants were required to monitor one 
single continuous event only they showed the ability to individuate before they 
completed the first year of life.  Recent evidence from studies by Kaldy and Leslie 
(2003) supports this objection. They provided evidence that 9-month-olds exert 
feature information (i.e. shape) to individuate and identify objects. The more over, 
infants as young as 3 months utilize size to detect discrepancies between a hidden 
object and its occluding screen (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002; Baillargeon & 
Brueckner, 2000). Shape is in addition to size used at 4.5 months of age (Spelke et al., 
1992; Wilcox, 1999), texture by 7.5 months, and color by 11.5 months (Wilcox, 
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1999). Thus, when the amount of information the infants need to include in their 
representation of the occlusion situation is reduced infants make correct inferences 
about various object features that are partially or completely hidden behind an 
occluding screen (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b). Therefore, event-monitoring tasks 
appear to be especially suitable for younger infants. The underlying account of this 
research is that infants group physical events into categories such as occlusion, 
containment, and support and then access their knowledge of the category selected 
(Baillageon, 1995, 2000). This knowledge specifies the variables identified as 
relevant to that category and determines which are included in the event 
representation. By evaluating these variable (e.g. size, object shape, pattern, or color) 
infants are able to detect violations of their expectations. Hence, the construction of 
event categories leads to the perception of the event as a whole without necessarily 
attending to the particular objects that are part of it (Baillargeon, 2004a; Baillargeon 
& Wang, 2002; Mandler, 2000).  
One problem with some event-monitoring tasks, however, is the presence of 
unintended spatiotemporal information in the paradigm, which nevertheless refers to 
the number of objects. For instance, when infants look longer in the narrow-wide 
screen experiments realizing that the combined width of the objects exceeds the size 
of the narrow occluder, the surprise might be based on the spatiotemporal premise that 
two distinct solid objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. This 
interpretation would speak for the use of spatiotemporal knowledge instead of featural 
information. Xu et al. (2001) provided additional alternative explanations for the 
results obtained with the event-monitoring paradigm. For instance, they explained the 
findings of Wilcox and Baillargeon’s (1998b) narrow/ wide screen experiments with 
the tunnel effect (Burke, 1952; see p. 16 for explanation). Based on this phenomenon, 
infants might have interpreted the ongoing in the narrow-screen event as a box turning 
into a ball behind the screen. The reason for this was that the narrow screen provided 
unambiguous and strong spatiotemporal evidence for a single object (Xu, 2003). In 
contrast, infant’s percept was not influenced by spatiotemporal information in the 
wide-screen condition. On this alternative account, 4.5-month-old infants looked 
longer at the narrow-screen event because they found it interesting or anomalous that 
the object with box properties turned into an object with ball attributes during 
occlusion. This interpretation is supported by data from adults who were asked how 
they apprehended the displays used in Wilcox and Baillargeon’s (1998b) experiment 
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(Xu et al., 2001). The results indicate that in the narrow-screen event adults either did 
not notice anything impossible or they described the event as an object changing it 
properties as predicted by the literature on the tunnel effect (Xu et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, even though Wilcox’s (1999) work showed that infants starting at age 
4.5 months detect property changes in size shape, surface pattern, and color, “the 
longer looking in these experiments reflected which property changes were salient 
and interesting to the infants, but it did not bear on the question whether infants 
established a representation of two distinct objects behind the occluder using 
perceptual property differences (Xu, 2003, p. 178).” According to Xu (2003), this 
issue can only be addressed with an experimental method, which presents one- and 
two-object test displays directly to infants.  
Although the tunnel effect can elucidate the narrow/wide screen experiments, 
it does not account for the single-trajectory experiments (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 
1998b, Experiments 8). These studies provide evidence that infants could show their 
ability to use perceptual property or kind information for object individuation at an 
earlier age, when information-processing demands are reduced by using simple 
geometric forms as opposed to more complex multi-parted functional objects and by 
applying a less complicated experimental procedure with no reversal of the objects 
along their path of motion (Xu, 2003). What leads to this earlier success in Wilcox 
and Baillargeon’s (1998b) studies? In her analysis of the factors that influenced the 
performance of infants, Xu (2003) argues that the difference in methodology might 
not be as critical as proposed by Baillargeon and her colleagues. After all, manual 
search tasks such as the one employed by Van de Walle et al. (2000) found the same 
developmental shift as Xu and Carey (1996) who used a violation-of-expectation 
looking time measure. Further, the complexity of the objects is unlikely to be 
responsible for it, because even when the procedure of Xu and Carey (1996) was 
implemented with simple objects (e.g., box and cylinder), Bonatti et al. (2002) 
replicated the failure at 10 months. A long these lines, Bonatti et al. (2002) objected 
that high task demands alone account for the failure at 10 months of age. In their 
studies infants succeeded in an event-mapping task with complex stimuli whereas 
they failed when provided with simple geometric forms that are less complex. 
Therefore, they came to the conclusion that certain objects are special in an infant’s 
world and hence their properties are available early on for object individuation 
(Bonatti et al., 2002). At the same time could this familiarity be the reason why this 
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might not be a complex task for younger infants and thus solved earlier. This 
however, remains an open question for further research. 
Taken together, Xu (2003) arrived at the conclusion that the inconsistency of 
the results originated from the complexity of the procedure introduced. Confirming 
evidence for this resume comes from Xu and Baker’s (2005) work in which the 
authors tested whether 10-month-old infants searched more persistently in a manual-
search task after retrieving an object that was different from the original object 
(switch trials) than after retrieving the original object (no-switch trials). As predicted, 
infants used the differences between a toy car and a toy duck to conclude that two 
distinct objects were inside the box. As a result they searched more persistently on the 
switch trials compared to the no-switch trials. From these results it could be 
concluded that the complexity of the procedure was likely to be responsible for the 
success or failure at different age groups in various studies. Indeed, infants succeed in 
event-mapping tasks at a younger age when the events are pared down so that the 
object on each side of the screen present a single, left-right trajectory. Infants’ 
performance is deteriorated if one or both of the objects undergo one or more 
reversals (Wilcox & Baillaregon, 1998b). Hence, even younger infants can show their 
ability to use featural information under conditions where complexity is reduced. 
Instead, when information-processing demands are high, infants draw upon kind 
representations. The connection between higher information-processing demands and 
kind representations can thus be summarized as follows: 
 
“In this view, the relatively late success in Xu and Carey (1996) and 
Van de Walle et al. (2000) may reflect the emergence of kind 
representations whereas the basis of the relatively early success in 
Wilcox and Baillargeon (1998b) may reflect the use of perceptual 
property representations (Xu, 2003, p. 179).” 
 
Xu (2007) represents this point of view also in her further developed Theory of 
Different Kind of Information. According to this approach, the relative strength of the 
various sources of information, which are available for object individuation, can 
account for the observed differences in infants’ performance (Xu, 2007). Thus, the 
simplified tasks, in which property information may be the only source of evidence 
available, might tap on an early sensitivity to use featural information, hence, 
Object Individuation 54 
producing evidence for the usage of property information. On the other hand, even 
though the more complex tasks are designed in a way to exclude spatiotemporal 
information, it might be that younger infants posit one object with changing 
properties. In this case spatiotemporal information might override property 
information just like in the perceptual phenomena of apparent motion or the tunnel 
effect. Hence, it is not until 12 months of age when infants over come the strong 
spatiotemporal evidence for one object and represent two objects with the aid of the 
developing sortal concepts (Xu, 2007).     
Similarly to Xu’s theory of different kinds of information as well as the 
Object-first Hypothesis, the object indexing theory proceeds on the assumption that 
infants at first dispose of more general knowledge and conceptions about objects in 
their environment. It is not until later that infants develop more complex and detailed 
object concepts, which include information about properties and kind. In contrast to 
these theories, Leslie and colleagues hold other mechanisms accountable for this 
development. The key construct of the object indexing theory is, as its name implies, 
the object index – a mental finger that points at an object in the world and allows 
rapid access to the object and its descriptive information. Hence, an index forms the 
core of the object representation that an infant constructs in working memory while 
attending to a physical object. This allows tracking it as it moves even if occluded in 
the course of it (Leslie et al., 1998; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). Applied to Xu and Carey’s 
(1996) results, the development of feature binding is exemplified. In terms of the 
object-indexing framework, infants’ performance at 10 months of age reflects 
‘feature-blind object indexing’ (Scholl & Leslie, 1999, p. 56). This entails that 10-
month-old infants infer the existence of two objects only on the basis of 
spatiotemporal information. The simultaneous observation of both objects in two 
separate locations at the beginning of the familiarization phase leads to the assignment 
of two object indexes (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). Because these indexes stick to the 
objects in and out of sight infants track the objects individually and expect two. 
Therefore, infants showed increased attention to the one-object outcome in this 
condition. Ten-month-old infants failed to individuate, however, when both objects 
were not simultaneously visible in different locations. This means that despite distinct 
property/ kind condition the object system did not track the existence of the second 
object (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). The reason for this is that only a single index was 
assigned to the objects. As the first object emerged from behind the occluder an index 
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is designated to it. The index then tracks the object and continues to point to it when it 
returns behind the screen. When the second object appears thereafter the ‘feature-
blind system’ treats it as the originally indexed object (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). Hence, 
no additional new index is established for the second object but rather the old index is 
reassigned. Therefore both objects are tracked by the same index suggesting one 
object. Thus, even under circumstances in which the second object differs in its 
features and is of a discriminative kind the indexing system cannot track it without 
contradicting spatiotemporal information. It is not until the feature-driven indexing 
develops around 12 months of age that featural variations drive index assignment in 
situations where spatiotemporal information is ambiguous or absent. In such events 
the presence of property information is registered and stored on a feature map. Novel 
features on the feature map indicate a distinct object. Due to this developmental 
change 12-month-old infants conclude “objecthood” from both sorts of information 
(Scholl & Leslie, 1999). This explains why infants succeed in the spatiotemporal 
condition but fail in the property/ kind one in Xu and Carey’s (1996) experiments. 
However, Xu (2007) points out that the task in object identification studies is to bind 
object features to locations. Therefore, the number of objects is kept constant. This 
implicates that infants are not directly asked whether they expect one or two object in 
an event. In addition, this account cannot elucidate the results by Bonatti et al. (2002) 
in that 10-month-old infants seem to attribute two indexes when humanlike and non-
humanlike are contrasted even in the absence of spatiotemporal cues. In order to 
explain the results the indexing theory would have to make special provisions for 
systems that treat members of the same species as special objects (Bonatti et al., 
2002). Nevertheless, the object-indexing framework contributes an important 
conceptual distinction between object individuation and object identification in 
addition to offering an interesting approach for explaining the development of object 
individuation and its underlying mechanisms.  
The identity theory adopts the primacy of spatiotemporal information in 
accord with the object indexing theory, the Object-first Hypothesis, and the theory of 
different kind of information. However, concerning individuation on the basis of the 
difference in properties Meltzoff and Moore (1992, 1998, 2001) take the same view as 
Baillargeon and Wilcox (1998b). They state that featural information plays an 
important role for object individuation even during the first half of the first year of 
life. The more over similarly to the Human-first Hypothesis the identity theory 
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integrates a special treatment of humanlike objects through the inclusion of human 
beings as objects in their theoretical reflections. In addition, the theory incorporates 
well the distinction between object identification and object individuation as proposed 
by Leslie et al. (1998). Besides these numerous overlaps Meltzoff and Moore’s (1992, 
1998, 2001) model differs entirely from all the others in the meaning they ascribed to 
object permanence. They proposed that infants are evolutionarily prepared to 
represent objects without the understanding of object permanence. Object identity is a 
prerequisite for object permanence in their view. According to this are infants able to 
represent objects in their mind but at the same time they have no knowledge about the 
objects’ existence in the world (Meltzoff and Moore, 1992, 1998, 2001). Even though 
Meltzoff and Moore’s discussions are well argued and their theory is able to and 
reinterpret empirical findings such as the draw bridge results by Baillargeon (1987) 
many results cannot be accounted for without the ability to perceive objects as 
permanent (e.g., Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; Arguiar & Baillargeon, 2002). Thus, it 
seems difficult to acknowledge the theory as a broad and general account (Krojgaard, 
2002). 
 
 
2.8 Summary 
 
The previous chapter brings home the message that despite a vast number of 
studies, research has not yet definitive clarified to what extent the infantile object 
concept embeds knowledge about possible and impossible object transformations. 
Even though today most researchers agree that spatiotemporal information has an 
early and superior relevance in the setup of distinct object representations, 
disagreement prevails concerning the application of featural or kind information, 
respectively.  
Only Xu’s Theory of Different Kinds of Information is able to combine the 
different lines of empirical work concentrating on the development of object 
individuation. Xu (2007) distinguishes between various kinds of sortals such as 
physical object, person, and basic-level objects, which infants represent at different 
times during the first year of life. This growing understanding correlates with infants’ 
performance in object individuation tasks. In connection with this, their proficiency 
depends on information processing demands and on what information a paradigm 
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presents. Based on a large number of studies, it seems undoubtedly that younger 
infants are well capable of making use of featural information to interpret occlusion 
events with different objects involved. Infants’ ability to use this type of reference can 
just be observed, though, under conditions where they cannot rely on spatiotemporal 
information (i.e., there is only one trajectory reversal) and property information is the 
only evident source of information available (Xu, 2007). However, the environment in 
which we grow up offers a rich array of information providing infants with the most 
complex task. Under such conditions it is not until 12-month of age that infants make 
use of adult-like representations resulting in adult-like reactions (Xu, 2007). Thus, 
when interested in infants’ apprehension of the number of objects in an event Xu and 
Carey’s (1996) original paradigm seems to be the most direct one to investigate this 
matter. 
 Even so, up to now only static object features have been considered within the 
scope of this object individuation task. This is striking since events are dynamic in 
principle, which means that the activities constituting an event are carried out in a 
particular order governed by causal and conventional relations. Further, research on 
motion perception, biological motion, categorization, and agency suggests that motion 
information plays a crucial role in early cognitive development. According to work in 
these areas, motion gives rise to an understanding of goals, intentions, and 
psychological causes – competencies which infants show during the first year of life. 
Still the influence of dynamic characteristics has not been taken into account in the 
field of object individuation. However, conceptual event knowledge should include 
the comprehension of dynamic aspects the kinds of objects engage in and the kinds of 
actions that bind events together. One form of early knowledge that is used as 
particular source of dynamic information is the manner in which objects engage in 
self-motion (Mandler, 2004). Although there exists a remarkable amount of research 
on infants’ inferences about self-propelled motion, contingent motion, and agent-
patient roles, this research has typically been carried out outside the context of objects 
associated with these activities (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 1994; Rochat et al., 1997; 
Schlottmann & Surian, 1999). The next chapter illustrates the role motion plays in the 
formation of concepts about object kind and how children come to understand the 
distinction between animate being and inanimate object. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MOTION INFORMATION AS KIND INFORMATION 
 
 
Human infants have been found to be sensitive to motion. Numerous studies 
on infant motion perception has shown that infants detect motion information readily 
even when their visual activity for static displays is still rather low. Infants not only 
attend to motion but also use corresponding information to make inferences about the 
surrounding world (Banks & Salapatek, 1981; Gibson, 1987; Gibson & Gibson, 
1991). They both use and depend on motion information provided to specify the 
nature and properties of objects (Haith & Campos, 1977; Freedland & Dannemiller, 
1987).  
The following chapter will elucidate that motion information not only is a 
highly salient and crucial factor when perceiving objects but also has an essential 
impact on the establishment of object concepts. After a brief outline of the influence 
motion information has on object perception in general, the second part of the chapter 
will describe the impact of motion as domain-specific knowledge on the formation of 
object concepts. 
 
 
3.1 Motion Perception in Early Childhood 
 
Information concerning movement takes up a central role in object perception 
during infancy (Bertenthal, 1993; Burnham, 1987; Kellman, 1984; Slater, 1989). 
Since motion information is only evident when something moves, it relies on objects 
for its perceptual manifestation (Burnham, 1987). Moving objects or moving object 
parts are highly captive and attract infants’ attention from early on (Gibson, 1969). 
For instance, newborn infants are already able to discriminate between static and 
dynamic displays. They clearly prefer to fixate moving stimuli over stationary ones 
(Burnham, 1987; Slater, 1989). Between 7 and 21 weeks of age infants will pick out a 
moving object among stationary entities and look significantly longer at it 
(Dannemiller, 2000). From birth on, infants have the ability to perceive various types 
of movement such as lateral, approaching, and receding motion (Burnham, 1987). By 
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8 weeks of age infants differentiate rotating objects (Burnham & Day, 1979) and track 
faster moving objects better than objects in slow motion (Burnham & Dickinson, 
1981). Infants as young as 4 months of age distinguish biological from mechanical 
motion (Bertenthal, Profitt, & Cutting, 1984) and 5-month-olds discriminate between 
rigid and non-rigid motion transformations (Gibson et al., 1978). Due to the presence 
of these very early abilities it seems like there are innate structures for the registration 
of movement. Nevertheless, infants’ processing abilities have first been described as 
limited, and movement information has been made accountable for suppressing object 
perception in young infants (Bower, 1971). Meanwhile this claim has been rejected 
due to studies that provided evidence that motion information facilitates not only the 
detection of objects over a distance but also the perception of object features. 
Burnham and Day (1979) showed that infants younger than 20 weeks are able to 
perceive the color and shape of objects rotating in various ways. Hartlep (1979) found 
that 11-week-old infants looked longer at a rotating cube than at a rotating sphere. 
Thus, provided that the movement is neither too complicated nor too fast, it facilitates 
the perception of the structure of certain types of objects (Burnham, 1987; Owsley, 
1984; Ruff, 1982). Supporting this claim, Kellman and Spelke (1983) as well as 
Kellman, Spelke, and Short (1986) reported that 4-month-old infants perceived a 
partly occluded object only as whole when its ends moved in a common translation 
behind the occluder14. Infants did not conclude that there was one object involved 
when its perceptible parts were stationary. Neither did infants make the inference of 
one object upon color or forms of surfaces (Kellman & Spelke, 1983). This suggests 
that infants interpret object unity when two surfaces undergo a common rigid motion. 
Kellman (1993) takes these results as evidence for the assumption that motion 
information is fundamental for the development of perception. According to his view, 
abilities that are based on information given by spatiotemporal changes (kinematic 
information) form the foundation for an important contact with the environment in the 
first months of life (see also Arterberry, Craton, & Yonas, 1993 as well as Burnham, 
1987). Thus, movement is a dominating stimulus that takes a priority role in 
                                                
14 The general method in these experiments was to habituate infants to an occlusion display in which 
the center of an object was hidden behind a nearer object. In one condition the two visible parts of the 
object underwent common motion. Infants’ perception of object unity was then tested by presenting a 
display with two separate pieces (broken rod) and one with a single, connected object (complete rod) 
shown on alternating trials (Kellman & Spelke, 1983). This general method was additionally used to 
test a variety of relationships between the two unblanked portions such as alignment of edges or 
similarity of color and lightness. 
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processing. Additionally, motion information is relevant for the early perception of 
particular characteristics of objects such as object unity and kind. Research on 
biological motion15 has illustrated that motion is not only an object feature it self, but 
also matters for the definition of identity (e.g., Bertenthal et al., 1984; Butterworth, 
1989; Johansson, 1973). In studies investigating an understanding of biological 
motion infants are presented with displays containing point light figures, which are 
created by placing small lights or reflective patches on characterizing locations of an 
object (e.g., head, shoulders, elbows, wrists, hip, and knees on a person) covered in 
black and moving in the dark (Maas, Johansson, & Jansson, 1971). Point light 
displays present motion patterns without providing the surface information. Hence, 
recognition of the figures is only possible if the perceiver is sensitive to the motion 
patterns viewed and is able to link then to a representation of the underlying form 
(Moore et al., 2007). Developmental research shows that 4- to 6-month-old infants are 
sensitive to biomechanical motion specified by point light displays (Butterworth, 
1989). They discriminate a point light walker from an upside-down one as well as 
random movement with the same number of dots (Bertenthal et al., 1985). Temporally 
or spatially scrambled lights lead to a complete loss of the perceptual effect. This 
suggests that the motion information is only carried in the dynamic transitions of 
coherent moving presentations. Stationary point light displays are rarely recognized 
and therefore, do not transport the essential information (Bertenthal et al., 1987). 
Biological motion contains common properties expressed by spatiotemporal patterns. 
Early perception captures these transitions and assembles a unified manifestation of a 
matter in motion (Butterworth, 1989) to the extent that 6-month-old infants are able to 
categorized dynamic point-light displays showing only motions of animals and 
vehicles (Arterberry & Bornstein, 2002, see Chapter 3.3 for further specification). 
As a result for the work at hand, it remains to be said that motion is an 
extremely salient source of information for object perception during infancy. On top 
of this, movement seems to be of great importance for early concept formation. The 
early sensitivity to biological motion sets an example for the influence of motion 
information on later conceptual development, for example in the way in which 
children conceive what is alive. Even children at 3–5 years of age make false 
attributions as to living and non-living things based on movement (e.g., clouds). 
                                                
15 Biological motion incorporates mechanically complex, animate movements as found in humans and 
animals (Butterworth, 1989). It expresses movement with ecological significance. 
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Research provides evidence that specific patterns and aspects of motion might play a 
role in the formation of object representations (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). 
Thus, over the course of development infants attend selectively to the types of 
movement important for object identification and motion that is not. This distinction 
will be amplified in the next section. 
 
 
3.2 Contribution of Motion to the Animate – Inanimate Distinction 
 
Besides its impact on general object perception some aspects of motion appear 
to play an important role in characterizing animate and inanimate entities (e.g., 
Gelman & Spelke, 1981, Mandler, 1992; Pauen, 1999). Even though both types of 
object kinds share physical dimensions (e.g., size, shape, and color) and underlie 
similar physical transformations such as occlusion and displacement they greatly 
differ in various ways that are more or less obvious. For instance, they vary with 
respect to perceptual components and more importantly with regard to behavior as 
well as internal processes and structures (Gelman & Spelke, 1981; Rakison & Poulin-
Dubois, 2001). Animate objects are self-propelled; they are able to initiate actions in a 
causal event, engage in interactions and act in goal-directed ways as agents. Inanimate 
objects, on the contrary, do not have the capacity to behave in self-initiated and 
intentional ways. Their transformations and functions depend mostly on outside 
sources and they can only be acted on. Continuing, animate objects have the ability to 
grow, perceive, think, incorporate knowledge and communicate these things whereas 
inanimate objects lack the capacity for any mental representation or process. Internal 
functions like motivation, learning, and emotion are only common to animates 
(Gelman & Spelke, 1981; Mandler, 2004; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Thus, in 
order to identify animate and inanimate objects we not only rely on physical 
properties, but also focus on actions and reactions of objects in relation to their 
environment. Although some of these concepts (e.g., non-observable biological 
information such as growth, reproduction, and theory of mind) are not comprehended 
and used for classification until the preschool age (Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1990; 
Gelman & Markman, 1986; Simons & Keil, 1995), infants already posses knowledge 
about core characteristics that determine living and non-living entities. What these 
entail is discussed next.     
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The foundation for the animate – inanimate distinction is mainly seen in the 
way motion is initiated (Gelman & Spelke, 1981; Mandler, 2004; Premack, 1990; 
Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). According to Premack (1990), infants classify the 
world in self-initiated objects, which set in motion and stop moving on their own and 
non-self-starting objects, which need an external cause in order to move. Premack’s 
theory describes an innately specified system, which interprets the change from rest to 
motion (or vice versa) as intentional and most movement changes of non-self-
propelled objects as causal (Premack, 1990). This implies that biological patterns of 
motion activate infants’ perception of objects as agents with goals and desires 
(Premack, 1990). Thus, Premack’s view is consistent with a number of other 
approaches (e.g., Carey, 1985; Gelman & Spelke, 1981). Leslie’s theory of causality 
is likewise associated with these basic assumptions and discusses infants’ developing 
understanding of entities in terms of agency as well (Leslie, 1984, 1988, 1994, 1995). 
However, Leslie claims that agency is not tied to motion but rather the enduring 
properties of objects, which include mechanical, intentional, and cognitive 
characteristics. According to the author, specific modules cause infants to attend to 
and interpret certain events in certain ways. 
Mandler (1992, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2004) linked different types of causality to 
different types of motion. In addition to Premacks’ (1990) differentiation, the 
investigator describes characteristic types of motion as basis for the formation of the 
global concepts animate and inanimate in early childhood. In her theory of conceptual 
development and the origins of thought, Mandler proceeds on the assumption that 
“people judge motion to be animate on the basis of perceptual characteristics which 
they are not aware” (Mandler, 1992, p. 593). Like Premack (1990), Mandler 
distinguishes between self-instigated and caused motion and states that infants 
differentiate early between entities that start moving without any force acting on it 
and something that is made to move (Mandler, 1992, 2004). Further, the author 
postulates three so-called image-schemas16 for several motion attributes, which are 
sufficient for the primarily distinction of animates and inanimates during the first year 
of life. These are the origin of motion, the characteristics of the trajectory that moving 
                                                
16 According to Mandler (1992, 2004), image-schemas lie at the core of understanding. They represent 
foundational meaning elements used to form accessible concepts during the first year of life. Image-
schemas result from an innate perceptual-analysis mechanism, a process in which the infant extracts 
and abstracts meaningful connections from perceptual input. That is a redescription of perceptual input 
into image-schema. These in turn provide the grounding for symbolic representations and concepts 
(Mandler, 1992, 2004).    
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objects follow, and the nature of motion contingency between objects (Figure 6). 
People and animals excel by moving self-propelled, following an irregular, non-linear 
trajectory, and by interacting over a distance (Mandler, 1992, 2004). In contrast, 
inanimate objects need an external source that sets them in motion. They typically 
pursue a linear path of motion, and are subject to the contact principle (Spelke, 1990). 
Based on such perceptual dynamic information infants acquire their first conceptual 
ideas concerning the essential characteristics of animates and inanimate objects 
through visual image-schema. The gradual acquisition of image schemas provides 
infants with knowledge about the “kinds of things” there are (Mandler & 
McDonough, 1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Motion image-schemas for animate (self-propelled, irregular path, induce 
action at a distance) and inanimate (caused motion, linear path, action from contact) 
objects. From Mandler (1992). 
 
 
A number of studies provide empirical evidence for these assumptions. For 
instance, Poulin-Dubois and Shultz (1988) present findings showing that infants relate 
different types of onsets of motion with different types of objects. In their study the 
investigators demonstrate 8- and 13-month-olds novel events in which a female 
stranger and an inanimate object such as a ball or a chair moved without any external 
forces acting on them. The looking times for 8-month-old infants decreased 
significantly for both events. In contrast, 13-month-old infants looked only less in the 
stranger event. These results indicate that by 13 months of age infants know that 
inanimates are not capable of self-motion. A further test of infants’ knowledge 
showing that the origins of movement differ across ontological categories came from 
a study by Spelke, Philips, and Woodward (1995). In the habituation phase 7-month-
old infants saw an object move from the left side of a stage disappearing behind a 
central occluder. After a brief delay a second object that was partially visible on the 
 
Animate Motion    Inanimate Motion  
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right side of the occluder started to move following the same trajectory as the original 
object. The object vanished out of sight at the right side of the stage. During test 
infants were presented with a scene in which either two objects made contact before 
the second object began to move or had no contact before the second object started to 
move. Compared to a condition in which people instead of inanimate objects 
participated in the event, 7-month-old infants looked longer in the no contact 
condition. These findings demonstrate that 7-month-old infants expect inanimate 
objects to only move upon contact with another object. Further, launching events17 
look also at the form of causal action at a distance versus action from contact. Studies 
using this procedure demonstrate that infants at 9 to 10 months of age are able to 
discriminate between action from contact and action at a distance (e.g., Oakes & 
Cohen, 1990; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999). In the Schlottmann and Surian (1999) 
study infants were habituated to a red square moving non-rigidly toward a green 
square. At no time was there contact between the squares. Then one group of infants 
saw the green square starting to move before the red square came to a halt whereas 
another sample watched the green square beginning to move shortly after the red 
square had stopped. Infants who were familiarized to the first event dishabituated 
when the causal roles were reversed (the green square moved toward the red). These 
results suggest that infants at 9 months of age acknowledge the red square as an agent 
with the ability to cause action at a distance. Leslie (1984) as well as Pauen and 
Träuble (2004) offer additional empirical evidence for the association of causality 
with specific objects. According to Leslie’s experiments (1984) infants between 4.5 
and 7.5 months of age are able to perceive direct launching as events with internal 
structure in which one object causes another to move through collision. Pauen and 
Träuble (2004) examined young infants’ causal thinking about the motions of animate 
and inanimate objects with a new paradigm. Infants were shown two objects involved 
in three events: In the first part they showed two motionless objects (a ball and a toy 
animal with a furry body and a face) side by side. In the next trial, an ambiguous18 
motion scene (familiarization phase), both objects were connected and moved 
together in a contingent self-propelled manner on an irregular path. In a final test trial, 
the animal and ball again were placed motionless in separate locations. Testing 7-
                                                
17 In causal launching events the observer sees an event involving two objects. One object approaches a 
second object and causes it to move through collision. Thereby, spatial and temporal continuity act as 
cues to causality (e.g., Michotte, 1963). 
18 No external cause of the motion was identifiable. 
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month-old infants with this task, Pauen and Träuble (2004) were able to provide 
evidence for the use of previously acquired knowledge about causal behavior of 
animals and inanimate objects guiding infants’ interpretation of an ambiguous 
sequence of moving objects. Seven-month-old infants looked longer at the animal in 
test compared to baseline, suggesting that, during familiarization, they parsed the ball 
and the animal into two separate objects and attributed the objects’ common self-
propelled motion to the animal. This assignment in turn suggests that 7-month-old 
infants appreciate that animals, but not artifacts, can move on their own. Thus, they 
look longer at objects for which they anticipate being the source of the motion and 
which they expect to start moving again (Markson & Spelke, 2006). At the same time 
these results provide suggestive evidence for an early sensitivity to the property of 
self-propelled motion. They accessorily suggest that 7-month-olds activate kind 
knowledge about static and dynamic attributes to form expectations regarding the 
future behaviors of objects involved in an event when provided with property/ feature 
information AND motion information at the same time. On top of this, these studies 
debilitate the objection of some researchers that infants possibly link self-induced 
motion in particular with humans. Markson and Spelke (2006) come to the same 
conclusion. In a set of studies they investigated 7-month-old infants’ ability to learn 
about the self-propulsion of an object. Infants observed one wind-up toy animal move 
on its own and a second wind-up toy animal being moved by a hand. Thereafter, both 
wind-up toy animals were presented stationary side by side. In this stationary 
preference test infants looked reliably longer at the wind-up toy animal that 
previously moved on its own. These results suggests that infants not only learn and 
remember the mapping of objects and their motions but more importantly that they 
attribute self-propelled motion as a property to an object which in turn leads to their 
anticipation that this object starts moving again (Markson & Spelke, 2006). Infants 
did not show this preference when vehicles or nonsense objects undergoing 
translatory motion were used during familiarization. Thus, 7-month-old infants 
rapidly learn about self-propelled motion of an object with animal features and 
biological motion. Follow-up studies implementing the same method provided 
evidence however that learning about self-propelled motion is not restricted to the 
domain of animals (Shutts, Babocsai, Markson, & Spelke, 2004). These experiments 
speak for a rather broad ability to learn about self-propelled objects. Even when they 
observed novel toys, which lacked specific animate features or characteristic 
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movements infants distinguished self-propelled from passive motion as long as the 
motion was more complex than rigid translation. Under these circumstances infants 
are capable to map self-propulsion to any object and treat it as animate even in the 
absence of biological motion and animate features (Shutts et al., 2004). Thus, together 
with previous findings these results demonstrate that infants differentiate between 
self-propelled and passive motion, associate self-propulsion with animate, expect 
animate but not inanimate objects to move on their own, and look longer at an object 
that had previously done so (Markson & Spelke, 2006; Leslie, 1988; Pauen & 
Träuble, 2004; Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1993). 
Even though other investigators agree with the domain-specific approach on 
motion as well as the importance of movement information for the animate-inanimate 
distinction, they albeit doubt that it is the only foundation for a knowledge-based 
differentiation of living and non-living things. For instance, Gelman (1990, 2002) 
claimed that motion alone is insufficient for the distinction because the information 
can be ambiguous. For example people can also be the recipient of actions. Thus, the 
author proposed that innate domain-specific causal principles (so-called innards 
principles for animates and external-agent principles for non-living objects) are 
crucial because they channel attention to information about the energy source and 
material of an object. These conceptual schemes help to direct and interpret 
information relevant to animates and inanimates. In a very recent study the 
assumption that children distinguish between internal and external properties and use 
this knowledge for inferences about an object’s behavior was supported. Newman et 
al. (2008) tested whether the appreciation that internal features are vital to how an 
animate being moves and behaves might be present in infancy. In their set of studies 
they familiarized 14-month-old infants with two animated cats that were identical in 
appearance except that one had a red stomach and a red hat and the other had a blue 
stomach and a blue hat. Each cat exhibited a different style of self-generated motion. 
Thereby they learned an association between feature color and a particular type of 
movement. Subsequent to this familiarization phase infants viewed a novel exemplar, 
which had the internal feature (stomach) similar to one cat and the external feature 
(hat) that the other cat signified. Infants looked significantly longer when the novel 
cat moved congruently with its external feature than when it moved matching its 
internal attribute (Newman et al., 2008). In a second experiment same aged infant 
were given an object choice that checked whether infants would prioritize internal 
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features only when those features are a potential cause of the objects behavior. In this 
study infants were shown an animal-like toy with green hair on top and a white box 
inside. Upon pressing a button the toy started to shake and make a cooing sound. In 
test the experimenter offered two new toys, one with green hair on top and one with a 
white box inside. The presence of self-generated behaviors encouraged infants to 
focus on the importance of the internal feature and thus, they were more likely to 
choose the object with the same inside. Together, these results demonstrate that 
already at 14 months of age infants tend to associate an object’s behavior with 
internal, rather than external features (Newman et al., 2008). However, as discussed 
by the authors these findings do not speak for explicit causal theories but rather 
suggest that infants might possess cognitive biases that prioritize certain features over 
others in certain situations. Rakison and Poulin-Dubois (2001) as well posit additional 
characteristics besides physical principles, which they count motion information 
among as part of the foundation of the animate-inanimate distinction19. These are 
purpose of action (goal-directed versus without aim) and influence of mental states 
(intentional versus accidental). Research by Gergely, Csibra, and their colleagues is in 
consent with Rakison and Poulin-Dubois’ notion regarding the significance of goal-
directedness as well as intentionality in defining an animate being20 (see Csibra & 
Gergely, 1998, 2006 and Gergely, G. & Csibra, G., 2003 as an overview; Legerstee, 
1992, 2001). However, their studies among others speak against Rakison and Poulin-
Dubois’ (2001, see also Rakison, 2006) hypothesis that physical and psychological 
characteristics of the animate-inanimate distinction are acquired in the form of a 
correlation between salient aspects of motion such as self-propulsion and smooth 
movement and obvious properties of objects (e.g., large moving parts). Gergely et al. 
(1995) for example used geometric forms as animate and inanimate entities, which 
had no conspicuous parts defining the two individually. Even without a correlation 
between object features and motion information these studies still showed that infants 
9 and 12 months of age read the actions of computer-animated figures as rational 
                                                
19 In contrast to the accounts mentioned so far, Rakison and Poulin-Dubois (2001) take a domain-
general stance toward explaining the development of animate and inanimate concepts, however. The 
authors reckon a sensitive perceptual system coupled with a domain-general associative learning 
mechanism as the underlying process of infants’ ability to discriminate between living and non-living 
entities. 
20 Even though both attributes play a considerable role in distinguishing animates from inanimates and 
there has been a remarkable amount of investigations done on both topics, they will not be discussed in 
detail here, because for the work at hand the role of motion patterns (i.e., onset of motion, path of 
motion, and form of action cause) is implemented. 
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goal-directed behavior. This provides evidence that form and motion are not weighted 
equally. But what exactly constitutes the relation between form and motion? The 
following chapter will provide an overview of how form and motion might be 
associated. 
 
 
3.3 Form – motion association 
 
As noticed in previous chapters, research over the past decades has established 
that very young infants have the ability to discriminate a wide array of object 
properties under a variety of requirements. Such skills are not limited to basic low-
level stimulus features but rather extend to complex characteristics that allow them to 
uniquely single out conspecifics (e.g., Bertenthal, Proffitt, Spetner, & Thomas, 1985; 
Morton & Johnson, 1991; Meltzoff & Kuhl, 1994). Furthermore, these abilities are 
not just perceptual. Infants know something about the objects that possess those 
properties. Not only are infants able to discriminate animate objects from inanimate 
ones (e.g., Meltzoff, 1995; Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995), or animals from 
artifacts (e.g., Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998), or intentional objects from non-
intentional objects (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999), but they can 
also apply different psychological principles to the objects of such classes. Infants 
form specific expectations about the behavior of animate and intentional objects and 
have ideas of how to deal with the entities presented to them (e.g., Csibra et al., 1999; 
Mandler & McDonough, 1998; Premack, 1990; Premack & Premack, 1995; Premack 
& Premack, 1997; Woodward, 1998; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000). This raises 
the more general question of when in development we learn to combine form and 
motion information in order to class objects with animates or inanimates and reason 
about their behavior. 
As elaborated in Chapter 3.1 researchers have shown that the early developing 
perceptual system processes both form and motion information (e.g., Kellman & 
Spelke, 1983; Jusczyk et al., 1999). Additionally, infants make inferences about 
causality, self-propelled motion, contingent motion, and agent-patient roles (e.g., 
Gergely & Csibra, 1994; Leslie & Keeble, 1987), which suggests a profound 
understanding of the kinds of objects that would engage in animate motion. One 
example for such specific knowledge is, that infants associate human form but not 
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mechanical claws with deictic activities (Woodward, 1998). However, this does not 
mean that infants automatically associate the form of an object with its motion. 
Instead, it may well be that infants need to learn that a certain form connects with a 
particular motion. Arterberry and Bornstein (2002a) addressed the question of how 
form and motion are associated by investigating 3-, 6- and 9-month-old infants’ 
categorization abilities of animals and vehicles based on static or dynamic attributes. 
They used a visual habituation paradigm in which infants had to either categorize 
static color images of animals and vehicles or dynamic point-light displays showing 
only motions of the same objects. Most animals engaged in a pendular motion shown 
when four legs are walking. The motion common to all the vehicles was a rotary 
motion emerging from rolling wheels. In order to distinguish between animate and 
inanimate motion infants had to understand that animals but not vehicles move using 
pendular motion. The findings showed that all ages not only categorized the static 
pictures, a replication and extension of previous research (Behl-Chada, 1996; Quinn 
and Eimas, 1996) but also distinguished between the different kinds of movement 
patterns illustrated by the point-light displays. In addition, Arterberry and Bornstein 
(2002b) implemented a transfer task that tested 6- and 9-month-old infants who were 
habituated to static pictures with dynamic point-light displays and vice versa. Here the 
task required infants to match motion as specified by point-light displays to 
appropriate forms depicted in static pictures. Longer looking toward the congruent 
motion or form indicated matching. Infants 9 months of age who were habituated to 
dynamic displays succeeded in making the transfer to static forms (see also Bertenthal 
et al., 1985). They failed, however, in mapping static images onto dynamic motion. 
These directional findings are in line with conclusions coming from research on 
infants’ motion perception, namely motion affords advantages in perception. (e.g., 
Bertenthal, 1993; Burnham, 1987; Gibson, 1969; Kellman, 1984; Slater, 1989). Just 
as consistent with these findings is research showing that infants can construct form 
from motion. For instance, Arterberry & Yonas (2000) showed that shortly after birth 
8-week-old infants discriminated between patterns of motion that carried information 
about the three-dimensional objects’ shape. At the same time, the difference in 
transfer performance from form to motion and from motion to form reported by 
Arterberry and Bornstein (2002) speaks against associative learning of motion and 
form by mere attention to the conjunction between the two. In their study described 
above, form information did not activate motion information about the animate-
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inanimate distinction (Arterberry & Bornstein, 2002b). Besides there is considerable 
evidence that the encoding and/ or retaining correlations between motion and form do 
not develop earlier than the latter part of the first year of development. In one study 
Rakison and Poulin-Dubois (2002) habituated 10-, 14-, and 18-month-old infants to 
novel, computer-generated forms consisting of ovals, triangles and star-shapes 
moving across a screen on a rectilinear or a curvilinear path, respectively. Both the 
objects as whole entities as well as the single parts that comprised these objects 
moved in their own unique ways. In test infants saw once more the familiar event as 
well as new ones in which one of the object features (either the objects’ parts, the 
objects’ body, or the objects’ path of motion) appeared in a novel combination. The 
results revealed that movement of the object parts as well as the overall object itself 
helped infants of all ages to attend to functionally relevant properties around the 
beginning of their second year. However, it was not until the age of 14 months that 
infants detected the correlations between an object’s parts and its motion trajectory. 
At 18-months of age infants noted correlations between all three features (form, parts, 
and motion path) but only when the parts of the object moved (Rakison & Poulin-
Dubois, 2002). These findings suggest that motion is crucial in the processing of 
novel objects moving in novel ways. The authors reasoned that motion captures 
infants’ attention and directs it to the relevant information. Thus, the relation between 
moving parts and other dynamic properties can be discovered (Rakison & Poulin-
Dubois, 2002). Even though the late success of detecting novel combinations in this 
study might be due to the usage of non-naturalistic and unfamiliar stimuli in a lab 
situation, which might have placed a greater information-processing burden on 
infants, research with real-life stimuli confirms that dynamic aspects are more 
impressive than static ones. Experimental evidence provided by Bahrick et al. (2002) 
supports the view that dynamic events capture more attention than static objects or 
even faces in the context of actions. As elaborated in Chapter 2, Baillargeon and her 
colleagues suggest that infants can group physical events into categories such as 
occlusion, containment and support and then use these categories to detect violations 
of their expectations by evaluating the size, substance or form of the objects (e.g., 
Baillargeon, et al., 1995; Baillargeon & Wang, 2002). According to this argument, 
event categories, which among other things are defined by motion patterns, are 
established prior to the analysis of the details of forms. Nevertheless, attention to the 
properties of objects (e.g., their size and shape) is required for successful 
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performance. Thus, it seems like motion primes perception of form whereas form-
motion correlations possibly have to be learned. The formation of appropriate 
associations may on the one hand be challenged in that motion events may be more 
enduring than the form of the objects seen in the events. On the other hand however, 
motion may channel attention to the objects or object parts engaged in the movement, 
respectively, which may foster learning and reasoning about them. 
 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
Taken together, this chapter on motion information demonstrates that infants 
are apt to perceive and reason about information concerning the movement of objects. 
Motion not only helps them to perceive unitary objects and events but it also leads to 
distinct inferences infants make about the objects around them. Further, infants’ 
ability to connect motion with form enables them to establish knowledge about what 
is animate or inanimate. Theories on the animate-inanimate distinction point clearly 
out that motion plays an essential role in differentiating living and non-living objects. 
Each of the perspectives present physical, biological, and psychological attributes, 
which facilitate the development of knowledge concerning animates and inanimates. 
Gelman & Spelke (1981) provided a taxonomy of animate and inanimate features 
describing inner biological attributes on which the animate-inanimate distinction 
rests; Premack (1990) highlighted the role of self-propelled motion in the detection of 
intentionality; Leslie (1995) suggested that infants possess innate modules that 
interpret the actions of objects as mechanical, intentional, or cognitive; and Mandler 
(2004) provided a detailed developmental account of the role of motion as the 
foundation for early representations. 
Perhaps the least ambiguous of all the motion characteristics displayed by 
different object kinds is that of self-propulsion or onset of motion. Only animals and 
people tend to move without some external physical cause (Premack, 1990; Markson 
& Spelke, 2006; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). As Markson and Spelke (2006), 
Shuts et al. (2004), as well as Pauen and Träuble (2004) showed, infants use self-
propulsion to establish representations of objects in their environment. For these 
reasons, the concept of animacy has far-reaching consequences for complex cognitive 
processes such as categorization (Mandler, 2004; Pauen, 2002), causality (Leslie, 
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1994; Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1995), agency (Csibra & Gergely, 2006), or 
intentionality (Premack, 1990). However, the extent to which infants use motion to 
individuate objects and the role it plays through the course of the development of 
individuation processes remain to be studied. For these reasons, the following set of 
experiments investigates this topic. 
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III EMPIRICAL PART 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND STUDY APPROACH 
 
 
4.1 Objectives 
 
The major goal of the present work is to investigate the role of kind 
information in the construction of object concepts by asking whether domain-specific 
motion patterns have an impact on the process of individuation in early childhood. 
This is accomplished by linking findings from research on object individuation with 
the recent understanding of the role motion information plays in early knowledge 
acquisition. In previous chapters, the major theories concerning object individuation 
and early knowledge about motion were outlined and controversies regarding each 
theoretical account were pointed out.  
Referring to the subject-matter of object individuation in early infancy as 
elaborated in Chapter 2, work by Aguiar & Baillargeon, (1999), Baillargeon and De 
Vos (1991), Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson (1992) as well as by others, 
indicated that infants as young as 2.5 months are able to reason about hidden objects 
and occlusion events. Quite a few studies conducted with only slightly older infants 
showed that infants can distinguish the number of objects previously hidden behind 
an occluding screen on the basis of their featural information (e.g. Baillargeon & 
Wilcox, 1998; Wilcox, Schweinle, & Chapa, 2003). This early ability is mainly based 
on tests including spatiotemporal information or research operating with event-
monitoring tasks, in which the events during familiarization and test were in terms of 
occlusion internally consistent. In contrast, studies that use the same general 
technique (violation-of-expectation paradigm) but present an occlusion-event during 
familiarization and a non-occlusion event in test (event-mapping tasks), demonstrate 
the competence to individuate not until the end of the first year of life (Leslie et al., 
1998; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b; Xu, 2003; Xu & Carey, 1996). Researchers 
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holding the view that infants possess the capacity to individuate object kinds from 
early on have criticized event-mapping tasks for the high demands they place on the 
infants’ information processing. Whereas the just mentioned authors (e.g. Wilcox & 
Baillargeon, 1998b; Wilcox & Schweinle, 2002) concluded that the absence of 
individuation using property information cannot completely be ascribed to a general 
lack of specific concepts at a preverbal age, representatives of the Object-first 
Hypothesis assume that the earliest individuation capacities are based on 
spatiotemporal information instead of conceptual knowledge about underlying object 
characteristics (cf. Chapter 2). According to this position, young infants seem to 
possess the ability to individuate objects by means of spatiotemporal information but 
cannot make use of kind information. Results with 10-month-old infants support this 
assumption (Xu and Carey, 1996). However, as evident in the sections on motion 
information (cf. Chapter 3), infants are equipped with certain conceptual knowledge 
from early on. The results of Bonatti et al. (2002) are consistent with the conjecture 
that infants have more extensive kind knowledge than postulated by the Object-first 
Hypothesis. In their set of studies infants were capable of establishing different object 
representations by the kind information given (human being versus object) in an 
object individuation task similar to Xu and Carey’s (1996). Thus, it seems plausible 
that infants under the age of 12 months are able to apply particular kind information 
that is embedded in their domain-specific knowledge repertoire concerning specific 
concepts (e.g., animate and inanimate). Motion patterns represent kind information of 
this sort.  
The current work, therefore, hypothesizes that underlying conceptual 
knowledge about objects such as motion characteristics facilitates object individuation 
when made available. Motion attributes are so far an unexplored source of 
information that might contribute to the perception of individual objects and the 
establishment of object representations that are necessary to solve an individuation 
task. This idea is based on the assumption that motion plays a key role in object 
individuation. Although motion was part of the Xu and Carey’s experiments, the 
movement was not appropriate for the kind membership of objects tested. All objects 
(e.g., a ball, truck, duck, and elephant) were moved in the same self-initiated manner 
following a linear path. Hence, they displayed ambiguous motion pattern that partly 
revealed animate characteristics (i.e. self-initiation), and partly inanimate 
characteristics (i.e. following a linear path).  This will be different in the proposed set 
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of experiments: Using an adapted version of the Xu and Carey (1996) paradigm, each 
object performs a motion typifying a specific object kind and thus, provides domain-
specific cues. It is assumed that this enables infants to draw back on real-world 
knowledge about animate and inanimate objects, which they in turn can apply to the 
individuation task. Previous studies on infant categorization have shown that 
preverbal infants discriminate living and non-living objects (e.g., Mandler & 
McDonough, 1998; Pauen, 2002). Thereby conceptual knowledge is relevant in that it 
provides essential aspects about the underlying differences of distinct kinds of things. 
One type of information that infants base the animate-inanimate distinction on is the 
dissimilarity in movement, that is the difference between self-initiated motion 
following a non-linear path and externally induced motion following a linear path (see 
Mandler, 1992; 2004). In Mandler’s view, infants hold the conceptual animate-
inanimate distinction by the time they are 9 months old (Mandler & McDonough, 
1993). Research by Pauen and her colleagues indicates that even 7-month-old infants 
already possess some knowledge about this distinguishing mark. The infants in their 
studies relate motion information with information about the appearance of objects 
(Pauen & Träuble, 2004). Thus, it is predicted that the manner of motion provides a 
conceptual foundation for a notion of kind (Mandler, 2004). Further arguments 
strengthening the idea that motion may play a crucial role for early conceptual 
representations can be found in the literature: As suggested by a number of studies on 
the role of motion in early infancy (see Chapter 3 for an overview) even very young 
infants discriminate biological from non-biological movement (Arterberry & 
Bornstein, 2001; Bertenthal et al., 1984). This work indicates, that by 3 months of age 
infants have adequate knowledge of the kind of motion objects engage in. There are 
several reasons that account for this early understanding. Not only are differences in 
biological and non-biological motion perceptually salient, they are also highly 
relevant for survival. Only if a given species can detect other living entities and 
distinguish them from non-living things, will it be able to pay special attention to 
these objects and respond adequately to their presence. Hence, it seems only natural 
that biological motion takes up important significance in brain processes (Beauchamp 
et al., 2003).  
The aim of the planned set of studies is to illuminate how motion information 
contributes to and/or refines object individuation. Whereas the first set of studies uses 
natural looking material, hence providing appearance information about kind 
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membership as well as motion information (in an domain-adequate combination), the 
second set of studies uses abstract figures, providing motion information without 
appearance information to determine the specific impact of motion on object 
individuation. The remarks stressed so far suggest that in the current work it can be 
taken for granted that infants have the competence to differentiate the motion acted 
out by the objects. Thereby it is assumed that infants are already able to combine 
knowledge about appearance and behavior of animate and inanimate objects, a 
process that should aid them in individuating object kinds. 
 
 
4.2 Hypothesis 
 
Following the paradigm originally introduced by Xu and Carey (1996), the 
present work tests whether infants are able to detect the number of objects involved in 
an occlusion event based on kind information. Specifically, the experiments examine 
infants’ looking preference at displays containing one or two different objects after 
viewing an event in which these objects consecutively moved back and forth of a 
screen in their domain-specific way. According to Xu and Carey (1996), infants 12 
months of age are able to individuate objects on the basis of property/ kind 
information. In their investigations, the older infants anticipated two objects behind 
the occluder and were surprised when only one object occurred past the screen’s 
removal. Longer looking toward the one-object display was interpreted as indication 
of corresponding expectations. 10-month-old infants on the contrary failed to do so. 
In the research presented next, it is conjectured that 10-month-olds are able to set 
objects in an event-mapping task apart (cf. Xu and Carey, 1996) when the nature of 
the presented kind information bears upon important fundamental information (i.e. 
motion pattern) and the distinction of the objects’ kind information indicates a clear 
difference (i.e. regarding self-generation, path of motion, or contact). If that is the 
case, then infants should solve Xu and Carey’s ‘sortal-task’ (property/ kind condition, 
Experiment 2) before the end of the first year of life. Of course, infants would only be 
able to do so when they already make use of previously acquired knowledge about 
animate and inanimate objects in an object individuation task. After all, infants have 
no opportunity to learn this association during the task. If it is the case that infants 
individuate the two objects because of their particular domain adequate motion 
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pattern, then infants should, the logic of the violation-of-expectation paradigm 
accordingly, show a preference for one object over two objects in test when 
corresponding information (self-initiation and path of motion) was given in motion 
trials (familiarization) beforehand. That implies the following primary hypothesis of 
the experiments: 
 
 Infants who saw an animate and an inanimate object repeatedly travel from 
behind a screen show a greater preference for a one-object display (unexpected 
outcome) than a two-objects display (expected outcome) in test compared to their 
initial looking pattern in baseline. 
 
Thus, it is predicted that infants will individuate objects based on contrasting types of 
motion, a finding that would be consistent with Sharon and Wynn’s (1998) research 
on individuation of actions and Wilcox and Chapa’s (2004) research on the use of 
functional differences to individuate objects. Experiments 1 and 2 address this 
hypothesis employing the paradigm sketched out below. 
 
 
4.3 Implementation of the Research Question 
 
 In order to elucidate the premise of this hypothesis a task was generated that 
allowed testing the influence of motion information on object individuation. The 
violation-of-expectation paradigm proved to be useful to determine whether infants 
are able to individuate objects (Baillargeon, 1998; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b; Xu 
& Carey, 1996). According to Xu and Carey (1996), their event-mapping task admits 
the investigation of the role property/ kind information plays in infants’ object 
individuation capacity. Closely following the procedure described by the authors (cf. 
Xu & Carey, 1996, Experiment 2), infants are first familiarized with an event in 
which two different objects successively emerge from behind either side of a screen. 
During test trials, infants are presented with displays that comprise either one object 
(unexpected outcome) or both objects (expected outcome). Differing from the original 
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study where objects showed uniform motion21, the task to be used in the present 
context displays domain-specific motion patterns. Motion contains various types of 
information, which can be divided into path and manner information. Path 
information refers to the route an object takes when moving (i.e. from behind an 
occluder to the left side of a stage) such as depicted in the Xu and Carey experiments. 
Manner information on the contrary describes the way the object moves (e.g., Choi & 
Bowerman, 1991; Choi et al., 1999). Whereas path of motion provides location 
information, it is more likely that manner of motion can be used as an identifying 
feature of the object itself. In the current work manner information is made salient to 
activate conceptual knowledge about animates and inanimates in order to serves as 
kind information in the individuation task. 
To find out whether infants deduce certain expectations from the additional 
kind information, revealed during the familiarization trials, looking times toward the 
outcome scenes are checked against initial looking preferences22 at one-object versus 
two-object displays with the same objects used in test. Only if this comparison shows 
a significant shift in the expected direction (i.e. longer looking toward one object after 
familiarization) can one infer object individuation on the basis of property/ kind 
information that distinguished the objects. Xu and Carey (1996) as well as researchers 
who modeled experiments after theirs (e.g. Baillargeon & Wilcox, 1998b, Experiment 
1 and 2; Bonatti et al., 2002; Surian et al., 2004) implemented this in a between 
subject-design. That is, they used separate groups when comparing the preference for 
looking between baseline and test trials. Unlike previous work, the present studies 
applied a within-subject design meaning the outcome displays are presented as 
baseline before the start of the familiarization phase within one single session. This 
change in method seemed necessary because some experiments detected a priori 
looking preferences for the two-object display whereas others did not (e.g., Surian et 
al., 2004). Using the same stimuli for baseline and test displays (and for the same 
subjects) guarantees that significant results supporting the initial hypothesis cannot be 
attributed to either differences in stimuli or a-priori group differences. Pauen and 
Träuble (2004) successfully worked with this within-subject testing method to 
                                                
21 During familiarization the objects in Xu and Carey’s (1996) study were moved back and fourth on 
slightly visible sticks attached to the bottom of each object. 
22 In order to acquire a possible initial preference infants simply view the outcomes of the test trials 
without being exposed to any familiarization emergences before. This is referred to as baseline 
condition or baseline phase. 
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investigate knowledge-based reasoning. Their task was arranged in three separate 
scenes: A baseline scene (1) which was identical to a test scene (3) that examined the 
impact of a motion scene presented in second place (2). Testing 7-month-old infants, 
Pauen and Träuble provided evidence for the use of previously acquired knowledge 
about causal behavior of animals and inanimate objects guiding infants’ interpretation 
of an ambiguous sequence of moving objects. The experiments to be described next 
combine aspects of the Xu and Carey procedure with the Pauen and Träuble task. 
More specifically, infants’ preference for either one or two object displays was tested 
by comparing looking times during a baseline phase, which took place before the 
familiarization scenes with an occluder and a test phase that followed familiarization. 
Problematic with this approach is, however, that spatiotemporal information for two 
objects is given when presenting the two-object display which might result in a 
confounding of information available for infants to rely on. One might argue that the 
information provided by a within-subject baseline influences infants’ reaction in test. 
Despite that possibility this type of design was preferred according to the reasons 
explained above. Due to the within-subject design in which a baseline is presented 
before familiarization the following experiments forego additional introductory trials.  
In terms of the experimental presentation, Xu and Carey (1996) demonstrated 
the occlusion events live in a puppet stage and used an infant-controlled design. For 
the following set of studies a video presentation and a fixed-trial procedure23 was 
chosen. Several reasons speak for this line of action: The first is to assure maximal 
standardization in that each infant views the same animate movement pattern. It 
would be extremely difficult to avoid variations and irregularities in a life display 
involving animate motion. Another reason for a film presentation is the reduction of 
spatiotemporal information available to influence infants’ interpretation regarding the 
number of objects involved in the event. So if infants show a preference for one over 
two objects, it can be attributed to infants’ knowledge about the kind of visual entities 
performing the movements. Thus, no additional information besides global level 
category membership (expressed by characteristic motion information) is supposed to 
be present. In addition, results offered by Seekircher (2007) support the assumption 
that infants of the tested age-range are able to extract information from a film 
presentation equally well as from a live demonstration. When demonstrated per video 
                                                
23 The fixed trial design was chosen in order to equate the task across subjects. 
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presentation how a certain part of an object functions, 12-month-old infants made use 
of the information illustrated in the movie. In a subsequent live completed 
categorization task with similar three-dimensional objects consisting of various 
functional partitions infants discriminated in accordance with the critical part shown 
in the films. The data of this study was comparable to results obtained by Träuble and 
Pauen (2006) who worked with the same material and a similar procedure with the 
only difference being the demonstration of the function of the critical part, which took 
place live (Seekircher, 2007). Not only did infants extract crucial pieces of 
information from video but also did they transfer newly acquired knowledge to a live 
task. Other studies conducted by Madole and Cohen (1995), Perone and Oakes 
(2006), as well as Mumme and Fernald (2003), showed that infants gather, process, 
and apply information from videos in a variety of contexts. Surian et al. (2004) further 
demonstrated that infants performed successful object individuation by utilizing a 
video technique. Based on these findings, it seems well justified to presume that 
infants of the tested age-range process information in similar ways when presented in 
the format of live and video displays. 
The following chapters explain the design, the stimuli, the experimental 
setting, and the procedure of the experiments in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
METHODOLOGY AND PARADIGM 
 
  
5.1 Subjects 
 
Tested age groups 
 
Since the goal of the present work was to provide evidence for object 
individuation on the basis of motion as kind information in a complex event-mapping 
individuation task (cf. Xu & Carey, 1996), 12- as well as 10-month-old infants were 
selected as suitable age groups. Xu & Carey found that 12- but not 10-month-old 
infants were capable of using differences in features and kinds to tell the number of 
objects involved in an occlusion event when keeping the movement patterns of both 
objects identical. The prediction in the following experiments is that both age groups 
are able to solve the given object individuation task if provided with information 
about different domain-specific motion of both objects. Thus, the sample of 12-
month-old infants is supposed to replicate earlier findings using different stimuli and 
an adapted version of the original task whereas the group of 10-month-olds shall 
extend these results. 
 
Recruitment 
 
The studies took place in the infant laboratory of the Department for 
Developmental Studies at the University of Heidelberg. All infants were recruited by 
obtaining their birth record from town halls in Heidelberg, Dossenheim, and 
Eppelheim. Parents were contacted at first by mail and later by follow-up phone calls. 
Infants who participated in the studies came primarily from a Caucasian, middle-class 
background. The parents received a certificate including a picture of their child as 
well as information material describing research purposes and results of past studies 
as gratitude for their participation. 
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5.2 General Study Design 
 
Equal numbers of infants participated in the following experiments. Infants 
were tested using a violation-of-expectation method to determine whether or not they 
are able to individuate objects by means of their different motion. Based on the 
arguments raised in Chapter 4.3 a 2 by 2 design with number of objects (one versus 
two) and trial (baseline versus test) as within-subject factors derived for testing the 
hypothesis independent of age. Trial duration and sequence of trials were fixed 
through out all five experiments. The order of outcomes (one-object display first 
(1_2) versus two-object display first (2_1))24 and the kind of single object in the one-
object displays (bunny/ ball in the one-object display versus tractor/ box in the one-
object display) were counterbalanced across infants in each study. This results in four 
different versions of the movie each of which was presented to the same number of 
subjects. 
 
 
5.3 Overview of the Stimuli 
 
 The stimulus material (Figure 2) for the following experiments consisted of 
film demonstrations, which were either animated graphic shots, involving a jumping 
rabbit and a rolling tractor, or PowerPoint-Presentations showing a square-shaped and 
a round geometric form moving in either animate (round) or inanimate (square-
shaped) way. Thus, the objects differed in texture, shape, and color, as well as kind 
(animate-inanimate). In the animation appearance AND motion information identified 
kind membership, whereas movement information alone served this function in the 
PowerPoint-Presentations. Both entities as well as the occluder were featured against 
a white surface and background with the surrounding area being black. 
 
Film animations 
 
The animation films were produced with a Sony Camcorder including a 
Photoshot function to avoid the problem of adding a hand (a third object) with the two 
                                                
24 Each infant viewed one of two orders of outcomes 1212 or 2121 defining the order of the one- and 
two-object display as well as whether the task started out with the one- and two-object display. 
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target objects (compare to Surian et al., 2004). Pulling an invisible nylon string 
moved the inanimate object. The animate motion effects were generated by still 
photography of successive objects positions (i.e., placing the object against a board 
and moving it along the surface in the preferred pattern while taking shots with the 
camera using the Photoshot setup). After videotaping the scenes, the material was 
edited with Adobe Premier® a film-editing program25 and thereafter the movies were 
burned on DVD for presentation. 
 
PowerPoint-Presentations  
 
The presentations for Experiments 2 were created with Microsoft Office 
PowerPoint®. The layout and content of the PowerPoint-Presentations was similar to 
the movies. In addition to the objects and the screen, two poles were inserted in the 
displays 6 cm to the left and the right of the occluder. 
 
 
5.4 Experimental Setting and Technical Setup 
 
The study took place in an experimental room holding a 203 cm by 203 cm 
screen. To ensure that there was little distraction from other parts of the room while 
this particular study took place, the experimenter drew two light blue curtains through 
the room and created a small room consisting of a screen, speakers, two cameras, a 
high chair and a table on which the beamer was installed (Figure 7). The projector 
stood across from the screen and was placed high enough behind the infant and the 
parent so that no shadows were projected onto the screen. The study was recorded by 
two dome-cameras. One of them was positioned in front of the infant; the other was 
located behind the infant across from the screen. Two speakers stood to the left and 
the right below the screen and were covered by the curtains. 
 
 
                                                
25 The photographs were animated by presenting them in succession by 24 frames per second. It was 
also necessary to manipulate the speed as well as the backward movement of both objects with Adobe 
Premier. Therefore a fast motion was used and the movie was partly played backward. In addition, the 
occluder was inserted and positioned in the center of the white surface area (6 cm from each side). 
Further, Windows XP sounds were inserted when a scene was beginning and ending.  
Object Individuation 84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Experimental Setting 
 
All other equipment was located in an adjacent room called the observation 
room (Figure 8). The experimenters operated computer, program, and video 
recordings from here. Therefore, the room held a computer with all necessary features 
(e.g. DVD drive and player, Microsoft Office PowerPoint Software), a mixer, and 
four television screens.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Technical Setup 
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One of the two dome-cameras displayed the image of the infants’ face on one of the 
TV screens; the other camera recorded the displays. A third TV screen showed a 
mixed picture of the child’s face and parts of the display. The image was recorded on 
video for later coding. Once the movie/ program was started, the computer controlled 
the course of the experiment. A one-way mirror separated the experimental and the 
observation room. 
 
 
5.5 General Procedure 
 
The experimenter welcomed parents and infants to the laboratory and showed 
them both the experimental and the observation room while explaining the general 
course of the experiment. Each infant was positioned in a high chair placed 190 cm in 
front of the projection screen. The parents sat next to the infant. The experimenter 
gave the parents brief instructions regarding the experimental procedure. Parents were 
asked to refrain from speaking to the infant or directing the infant’s attention to the 
screen in any way (e.g. by pointing). The experimenter closed the curtain to the right 
and turned the projector on. Then the left curtain was drawn back. The experimenter 
dimmed the light when she left the room to start the presentation on the computer next 
door. Mother and infant could be seen and heard from there at all times during the 
experiment. 
Infants were presented an animated movie/ PowerPoint-Presentation, which 
had an average length of 4 min and incorporated a baseline phase, two familiarization 
phases, and a test phase. The baseline trials introduced the infant to the task and 
showed him/ her that there could be either one or two objects behind the occluder 
without providing the infant with a way of predicting which outcome would occur in 
the test trials. They further established a benchmark for each infant’s interest in the 
displays. Baseline and test visualized identical static one- and two-object displays in 
sequence. Therefore, these trials allowed checking for a preference, infants might 
have for one of the two displays presented as well as comparing such between trials. 
Changes from baseline to test were attributed to effects of the intermediate 
familiarization phase.  
During familiarization an animate or an inanimate object appeared 
successively from behind either the left or right side of a screen. The object traveled 
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some distance before reversing trajectory and vanishing behind the screen again. On 
each trial one exemplar of contrasting global categories (i.e. animate versus 
inanimate) was presented successively in motion. Infants viewed a total of four 
familiarization trials, in which the same exemplar of each global category was used 
(see Appendix A and Appendix C for a more detailed illustration of stimuli and 
general procedure). The motion trials acquainted infants with the kind information 
that distinguished the objects. This was assumed to influence their looking behavior in 
subsequent test trials. 
Test sessions usually lasted about 7 min. The experimenter oversaw the whole 
experiment and watched the infant through camera images on several monitors. The 
two dome-cameras videotaped the experimental setting. One of them recorded the 
infant’s reactions to the display; the other camera was angled to record the screen on 
which the movies were presented. Appendix B and Appendix D describe the course of 
the experimental presentations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 – NATURAL MATERIAL 
 
 
6.1 Study Concept 
  
In Experiment 1 a variation of Xu and Carey’s (1996) event-mapping task 
(property/kind condition) was carried out. The purpose of Experiment 1 was twofold. 
First, it attempted to confirm the results offered by Xu and Carey (1996) therein that 
12-month-old infants individuate objects on the basis of property/ kind information. 
Second it seeks to find out whether 10-month-olds would be capable of recalling how 
many distinct kinds of moving objects were hidden behind an occluding screen by 
means of their appearance and their domain-specific movement. An event-mapping 
task was carried out to answer the question if infants 10 months of age were able to 
solve the problem of object individuation when given domain-specific motion 
patterns as property/ kind information.  
 
 
6.2 Participants 
 
A total of 54 infants participated in the study. Thereof 27 infants were 10 
months of age and 27 infants were 12 months old. Seven of the 12-month-old and 
seven of the 10-month-old infants were tested but discarded from the final sample due 
to fussiness or crying (N = 14). The final sample ranged in age from 10 months, 03 
days to 10 months, 26 days (mean age = 10 months, 12 days) and from 12 months, 02 
days to 12 months, 27 days (mean age = 12 months, 15 days). Male and female 
infants were equally distributed in each age group. All were full-term healthy infants 
who showed typical development. One 10-month-old infant and two 12-month-old 
infants sat on their parents’ lab for the study. None of the subjects who began the 
session in the infant seat had to be switched to the parent’s lab during the session. 
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6.3 Stimuli 
 
In Experiment 1 infants watched an animated movie with a total length of 5 
minutes and 37 seconds in which a bunny and a tractor moved successively in and out 
from behind a center placed occluder (cf. Chapter 5.5 for a general description of the 
stimulus material). 
The bunny had beige fur, a white cottontail, and black eyes. Its size was 3 x 4 
cm in the movie, which yielded 22.5 x 30 cm when projected onto the screen. The 
tractor was 4 x 3 cm movie-size and measured 30 x 22.5 cm on screen. Its color was 
green with some orange on the side. It had a white rooftop and black wheels with a 
white inside. The occluder was dark blue in color and had a width of 8.8 cm and a 
height of 5.3 cm in the presentation and span 61.6 x 37.1 cm on screen. The 
background and the surface on which the objects rested were white.  
 
 
6.4 Procedure 
 
The task started out with the baseline phase, which was instigated by a short 
fade in accompanied by a sound (Windows XP login tone). The fade in was followed 
by the immediate descent of the uncovered occluder revealing either the bunny or the 
tractor or both objects standing still for 20 seconds. During this time looking time was 
measured. Thereafter the picture was faded out. Then the same sequence was repeated 
with the opposite event. Again the image faded in with the Windows XP login 
sound26. In case the movie started out with a scene of a single object, both objects 
turned up during the second presentation and vice versa. In the course of the task the 
bunny was standing on the right side whereas the tractor was positioned on the left 
side. In the two-object display both objects were situated at the same place 3.2 cm 
apart, which equals 22.4 cm on screen. 
 During familiarization the occluder stood in the middle of the display. The 
bunny and the tractor emerged alternately from each side of the screen. The bunny 
walked out form behind the occluder and then started to jump to the right side 
                                                
26 Throughout the experiment the fade in with sound initiated each new sequence with the purpose of 
drawing the infants’ attention to the film presentation and to signal the coders the starting point of the 
scene (see Appendix B for a detailed overview of the film events). 
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covering a distance of 42 cm on screen in approximately 6 seconds. When the bunny 
was half way in the off it reversed its trajectory and disappeared after another 6 
seconds behind the occluder again. After roughly a 4 second pause (the time it would 
take the bunny to travel behind the screen to the other edge of it with constant speed) 
the tractor emerged at the left side of the screen and rolled to the left until it was half 
way in the off27.  Similarly to the bunny, the tractor returned with a backward motion 
behind the occluder. Distance and timing were matched to the bunny. This sequence 
was repeated four times, which means that the infant saw the bunny emerging four 
times to the right and the tractor four times to the left. The objects were never 
simultaneously visible to the infant.  
After viewing these familiarization trials infants observed the first test trial in 
which the occluder descended (while the Windows XP login sound rang out) 
uncovering either one object (unexpected outcome) or two objects (expected 
outcome) depending on the order of outcomes in the previously presented baseline 
sequence. That is, infants who were presented with the bunny as a single object at first 
saw the bunny only also at first in test. Looking time was monitored after the screen 
was completely out of sight. The trial ended after 20 seconds and the image faded out. 
A second set of two complete familiarization emergences followed28. It was exactly as 
the above particularized familiarization sequence. Thereafter the second test trial 
ensued with the opposite outcome to the first. That is, when infants looked at both 
objects in second place during the baseline phase then two objects were pictured 
second in the test phase. Order of outcomes was counterbalanced across subjects. Half 
of the infants viewed the bunny as the kind of single object in the one-object display 
the other half saw the tractor by itself at this point. 
 
 
 
                                                
27 Research concerned with infants’ memory and control of visual attention demonstrated that infants 
not only remember objects (Bushnell et al., 1984; Cornell, 1979) from early on but also show 
appreciable working memory for events and actions around 6 months of age (e.g., Bahrick et al., 2002; 
Gilmore & Johnson, 1995; Reznick et al., 2004). These studies provide evidence that infants are able to 
retain memories for seconds, minutes, or even longer. In regard to object individuation, Baillargeon & 
DeVos (1989) showed that 8-month-old infants occluded objects even after a 70 second delay. Thus, it 
is assumed that infants keep the objects in mind during the time they are out of sight. Additional 
evidence for this claim comes from Leslie & Kaldy (2001) as well as Wilcox & Schweinle (2003). 
28 Reason for that was to ensure infants remember the motion events. Pilot testing suggested that four 
additional emergences were too boring and infants became fussy. Thus, the second set of 
familiarization trials was reduced to two emergences of each object. 
Object Individuation 90 
6.5 Scoring 
 
Infants were videotaped for the purpose of off-line coding after the experiment 
was completed. The videotapes showed the infant and part of the display. The latter 
was covered during the baseline and test coding process to assure observer’s 
impartiality to the experimental condition. The sound on the tape indicated start- and 
endpoint of the trials. Familiarization was scored, by simply indicating if the infant 
recognized each object appearance. Two independent coders measured looking times 
for every infant on baseline and test trials from the videotape with a stopwatch. 
 
 
6.6 Data Analysis 
 
The statistical analyses were based on a final sample of 40 infants. Only 
infants who saw at least one complete sequence (i.e., emergence and return of both 
objects) over the course of the familiarization phase were included in the final sample. 
The dependent measure was infant’s looking time, as indexed by the cumulative 
duration of their visual fixation to each of the baseline and the test slides. Analyses 
were completed with the mean looking times of coder A and B. Inter-observer 
reliability for baseline and test looking times was assessed by Person r = .97, which 
reached significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)29.  
The statistical analyses aimed to find out whether there was a shift in infants’ 
looking times to the one and two object display from baseline to test. Thereby the 
factor age should be insignificant, because it is hypothesized that both age groups are 
able to solve the object-individuation task based on motion information as 
differentiating kind information. This was checked in preliminary analyses. In 
addition, the factors gender, order of outcomes (1_2 versus 2_1), and kind of single 
object (bunny in the one-object display versus tractor in the one-object display) could 
have potential influence on results and thus, their impact was also clarified upfront. 
 
 
 
                                                
29 All statistical tests reported in Experiment 1 are two-tailed. 
Method  91 
Preliminary Analyses 
 
Preliminary analyses tested whether the factors age, gender, order of outcomes 
(1_2 versus 2_1), and kind of single object (bunny in the one-object display versus 
tractor in the one-object display) had an effect on infants’ looking times to the one- 
and two-object display in baseline or test. No age and gender effects were revealed. 
Therefore 10- and 12-month-olds as well as male and female infants were combined 
for all further analyses. However, analyses examining the significance of the factors 
order of outcomes and kind of single object indicated that both factors influenced the 
results. In order to obtain a clearer picture of the results a subsequent analysis with 
order of outcomes and kind of single object as between-subject factors followed the 
primary analysis. 
 
 
6.7 Results 
 
Main Analysis  
 
To address the key question of whether infants individuate objects based on 
their domain-specific movements, a 2 (trial) x 2 (number of objects) repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with trial (baseline versus 
test) and number of objects (one versus two objects) as within-subject factors. 
Looking times to the one- and two-object display obtained during baseline trials were 
compared with the ones retained during test trials. The ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect for number of objects, F(1, 39) = 23.34, p ? .000, ?2 (partial eta squared) 
= 0.37. The descriptive statistics (cf. Table 1) show that overall infants of both age 
groups looked longer at the two-object display.  
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Table 1: Mean Looking Times (in seconds) and Standard Deviations of Experiment 1: 
Main Analysis with Trial and Number of Objects as Within-Subject Factors 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation N 
Baseline 
1 Object 11.29 4.03 40 
Baseline 
2 Objects 13.45 4.38 40 
Test 
1 Object 10.79 4.34 40 
Test 
2 Objects 13.00 4.01 40 
 
 
No other main effects or interactions approached significance in this analysis. Thus, 
the expected interaction between trial and number of objects failed to appear in both 
age groups. Figure 9 illustrates the results. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Results of Experiment 1 (N = 40): Mean looking times to the 1 Object 
versus 2 Object display in Baseline and Test  
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Based on preliminary analyses, which revealed an impact of the 
counterbalanced factors, order of outcomes and kind of single object were considered 
more completely in subsequent analyses. 
 
Subsequent Analyses 
  
Preliminary Analyses revealed that infants made different inferences 
depending on the order of outcomes condition (1_2 versus 2_1), and the kind of single 
object presented to them in the one-object display (bunny by itself versus tractor by 
itself). To examine the impact of these factors on 10- and 12-month-old infants’ 
looking times to the one and two object display in baseline and test, a 2 (trial) x 2 
(number of objects) x 2 (order of outcomes) x 2 (kind of single object) repeated 
measures mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. Trial (baseline 
versus test) and number of objects (one versus two objects) were within-subject 
factors and order of outcomes (1_2 versus 2_1) as well as kind of single object (bunny 
in the one-object display versus tractor in the one-object display) were the between-
subject factors. Besides the main effect for number of objects, F(4, 36) = 39.64, p ? 
.000, ?2 = 0.52, indicating that overall infants of both age groups looked longer at the 
two-object display, an interaction between number of objects and order of outcomes, 
F(4, 36) = 10.47, p = .003, ?2 = 0.23 was found. This effect could be traced back to 
the following difference: Infants who viewed the two-object display before the one-
object display looked significantly longer at the two-object display (M1 Object = 19.91, 
SD1 Object = 7.77; M2 Objects = 27.13, SD2 Objects = 8.84), t(17) = -5.99, p ? .000,  whereas 
infants who saw the one-object display first only showed a tendency to do so (M1 Object 
= 23.86, SD1 Object = 7.20; M2 Objects = 25.88, SD2 Objects = 5.77), t(21) = -1.84, p = .081. 
Further, there was a significant interaction between number of objects and kind of 
single object, F(4, 36) = 6.99, p = .012, ?2 = 0.16. Looking times to the one- and the 
two-object displays depended on whether the bunny or the tractor was shown as a 
single object in the one-object display. Surprisingly, infants in the bunny condition 
looked overall significantly longer at the two-object display (M1 Object = 21.15, SD1 
Object = 7.24; M2 Objects = 27.83, SD2 Objects = 6.98), t(19) = -7.47, p ? .000, compared to 
infants who saw the tractor as a single object and showed no such difference between 
the one- and the two-object display (M1 Object = 23.01, SD1 Object = 8.07; M2 Objects = 
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25.05, SD2 Objects = 7.41), t(19) = -1.45, p = .163. One potential explanation for this 
result could be that the tractor was more interesting. When testing for a-priori object 
preferences, however, the t-test yielded no significant preference for the bunny nor 
the tractor (MBunny = 10.94, SDBunny = 4.09; MTractor = 11.64, SDTractor = 4.04), t(38) = -
0.54, p = .590. This means that both objects were equally attractive to the infants 
when presented separately (i.e., one-object display) during baseline.  
In addition to the within-subject effects, the ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction of the between-subject factors order of outcomes and kind of single object, 
F(4, 36) = 10.47, p = .003, ?2 = 0.23. This effect suggests that the looking times vary 
between the conditions bunny and tractor as a single object in respect to the order of 
outcomes conditions. Thus, each order of outcomes condition was observed 
separately. When the one-object display preceded the two-object display (order of 
outcomes 1_2) infants looked overall longer in the condition that presented the tractor 
as single object, F(2, 20) = 4.87, p = .039, ?2 = 0.20. Further, infants in this condition 
looked overall longer at the two-object display, F(2, 20) = 6.37, p = .020, ?2 = 0.24. 
However, besides this main effect of the within-subject factor number of objects, the 
analysis revealed an interaction between the within-subject factors number of objects 
and kind of single object, F(2, 20) = 11.05, p = .003, ?2 = 0.36. This interaction 
signified that only in the condition where the bunny was the single object did infants 
look longer at the two-object display. When the tractor was the single object, infants 
looked equally long at the one- and two-object display. This explains the interaction 
between number of objects and kind of single object described above. In the event of 
order of outcome 1_2 infants actually showed an A-priori preference for the tractor. 
This preference continued to exist in test. Figure 10 illustrates the results for order of 
outcomes 1_2. In the reverse case when the two-object display came first (order of 
outcomes 2_1), infants looked altogether longer in the bunny condition, F(2, 16) = 
5.30, p = .035, ?2 = 0.25 and preferred overall the two-object display, F(2, 16) = 
33.61, p ? .000, ?2 = 0.68. Figure 11 maps the results for order of outcomes 2_1. No 
other comparisons reached significance. Table 2 lists the mean looking times and the 
corresponding standard deviations observed in the subsequent analyses of Experiment 
1.  
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Table 2: Mean Looking Times (in seconds) and Standard Deviations of Experiment 1: 
Subsequent Analyses with Order of Outcome and Kind of Single Object as 
Between-Subject Factors 
 
 Order of 
Outcomes 
Kind of Single 
Object 
Mean Standard Deviation N 
Bunny 9,63 3,97 10 
Tractor 13,59 3,40 12 12 
Total 11,79 4,11 22 
Bunny 12,25 3,97 10 
Tractor 8,71 3,13 8 21 
Total 10,68 3,96 18 
Bunny 10,94 4,09 20 
Tractor 11,64 4,04 20 
Baseline 
1 Object 
Total 
Total 11,29 4,03 40 
Bunny 12,83 4,16 10 
Tractor 13,87 4,24 12 12 
Total 13,40 4,13 22 
Bunny 15,04 4,34 10 
Tractor 11,59 4,90 8 21 
Total 13,50 4,79 18 
Bunny 13,93 4,29 20 
Tractor 12,96 4,53 20 
Baseline  
2 Objects 
 
Total 
Total 13,45 4,38 40 
Bunny 9,75 3,34 10 
Tractor 14,01 3,12 12 12 
Total 12,08 3,82 22 
Bunny 10,67 4,87 10 
Tractor 7,42 3,49 8 21 
Total 9,23 4,51 18 
Bunny 10,21 4,10 20 
Tractor 11,38 4,60 20 
Test 
1 Object 
 
Total 
Total 10,79 4,34 40 
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Bunny 11,85 2,31 10 
Tractor 13,00 3,92 12 
 
12 
Total 12,48 3,27 22 
Bunny 15,95 3,73 10 
Tractor 10,73 4,50 8 
21 
Total 13,63 4,78 18 
Bunny 13,90 3,68 20 
Tractor 12,09 4,20 20 
 
 
 
 
Test 
2 Objects 
Total 
Total 13,00 4,01 40 
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Figure 10. Results of Experiment 1 with order of outcome and kind of single object as 
between-subject factors (N = 40): Mean looking times to the 1-object versus 2-object 
display in baseline and test depending kind of single object in order of outcome 
condition 1_2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Results of Experiment 1 with order of outcome and kind of single object as 
between-subject factors (N = 40): Mean looking times to the 1-object versus 2-object 
display in Baseline and Test depending kind of single object in order of outcome 
condition 2_1. 
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6.8 Discussion of the Results 
 
Both 10- and 12-month old infants showed the same looking pattern in 
Experiment 1. Even though no age effect was expected, contrary to the hypothesis 
infants of both age groups devoted overall more visual attention to the two-object 
display. In other words, on average, infants had a strong preference for the two-object 
display independent of the trial (baseline or test) it was presented in. Overall greater 
looking times to the two-object display indicate on the one hand that the events shown 
in the familiarization phase (bunny jumping from behind an occluder and a tractor 
emerging from behind the same occluder after the bunny had disappeared there) did 
not build up any expectation in infants. On the other hand it signifies, that 10- as well 
as 12-month-old infants failed to demonstrate that they could use the different motion 
pattern displayed by an animate (bunny) and an inanimate object (tractor), when 
emerging successively from behind the left and right side of an occluder, to infer that 
there must be two distinct objects behind the screen. Hence, the hypothesis that 
infants who saw an animate and an inanimate object repeatedly travel from behind a 
screen would show greater looking to a one-object display (unexpected outcome) in 
relation to a two-objects display (expected outcome) in test compared to their initial 
looking pattern in baseline could not be affirmed in Experiment 1. This is especially 
surprising for the group of 12-month-old infants who according to the literature 
should be able to individuate objects on the basis of featural as well as kind 
information and therefore, react with surprise indicated by longer looking to the one-
object display in test (Baillargeon & Wilcox, 1998b; Surian et al., 2004; Xu & Carey, 
1996; Xu 2007). In contrast, in this study 12-month-olds showed neither that they 
were able to use the clear featural differences between the objects (bunny and tractor) 
nor that they made use of the distinct kind information both objects carried in their 
appearance and their domain-specific motion pattern.  
Preliminary analyses specified an influence of the counterbalanced factors 
order of outcomes and kind of single object on the variables of interest. Hence, 
subsequent analyses tested whether infants made different inferences depending on 
the order of outcomes and/ or kind of single object that was presented to them in the 
one-object display. One finding was that when the order of outcome was 1_2, infants 
in the tractor condition looked longer, whereas when the order of outcome was 2_1 
infants looked longer when the bunny was the single object. The latter difference 
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would be best attributed to a sample difference instead of a distinguished variation 
between groups. That is, because infants in the tractor condition demonstrated overall 
significantly less interest than infants in the bunny condition. Despite greater looking 
in the bunny condition, infants in both kind of single object groups showed a similar 
pattern of results, namely longer looking toward the two-object display when the 
order of outcome was 2_1. As to the effect in the opposite condition (order of 
outcome 1_2), subsequent analyses revealed that infants favored the two-object 
display overall, too, except here this preference only became significant when the 
bunny served as the single object. When the tractor was the single object in the on-
object display, infants looked independent of trial equally long toward the one- and 
the two-object display. This pattern of results could be traced back to the tractor being 
more interesting. When considering both objects attentively in the static displays it is 
evident that the bunny lacks detail compared to the tractor. Not only are the bunny’s 
eyes hard to detect but also its fur is a homogeneous color. On the contrary, the tractor 
has several shades of color, which define various parts. Although there was no overall 
a-priori preference for either object, evidence for this speculation came from the 
descriptive statistics, which suggested an initial baseline preference when the tractor 
was presented first as single object compared to when the bunny was shown first as 
single object. Additional results obtained through the subsequent analyses correspond 
to the preference explanation as well. When the tractor was added to the display (two-
object display) after infants saw the bunny, they observed the two-object display 
longer. In the case, the bunny was added to the display after infants watched the 
tractor no preference for the two-object display occurred. Nevertheless, even if a 
preference for the tractor existed it could not hold up in the condition in which both 
objects were presented together at first. Here infants examined the two-object display 
longer independent of whether they saw the bunny or tractor as kind of single object, 
which implies that the one-object display was less interesting when presented during 
the second test trial. This makes sense because not only is there less to see and 
examine in the display to begin with (half of the amount that is visible in the two-
object display) but also when the order of outcomes was 2_1 the object in the one-
object display had been part of the two-object display presented before. Hence, it is 
most likely that the prior examination lead to less interest or shorter processing time, 
which in turn interfered with any expectation for the single object during the second 
test trial. 
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More importantly, however, is the question why at least 12-month-old infants 
did not show object individuation. In all other individuation studies it was the case 
that the two-object display provided more to see and 12-month-old infants still 
overcame their looking time preference for two objects (e.g., Baillargeon & Wilcox, 
1998b, Surian et al., 2004; Xu and Carey, 1996). Thus, is the simple argumentation 
that there is more to see in the two-object display sufficient to explain 12-month-olds 
failure? Maybe there is a more complex cause. One problem that could add to the 
longer looking times toward two objects is that both objects might have been 
perceived as self-propelled leading to the perception of two animate objects. In one 
important dimension for the animate-inanimate distinction, namely self-propulsion, 
both objects were alike. According to Mandler’s (1992, 2004), animate beings 
distinguish oneself through moving self-propelled on a non-linear path. Even though 
the bunny irregularly jumping up and down implemented the later characteristic, the 
origin of the onset of motion was not explicit. At no point during the experiment did 
the infant see that the bunny started moving on its own whereas the tractor set in 
motion due to an external cause. Both objects came out from behind the occluder 
already moving and the reversal of their trajectory was concealed, too. The reasoning 
for such a setup was to avoid that infants see how the objects set in motion before 
they return behind the occluder again. This was supposed to avert that infants 
perceived the two objects as self-propelled. As research on the animate-inanimate 
distinction makes clear, infants at 7-months of age are able to remember previously 
moving objects and more over, expect self-propelled ones to start moving again when 
encountered later stationary (Markson & Spelke, 2006). However, due to the 
complexity of the individuation task, it might have been to complicated for infants to 
infer from the distinct pattern of motion the objects showed that only one of the 
objects could be self-propelled (the one with the irregular path of motion). Thus, it is 
possible that infants expected both objects to move again when they were presented 
stationary in test. Therefore, the expectation that two objects might move again 
elicited longer looking than the expectation that one entity sets back in motion. Even 
12-month-old infants might prefer the two-object display over the one-object display 
because they wait for the two objects to move again. Hence, this anticipation might 
overlay the expectation that two objects were involved in the familiarization event 
leading to the opposite looking pattern than hypothesized. However, against this 
explanation speaks the fact that there is no significant difference between baseline and 
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test trials. The expectation that one or both objects would start moving again can of 
course only arise after infants encountered the objects in motion. Because this was not 
until the familiarization phase, there should be either a variation in looking behavior 
between baseline and test trials or no difference between the one- and two-object 
display in baseline for this interpretation to count. The analyses do not show such 
patterns of results. Again, the latter could have been absent because of the fact that 
there is more to see in the two-object display. This is accompanied with another 
aspect that might be have contributed to the negative results in both age groups. It 
could be that the objects themselves are too complex and thus too interesting. It is 
possible that this not only distracts from the original task to determine whether one or 
more objects are involved in the familiarization event but more importantly it might 
cast a problem between the interpretation of form and motion information. As 
elaborated in Chapter 3.3 it is not that infants do not attend or perceive both form and 
motion. Research showed that young infants are able to attribute certain types of 
motion to particular entities (Pauen & Träuble, 2004) categorize motion (Arterberry 
& Bornstein, 2002), and make causal and goal attribution inferences about animate 
motion in absence of animate forms (Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Csibra et al., 
1999). Nevertheless, they still have difficulties tracking the kinds of motions 
associated with animate entities (such as expansion and contraction; Chiang & Wynn, 
2000; van Marle & Scholl, 2003) and integrating form and motion when the task 
requires associative learning, not simply resolving structure from motion, which is 
readily handled via perceptual processes (e.g., Domini et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 
2003; Wickelgren & Bingham, 2001). That is for instance, infants remember dynamic 
events after a 7-week delay but do not remember the specifics of the persons or 
objects shown in the events (Bahrick et al., 2002). In addition, because of infants’ 
sophisticated knowledge about which objects engage in animate motion (see Chapter 
3.2) one would reckon that they would be able to interpret the motion itself. However, 
despite an early detection of violations regarding object properties in occlusion, 
containment and support events (events that have predictable outcomes) they do not 
transfer animate and inanimate actions (actions that in real world situations do not 
have consistently predictable outcomes) to their associated forms until 9 months of 
age (e.g., Arterberry & Bornstein, 2001; Bertenthal et al., 1984). Using even more 
complex tasks (Rakison & Poulin Dubois, 2002), one can see that even in their second 
year of life, infants may still have difficulties coordinating form and motion 
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information perhaps because this kind of associative learning requires several trials 
and is generally not accessible to later reflection (e.g., as found in implicit learning 
tasks). 
The present procedure is a complex event-mapping task. Although the initial 
goal was to simplify the task for infants by providing salient domain-specific motion 
patterns in addition to featural kind information, it might have been the case that this 
added information made the task even more complex. As a result the detailed and 
interesting objects as well as the distinct motion pattern might have overloaded 
infants’ information processing capacities in the, in principal, complex event-mapping 
task.  
 
 
6.9 Summary 
 
The major result of Experiment 1 is the failure of 10- and 12-month-old 
infants to show object individuation. Instead of animate and inanimate motion as kind 
information, infants looking times depended on the individual object or the number of 
objects in the displays. Thus far it is not clear whether the complexity of the objects or 
the expectation for the objects to move again constituted the major influencing factor. 
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 lead to the conclusions that (1) the 
detailed realistic-looking objects are in conflict with the processing of the motion 
information as an individuation factor. (2) After all it cannot completely be ruled out 
that infants look longer at the two-object display because both objects were perceived 
as self-propelled and thus, generated more interest through the expectation that two 
objects would move again. 
Given the strong preference for the two-object display, in Experiment 2 the 
critical content-related as well as methodological points concerning object complexity 
and self-propulsion were modified in order to eliminate them as causes for the 
missing object individuation in Experiment 1. Consequently, goal of Experiment 2 
was to examine the primary hypothesis with a simplified task that followed the 
procedure of Experiment 1 but made use of simple yet perceptually distinct forms 
with very little detail. The removal of form characteristics allowed the investigation of 
whether 10- and 12-month-old infants process motion as an individuating factor by 
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itself. Additionally, the ambiguity regarding the self-propulsion dimension was 
eliminated. The changes are specified in more detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 – ABSTRACT MATERIAL 
 
 
7.1 Study Concept 
 
Experiment 2 was closely modeled after Experiment 1 but varied in the 
following critical aspects:  
First, one way of overcoming the preference for two objects is to make the 
entities less interesting. Instead of using real-life miniatures with a lot of detail (e.g. 
fur, stripes, legs, wheels) the objects were switched to a pair of very simple 
geometrical objects with little characteristics but still different in color and shape. A 
square and a round-shaped geometric form replaced the bunny and the tractor. 
Concerning both objects, the only direct cue for kind membership was the animate 
and inanimate movement the objects engaged in, respectively. However, to emphasize 
animacy the ball had a pulsating inside whereas the box did not (see for example 
Gelman, 1990, 2002, or Newman et al., 2008 for discussion). The question was 
whether the absence of perceptually salient, category specific feature information 
would help infants to focus on the domain-specific movement pattern and therefore, 
would facilitate the differentiation of kind on the basis of motion.  
Second, in order to better control for the influence of self-initiation two poles 
confined the end of the path on each side of the occluder. Contrary to Experiment 1 in 
which the objects traveled half way out of sight before moving back, in Experiment 2 
the inanimate object reversed its trajectory by bumping against a pole whereas the 
animated object returned without having any external contact (see Leslie, 1995 and 
Spelke, 1994 for infants’ expectations about contact).  
Third, Experiment 2 differed methodologically in respect to the timing of 
baseline and test trials, namely they were presented for 15 seconds instead of 20 
seconds. Pilot infants demonstrated boredom toward the end of the experimental 
session, which I attributed to the geometric forms with little detail. An additional 
distinction regarding the procedure was that after the baseline trials the experimenter 
calibrated. During calibration the experimenter entered the experimental room 
directing the infants attention to various points on and off screen. This had two 
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functions: first, it created a break between the baseline phase and the rest of the 
experiment and thus, diminished a possible influence of the baseline on infants’ 
performance in test. Second it served the purpose of pointing out the dimensions of 
the screen and the positions of the objects for later coding. Besides these structure 
variations the design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. 
 
 
7.2 Participants 
 
A total of 45 infants participated in the study. Twenty-one of the infants were 
10 months of age and 24 of them were 12 months old. Even though they were tested 
one 10-month-old infant and four 12-month-old infants had to be discarded from the 
final sample due to experimenter error (2) and fussiness or crying (3). Infants making 
up the final sample ranged in age from 10 months, 00 days to 10 months, 23 days 
(mean age = 10 months, 11 days) and 12 months, 03 days to 12 months, 29 days 
(mean age = 12 months, 17 days). All were full-term healthy infants who showed 
typical development. During the experimental session, one 10-month-old infant sat on 
its parents’ lab for the study and one 12-month-old subject who began the study in the 
infant seat had to be switched to the parent’s lab. 
 
 
7.3 Stimuli 
 
Four PowerPoint Presentations served as stimulus material in Experiment 2. 
Each presentation contained of 59 slides and was exactly the same except for 
variations regarding the order of outcome and the kind of single object in the one-
object displays. A blue ball with a red dot in the center and a red box with a blue 
square in the middle represented the animate and the inanimate object, respectively. 
The ball had a diameter of 2 cm in the slide and 13.5 cm on screen. In the presentation 
the square was 2 cm high and 2 cm long; on screen its length was 12.5 cm and its 
width was 13 cm. When in motion the ball engaged in a jumping movement following 
an irregular path, which was different on the way to the side and on the return. 
Furthermore, it changed on every trial. Thus, the ball covered a total of 12 dissimilar 
routes. This was done to emphasize the liveliness of this particular object. 
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Additionally, for the same reason the dot that ball contained in the center pulsated two 
of three times as the ball landed on the ground during the jumping motion. The third 
time the dot remained its original size because the infant was supposed to see that this 
action was not always performed. This was important in regard to the stationary 
scenes in which both objects did not move at all. In contrast the box moved on a 
linear path to the side and returned in the same manner. There was no internal motion 
of the blue square in the center if the box. Besides the two objects the slides contained 
a grey occluder (slide size 4.7 cm x 5.6 cm and 35.25 cm x 42 cm screen size) and 
two black poles on each side of screen (slide size 3.9 x 0.5 cm and screen size 28.5 x 
4 cm). The occluder covered the objects during baseline, familiarization and test 
while the poles served as barriers (0.25 cm from the picture margin and 3 cm from the 
edge of the screen). The floor on which the objects rested and moved had a dark grey 
color and the background was white (see Appendix C for a display of stimuli and 
general procedure). 
The first slide of the PowerPoint Presentation was completely black 
containing no objects. It was projected while the infants got situated to begin the task. 
The following 57 slides incorporated baseline, familiarization, and test trials of the 
individuation task. The last slide was identical to the beginning slide. The 
PowerPoint-Presentation had a total length of 3 minutes and 83 seconds. Appendix D 
illustrates the course of presentation of the experiment. 
 
 
7.4 Procedure 
 
The order of events most closely corresponded to Experiment 1. The task 
started out with a black slide. A bell sound initiated the beginning of the first trial of 
the baseline phase. Either the ball or the box or both objects30 were statically 
presented for 15 seconds. No screen was involved. Thereafter a black slide came on 
for 1 second and with the next bell sound the opposite event was shown. When the 
presentation started with the one-object display the two-object display turned up in 
the second baseline trial and vice versa.  In the following the screen was introduced. 
                                                
30 The ball was situated on the left side whereas the box was positioned on the right side. In the two-
object display both objects were situated at the same place 1.5 cm (11.25 cm when projected) apart. 
This set up was kept through out the presentation. 
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Accompanied by a bell sound it descended and rose back into view. This sequence 
was repeated. 
 Then the familiarization phase began. The occluder stood in the middle of the 
display. Ball and box emerged alternately from each side of the screen. The ball rolled 
from behind the occluder and jumped to the left side covering a distance of 6 cm in 4 
seconds. Just before the pole the ball paused for a second with the red dot pulsating 
and then jumped on its own back behind the occluder. After roughly 2 seconds (the 
time it would take the ball to get with constant speed to the other edge of the screen) 
the box emerged at the right side of the screen. It slid to the right until it hit the pole 
from where it returned. It appears as if the collision caused the trajectory reversal. 
Distance and timing were matched to the ball. This sequence was repeated four times, 
which means that the infant saw the ball emerging four times to the left and the box 
four times to the right. The objects were never simultaneously visible to the infant.  
After viewing these familiarization trials infants observed the first test trial in 
which the occluder descended (while the bell tone sounded) uncovering either one 
object (unexpected outcome) or two objects (expected outcome) depending on the 
order of outcomes in the previously presented baseline sequence. That is, infants who 
were presented with the ball as a single object at first saw the ball only at first in test, 
too. Looking time was monitored after the screen was completely out of sight. The 
trial ended after 15 seconds after which the occluder rose back up and a black slide 
came on. A second set of two complete familiarization emergences followed. They 
mirrored the first familiarization trials. Thereafter the second test trial ensued with the 
opposite outcome to the first. That is, when infants looked at both objects in second 
place during baseline then two objects were pictured second in test. 
 
  
7.5 Scoring 
 
Infants were videotaped for the purpose of off-line coding after the experiment 
was completed. The videotapes showed the infant and part of the display. The latter 
was covered during the baseline and test coding process to assure observer’s 
impartiality to the experimental condition. The sound on the tape indicated start- and 
endpoint of the trials. Familiarization was scored, by simply indicating if the infant 
recognized each object appearance. Two independent coders measured left and right 
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looking times for every infant on baseline and test trials from the videotape with a 
stopwatch. 
 
 
7.6 Data Analysis 
 
The statistical analyses of Experiment 2 were as well based on a final sample 
of 40 infants. As in Experiment 1 only infants who saw at least one complete 
sequence (i.e., emergence and return of both objects) over the course of the 
familiarization phase were included in the final sample. The dependent measure was 
again infant’s looking time, as indexed by the cumulative duration of their visual 
fixation to each of the baseline and the test slides. Analyses were completed with the 
mean looking times of coder A and B. Inter-observer reliability for baseline and test 
looking times was assessed by Person r. The reliability was r = .99 and reached 
significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)31. 
As in Experiment 1 the statistical analyses checked whether there was a shift 
in infants’ looking times to the one and two object display from baseline to test. 
Again age should not have an impact, because it is hypothesized that both age groups 
are able to solve the object-individuation task based on motion information as 
differentiating kind information. Preliminary analyses examined this assumption. In 
addition, the factors gender, order of outcomes (1_2 versus 2_1), and kind of single 
object (ball in the one-object display versus box in the one-object display) could have 
potential influence on results (as shown in Experiment 1) and thus, their influence 
was screened beforehand, too. 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 
As in Experiment 1 preliminary analyses were performed to check for age and 
gender effects. Similarly to the preliminary results in Experiment 1, both factors had 
no overall impact on the looking times in Experiment 2. Therefore, data from 10- and 
12-month-olds as well as male and female infants were combined for all further 
analyses. Comparable to Experiment 1 the influence of the factors order of outcomes 
                                                
31 All statistical tests reported in Experiment 2 are two-tailed. 
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(1_2 versus 2_1) and kind of single object (ball in the one-object display versus box 
in the one-object display) was examined. These analyses indicated that both factors 
were again associated with some effects. Thus, as in Experiment 1 subsequent 
analyses with order of outcomes and kind of single object as between-subject factors 
followed the main analysis of Experiment 2. 
 
 
7.7 Results 
 
Main Analyses 
  
To address our primary question of whether infants individuate simple, 
abstract objects based on their domain-specific movements, a 2 (trial) x 2 (number of 
objects) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with trial 
(baseline versus test) and number of objects (one versus two objects) as within-
subject factors. Looking times to the one- and two-object display obtained in baseline 
trials were compared with the ones retained in test trials. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for trial F(1, 39) = 9.76, p = .003, ?2 = 0.20 as well as number 
of objects F(1, 39) = 16.28, p ? .000, ?2 = 0.30. Mean looking times displayed in 
Table 3 demonstrate that overall infants looked longer during test trials and preferred 
the two-object display. 
 
 
Table 3: Mean Looking Times (in seconds) and Standard Deviations of Experiment 2: 
Main Analyses with Trial and Number of Objects as Within-Subject Factors 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation N 
Baseline 
1 Object 7.12 2.92 40 
Baseline 
2 Objects 8.62 3.50 40 
Test 
1 Object 8.51 2.97 40 
Test 
2 Objects 9.93 2.88 40 
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In common with Experiment 1, the hypothesized interaction between trial and 
number of objects did not arise in the main analysis of Experiment 2. Figure 12 
illustrates the results obtained through this analysis. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Results of Experiment 2: Main Analysis (N = 40): Mean looking times to 
the 1-object versus 2-object display in baseline and test  
 
 
Preliminary analyses made aware of an impact the counterbalanced factors 
order of outcomes and kind of single object had on infants’ looking times. Thus, 
corresponding subsequent analyses were carried out to get to the bottom of it. 
 
Subsequent Analyses 
 
The influence of the factors order of outcomes and kind of single objects was 
assed by a 2 (trial) x 2 (number of objects) x 2 (order of outcomes) x 2 (kind of single 
objects) repeated measures mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial 
(baseline versus test) and number of objects (one versus two objects) as within-
subject factors and order of outcomes (1_2 vs. 2_1) as well as kind of single object 
(ball in the one-object display versus box in the one-object display) as between-
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subject factors. This analysis generated two within-subject main effects, trial F(4, 36) 
= 10.76, p =.002, ?2 = 0.23 and number of objects F(4, 36) = 20.53, p ? .000, ?2 = 
0.36 as well as a marginal significant between-subject main effect, order of outcomes 
F(4, 36) = 3.90, p = .056, ?2 = 0.10. Overall, infants looked significantly longer in test 
and preferred the two-object display. Further, infants look reliably longer in the order 
of outcomes condition 2_1.  
Additionally, several interactions turned out significant. In regard to the 
within-subject factors, trial interacted with the factor order of outcomes F(4, 36) = 
4.89, p = .033, ?2 = 0.12. Follow-up T-Tests pointed out that infants only looked 
significantly longer in test compared to baseline when the two-object display was 
presented first (MBaseline = 16.10, SDBaseline = 4.59; MTest = 20.60, SDTest = 3.03), t(19) = 
-3.83, p = .001. In the condition in which infants saw the one-object display first no 
such difference between baseline and test looking times occurred (MBaseline = 15.40, 
SDBaseline = 7.13; MTest = 16.27, SDTest = 4,15), t(19) = -0.77, p = .454. Number of 
objects interacted with order of outcomes as well F(4, 36) = 4.25, p = .047, ?2 = 0.11. 
The T-Test comparison yielded that infants who saw the two-object display first 
looked significantly longer to the two-object display (M1 Object = 16.23, SD1 Object = 
3.26; M2 Objects = 20.47, SD2 Objects = 4.20), t(19) = -3.91, p = .001, whereas infants who 
viewed the one-object display first showed only a tendency in that direction (M1 Object 
= 15.04, SD1 Object = 5.75; M2 Objects = 16.63, SD2 Objects = 5.45), t(19) = -1.80, p = .088. 
The more over, an interaction between number of objects and kind of single object 
reached significance F(4, 36) = 7.78, p = .008, ?2 = 0.18. Under circumstances where 
the box was visible in the one-object display, infants looked reliably longer at the 
two-object display (MBall = 14.42, SDBall = 4.53; MBox = 19.14, SDBox = 6.08), t(19) = -
4.99, p ? .000. This was not the case when the ball was shown in the one-object 
display MBall = 16.84, SDBall = 4.56; MBox = 17.96, SDBox = 4.18), t(19) = -1.17, p = 
.255. Concerning the between-subject effects, an interaction between the factor order 
of outcomes and the factor kind of single object was found F(4, 36) = 5.58, p = .024, 
?2 = 0.13. Subsequent ANOVAs elucidated that the kind of single object presented in 
the one-object display tended to influence infants looking only when the displays 
were shown in the order 2_1, F(2, 18) = 4.02, p = .060, ?2 = 0.19. When the order of 
outcomes was 1_2 the kind of single object featured in the one-object display had no 
effect on infants looking times F(2, 18) = 2.60, p = .124, ?2 = 0.13. The results point 
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to a favor of the box when the two-object display was presented first. All other 
possible effects turned out non-significant. Mean looking times and the corresponding 
standard deviations are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Mean Looking Times (in seconds) and Standard Deviations of Experiment 2: 
Subsequent Analyses with Order of Outcomes and Kind of Single Object as 
Between-Subject Factors 
 
 Order of 
Outcomes 
Kind of 
Single Object 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
Ball 6,85 2,91 5 
Box 6,44 4,25 5 12 
Total 6,64 3,44 10 
Ball 5,18 2,01 5 
Box 6,64 2,60 5 21 
Total 5,91 2,32 10 
Ball 6,02 2,52 10 
Box 6,54 3,32 10 
Baseline 
1 Object 
Total 
Total 6,28 2,88 20 
Ball 8,78 4,96 5 
Box 7,43 4,95 5 12 
Total 8,12 4,73 10 
Ball 6,84 2,15 5 
Box 9,40 2,82 5 21 
Total 8,12 2,72 10 
Ball 7,81 3,75 10 
Box 8,42 3,94 10 
Baseline  
2 Objects 
Total 
Total 8,11 3,75 20 
Ball 8,69 4,30 5 
Box 6,22 2,47 5 12 
Total 7,46 3,56 10 
Ball 11,41 2,94 5 
Box 9,44 1,65 5 21 
Total 10,43 2,47 10 
Ball 10,05 3,75 10 
Box 7,83 2,61 10 
Test 
1 Object 
Total 
Total 8,94 3,35 20 
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Ball 9,50 3,03 5 
Box 8,30 0,87 5 
 
12 
Total 8,90 2,19 10 
Ball 9,73 2,77 5 
Box 12,30 2,34 5 21 
Total 11,02 2,77 10 
Ball 9,62 2,74 10 
Box 10,30 2,69 10 
 
 
 
 
Test 
2 Objects 
Total 
Total 9,96 2,66 20 
 
 
The following Figure 13 and Figure 14 graph the reported results. 
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Figure 13. Results of Experiment 2: Subsequent Analyses (N = 20): Mean looking 
times to the 1-object versus 2-object display in baseline and test depending on the 
kind of single object in order of outcome 1_2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Results of Experiment 2: Subsequent Analyses (N = 20): Mean looking 
times to the 1-object versus 2-object display in baseline and test depending on the 
kind of single object in order of outcome 2_1. 
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7.8 Discussion of the Results 
 
The question of Experiment 2 was whether infants make use of motion as kind 
information to establish the number of objects in an event under conditions where 
object complexity is reduced to a minimum and domain-specific movements are the 
only information for drawing conclusions regarding object kind. The results of 
Experiment 2 indicate no affirmation for the hypothesis that 10- and 12-month-old 
infants would individuate different object kinds by means of their kind distinct 
motion. The removal of form characteristics and the simplification of the task did not 
change the general pattern of results of Experiment 1.  
As reported in Experiment 1, infants of both age groups looked overall longer 
at the two-object display in Experiment 2. Infants showed no surprise when only one 
object was presented in test suggesting that they did not individuate simple, abstract 
objects on the basis of motion patterns as kind information even when this was the 
most salient source of information available. The result is especially puzzling in 
regard to the group of 12-month-old infants. Could it be that even 12-month-old 
infants are unable to establish the number of simple objects by means of domain-
specific motion patterns? Several previous studies demonstrated that in fact infants 
several months younger are able to individuate geometric forms (e.g., Kaldy & Leslie, 
2003; Tremoulet et al., 2000; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a, b), which makes it 
unlikely that the choice of objects is accountable for the missing object individuation. 
However, most of these studies did not use a within-subject design but implemented a 
between-subject design for the comparison of baseline and test trials. Hence, besides 
an inability of infants to solve the individuation task on the basis of motion 
information, it might be that the baseline presentation interferes with infants’ 
reasoning in test. To rule out this possibility the present study is repeated without 
baseline trials in Experiment 3.  
Nevertheless, the other main effect in this study as well as the findings of the 
subsequent analyses speak against a complete failure to make sense of the provided 
information. Besides the preference of the two-object display, the main effect trial 
pointed to an increased interest in the test displays. This could be partly in 
consequence of infants’ expectancy that the objects would start moving again. While 
watching the motion events infants build up this expectation and thus, reacted with 
longer looking toward the test displays compared to the baseline presentation. 
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Therefore, the information displayed during familiarization had an effect on infants’ 
reactions in test. Nevertheless, infants showed no surprise when only one object was 
present. One reason could be that infants’ anticipation that two objects would start 
moving again exceeded the expectation that one object would set in motion. However, 
this would only be the case if infants did not make use of the box’s return motion 
resulted from contact to the pole whereas the ball reversed its trajectory self-initiated. 
Research on infants understanding of the contact principle provides evidence that 
already 7-month-olds differentiate origins of movement, which in turn they use to 
reason about animacy as well as agency (e.g., Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Pauen & 
Träuble, 2004; Oakes & Cohen, 1990; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Spelke, Philips, 
& Woodward, 1995). 
What additional reasons could be considered for this renewed failure? 
Subsequent analyses demonstrated that infants’ looking behavior toward the one- and 
two-object display was affected by the order of outcomes as well as the kind of single 
object presented in the one-object display. Infants preferred the two-object display 
and looked longer in test when the order of outcome was 2_1. Why the factor order of 
outcome exerted influence on these findings remains speculative and must be 
discussed in light of the following effects. Aside from the order of outcomes, infants’ 
favor of the two-object display was particularly evident in the box condition. Further, 
overall infants looked longer in the order of outcomes condition 2_1 when the box 
was the single object in the one-object display. Taken everything into account, 
infants’ looking pattern could be explained as follows. It is possible that infants take 
the number of objects as well as the event information presented in the first test trial 
into account when looking at the second test trial. Concerning the number of objects, 
a favor of the two-object display in the order of outcomes condition 2_1 points to the 
explanation discussed in Chapter 6.9, namely infants look longer at the two-object 
display because there was more to see. Therefore, the one-object display is less 
interesting/ needs less processing time after the two-object display was presented. In 
regard to event information, infants may have different expectations in conjuncture 
with conceptions about animacy such as self-propulsion or agency in general. 
Together with the effect that order of outcomes also impacted infants’ looking 
preference in regard to the one- or two-object display it might be possible that infants 
had particular expectations concerning the two-object display. One such expectation 
could bear on the objects behavior. Not only would it be possible to assume that the 
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objects could start moving again but that the presumably animate object interacts with 
the inanimate object. Thus, infants might analyze the behavior of the previously 
animate and inanimate acting objects. After all, infants were taught during 
familiarization that one object has animate attributes (ball) and one objects represents 
inanimate features (box). Thus, consider the following scenarios on infants’ 
reasoning: 
In the order of outcome condition 2_1 infants might have had the expectation 
that the ball would either moved again or that the ball would interact with the box 
during the first test trial. Since both objects stayed motionless infants maintained their 
expectation that the ball would move again in case the ball constituted the one-object 
display during the second test trial, whereas they did not look for the box to move or 
behave in an interesting way on its own. Therefore, infants paid less attention to the 
one-object display containing the box. In contrast, when the order of outcome was 
1_2 infants awaited the ball to move again during the first test trial, but because the 
ball failed to do so this expectation diminished for the second test trial in which then 
both objects were present. In the condition in which the box was the single object in 
the first test trial, infants expected no action and hence spend little time watching this 
display. However, when the ball was visible with the box in the second test trial infant 
looked longer in anticipation of something interesting (ball interacts with the box). 
The data adumbrates that when the one-object display preceded the two-object display 
in baseline and test and the ball was the single object in the one-object display infants 
showed a slight trend to favor the ball display in test. No such preference was 
apparent for this order of outcome in the box condition. On the contrary, when the 
two-object display came in view before the one-object display during baseline and 
test trials infants tended to look longer to the two-object display in test. This was 
especially the case in the box condition. Thus, instead of engaging in object 
individuation and concentrating on the number of objects present or absent, infants 
might be more concerned with the objects’ behavior. Due to the distinct motion 
information, concepts such as animacy and agency might have been activated in 
infants. According to Mandler (2004), characteristic types of motion such as self-
instigated versus caused movement, regular versus irregular path of motion, and 
moving without any force acting on it versus made to move are the basis for the 
formation of the global concepts animate and inanimate in early childhood. Hence, 
rather than solving an individuation task by means of domain-specific motion 
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patterns, infants might be occupied with expectations concerning the animate-
inanimate distinction. Similarly, certain motion attributes displayed by the objects 
might suggest intentionality (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Particularly the internal 
pulsation as well as the self-initiated reversal of trajectory identifying the animate 
object might have contributed to the impression that the animate object is an agent 
(see General Discussion p. 142 for further explanation). Nevertheless, the data is only 
suggestive and the sample sizes of these subgroups are small (N = 10). Therefore, this 
should not lead to any general conclusions. In order for the interpretation that infants 
reason about motion instead of the number of objects to hold, further research is 
needed. One way to investigate whether the kind information as presented in this set 
of studies is hindering infants to individuate is by giving clear information regarding 
the number of objects (Experiment 4). However, before, let us consider one 
methodological control. As mentioned earlier at this point it is not clear whether the 
baseline influenced infants looking behaviors in test (Experiment 3). 
 
 
7.9 Summary 
 
 Taken together, the removal of form characteristics and the simplification of 
the task did not change the trend of results observed in Experiment 1. The findings of 
Experiment 2 indicate that even though infants make use of the information presented 
during familiarization, they have difficulty to individuate the objects in the present 
task by means of their kind information displayed in form of motion patterns. One 
aspect of the study design might interfere with the actual task to establish the number 
of objects. Problematic with the within-subject approach is that spatiotemporal 
information for two objects is given when presenting the two-object display in 
baseline. This might result in conflicting information available for infants to rely on. 
To avoid possible impacts of the information given during baseline calibration was 
done after the baseline phase. Nevertheless, the within-subject baseline might cause 
carry-over effects from baseline to test and therefore, influence infants’ reaction in 
test. Experiment 3 investigates this possibility.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 – BASELINE CONTROL 
 
 
8.1 Study Concept 
 
Experiment 3 ascertains a possible influence of the baseline presentation on 
infants’ looking behavior in test. After all a within-subject baseline in which the one- 
and two-object display are presented reveals strictly speaking spatiotemporal 
information about the number of objects. Theoretically, however, such a potential 
influence should have lead infants to the assumption that two objects are involved in 
the event with the result of longer looking to the one-object display in test. 
Nevertheless, infants showed a strong preference for two objects in Experiment 1 and 
2. Partly this bias for two objects was already observed in baseline. Thus, one might 
argue that the intrinsic preference for longer looking at two objects might have 
swamped the effect of infant’s expectation for two objects despite a break between 
baseline and the rest of the experiment that was inserted in the procedure of 
Experiment 2. To investigate this concern Experiment 2 is repeated without the 
baseline trials. Besides this modification the design and procedure were identical to 
Experiment 2. The study was done only with 12-month-old infants, because the two 
previous experiments did not yield any promising results for 10-month-olds. It is 
more likely to find out why infants prefer the two-object display in this set of studies 
when an age group is tested which is assumed to solve such a task. According to the 
literature, infants 12 months of age are supposed to individuate objects on the basis of 
kind information (e.g., Surian et al., 2004; Xu, 2003, 2007; Xu & Carey, 1996). In 
order to find out if the within-subject baseline contributed to infants’ failure to 
individuate in the previous experiments and whether infants are able to individuate on 
the basis of distinct object motion pattern the task immediately starts out with the 
familiarization phase followed by the test trials. For the analyses test looking times of 
Experiment 3 are compared between subjects to the corresponding baseline looking 
times of Experiment 2. 
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8.2 Participants 
 
A total of 22 infants who were 12 months of age participated in the study. 
Two infants were discarded from the final sample due fussiness. Infants who 
remained in the final sample ranged in age from 12 months, 01 days to 12 months, 26 
days (mean age = 12 months, 9 days). All were full-term healthy babies and had no 
known visual or auditory abnormalities. Two infants sat on their parents’ lab for the 
duration of the experimental session. 
 
 
8.3 Stimuli 
 
The PowerPoint Presentations employed in Experiment 2 was used in 
Experiment 3 with one modification. The baseline phase consisting of the one- and 
two-object display was deleted and left out of the experiment. Due to the missing 
baseline phase the presentation contained 50 slides instead of 59 slides and had a total 
length of 3 minutes and 27 seconds compared to 3 minutes and 83 seconds. Thus, 
each of the randomized PowerPoint Presentation began with the screen introduction 
(see Appendix F for a detailed description of the course of the experimental 
presentation). 
 
 
8.4 Procedure 
 
The order of events was except for the exclusion of the baseline phase exactly 
the same as in Experiment 2. Thus, the task started with the introduction of the screen 
in which the screen moved up and down. Thereafter, the presentation proceeded 
directly with the familiarization phase, followed by the outcomes of the test trials (see 
Experiment 2, p. 106 as well as Appendix E). The order of outcomes (1_2 versus 2_1) 
as well as the kind of single object (ball versus box) was randomized between 
subjects. 
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8.5 Scoring 
 
The coding procedure was identical to Experiment 2. 
 
 
8.6 Data Analysis 
 
The statistical analyses of Experiment 3 were based on a final sample of 20 
infants. Just like in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 only infants who saw at least one 
complete sequence (i.e., emergence and return of both objects) over the course of the 
familiarization phase were included in the final sample. The dependent measure was 
once more infant’s looking time, as indexed by the cumulative duration of their visual 
fixation to each of the baseline and the test slides. Analyses were completed with the 
mean looking times of coder A and B. Inter-observer reliability for baseline and test 
looking times was assessed by Person r. The reliability for the coding times of coder 
A and coder B was r = .95 in Experiment 3, reaching significance at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed)32. 
Because there was no baseline in Experiment 3, the comparison of looking 
times toward the one-object and the two-object displays in baseline and test trials was 
done by checking the test trials from Experiment 3 against the baseline trials from 
Experiment 2 in order to examine the hypothesized influence of a within-subject 
baseline. Thereby, the data was matched according to gender, order of outcomes 
condition, and the kind of single object that was presented in the one-object display. 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 
As in the preceded experiments preliminary analyses were performed to check 
for gender effects, and a possible influence of the counterbalanced factors order of 
outcomes (1_2 versus 2_1) and the kind of single object in the one-object displays 
(ball in the one-object display versus box in the one-object display). Neither a gender 
effect was observed nor did the counterbalanced factors order of outcomes and kind 
of single object reveal an influence on the interesting variables in this experiment. 
                                                
32 All statistical tests reported in Experiment 3 are two-tailed. 
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Therefore, data of male and female infants were combined for all analyses and 
because the between-subject factors had no major impact on the variables of interest 
no subsequent analyses are reported for Experiment 3. 
 
 
8.7 Results 
 
Main Analysis 
  
A 2 (trial) x 2 (number of objects) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to determine if a baseline presentation affects infants 
expectations regarding the number of objects in an object individuation task. If this 
was the case, 12-month-old infants’ would be expected to show a different outcome 
of results as in Experiment 2. By implementing a between-subject baseline-test 
comparison, Experiment 3 reassesses the within-subject design of Experiment 2. Trial 
(baseline versus test) and number of objects (one versus two objects) served as 
within-subject factors. Looking times to the one- and two-object display obtained in 
baseline trials from 12-month-old infants of Experiment 2 were compared with the 
ones retained in test trials of Experiment 3. The ANOVA solely revealed a significant 
main effect for number of objects F(1, 19) = 15.89, p = .001, ?2 = 0.46. Mean looking 
times displayed in Table 5 demonstrate that overall infants of both age groups 
preferred the two-object display. 
 
 
Table 5: Mean Looking Times (in seconds) and Standard Deviations of Experiment 3: 
Main Analyses with Trial and Number of Objects as Within-Subject Factors 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation N 
Baseline 
1 Object 
7,97 2,77 20 
Baseline 
2 Objects 
9,13 3,24 20 
Test 
1 Object 
8,11 2,75 20 
Test 
2 Objects 
10,55 2,66 20 
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No other effects reached significance. Figure 15 below plots the results 
obtained in Experiment 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Results of Experiment 3 (N = 20): Mean looking times of 12-month-old 
infants to the 1 Object versus 2 Object display in Baseline (data from Experiment 2) 
and Test (data from Experiment 3) 
 
 
This outcome is in accordance with the findings in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. Additional reviewing of the test looking times toward the one-object 
display and the two-object display independent of any baseline trials established that 
the preference for the two-object display held up. A T-Test analysis of the looking 
times to either display in test resulted in longer looking to the two-object display (M1 
Object = 8.10, SD1 Object = 2.75; M2 Objects = 10.55, SD2 Objects = 2.66), t(19) = -4.02, p = 
.001. Thus, after solely viewing the familiarization trials 12-month-old infants did not 
show any surprise when there was just one object presented. 
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8.8 Discussion of the Results 
 
Despite a between-subject baseline, 12-month-old infants still preferred to 
look at the two-objects display in Experiment 3. This indicates that even without prior 
information about the possible number of objects behind the occluder, infants were 
not surprised when just one object was visible during test after viewing two objects 
engage in domain-specific movements. The general finding that 12-month-old infants 
show no sign of object individuation on the basis of domain-specific motion patterns 
remains even when test looking times are checked against between-subject baseline 
measures and thus, the analyses followed Xu and Carey’s (1996). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that a within-subject baseline is probably not the reason for a failure to 
solve the task and individuate the objects involved in the familiarization event by 
means of their domain-specific motion pattern. This leaves open the possibility that 
the stimuli facet motion pattern interferes with infants reasoning about the number of 
objects involved in the events. It might be that the fact that the objects engage in 
domain-specific movement distracts from the original task, namely establishing the 
number of objects, which go in and out of sight. Infants 12 months of age have been 
repeatedly shown to be able to solve an object individuation task in different settings 
and with a variety of stimuli (e.g., Baillargeon, 2004; Xu and Carey, 1996). 
Therefore, it might be that infants reason about motion instead of solving the 
individuation problem in the task at hand. One way to test this is by running a control 
condition in which spatiotemporal information is provided. Research has 
demonstrated that independent of task and stimulus material infants from as early as 3 
months of age are able to individuate objects on the basis of spatiotemporal 
information. This question is investigated in Experiment 4. 
Even though a within-subject baseline has been found to not influence infants’ 
reaction to the one or two-object display, the findings suggest that it leads to an 
influence of the counterbalanced factors order of outcomes and kind of single object. 
When implemented within subjects as in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the baseline 
trials seemed to trigger different expectations depending on the order of outcomes and 
the kind of single object used. In Experiment 3 in which no baseline trials were shown 
such impact could not be registered in the analyses. Nevertheless, because it depends 
on the sample if infants show a preference for two objects in baseline trials (see 
results of the main analyses in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 a within-subject 
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baseline procedure is not only justified but actually strongly needed. For that reason 
and in order to ensure comparability, Experiment 4 uses the same procedure as 
Experiment 2. 
 
 
8.9 Summary 
 
Experiment 3 can be summarized as follows: 12-month-old infants did not 
show any sign of object individuation even when they did not view any baseline trials 
and their looking times in test were compared to baseline measures from a different 
sample of infants. Successful object individuation would have been indicated by 
longer looking to the one-object display in test compared to corresponding looking 
times in baseline trials. Instead 12-month-old infants in Experiment 3 looked overall 
longer to the two-object display. Thus, infants 12 months of age failed to solve the 
individuation task in a between-subject design where their looking responses in test 
could have not been influenced by a baseline presentation. Hence, including a within-
subject baseline does not explain the failure of 12-month-old infants to apply domain-
specific motion information as an individuation factor. However, it does not seem free 
of influence either, because it removed most of the between-subject factors (order of 
outcome and kind of single object) impacts. Thus, the motion information provided 
might have obstructed infants to solve the individuation task. Motion is a very salient 
feature and might activate other cognitive processes or concepts infants reason about. 
Thus, Experiment 4 tests whether motion information might divert from the task. For 
reasons of comparability Experiment 4 maintains the general procedure even though 
the factors of order of outcomes and kind of single object had an influence on infants 
looking times in the previous studies. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 – SPATIOTEMPORAL CONDITION CONTROL 
 
 
9.1 Study Concept 
 
Experiment 4 addresses the question whether 12-month-old infants are able to 
solve the task at hand when spatiotemporal information is given in addition to kind 
information. Research on object individuation showed that spatiotemporal 
information is the first and most important type of information that young infants base 
their inferences on when establishing how many objects are involved in an event. 
Thus, they should be able to solve this task because they do so in other studies 
regardless of the procedure and stimuli used. In order to test whether the so far 
reported failures are due to an inability to individuate objects on the basis of domain-
specific motion patterns or because of methodological issues, Experiment 4 provides 
infants spatiotemporal information that there two distinct objects are involved in the 
event. 
 
 
9.2 Participants 
 
A total of 25 infants 12 months of age participated in Experiment 4. Five 
infants were discarded from the final sample due to experimenter error (2) and 
fussiness or crying (3). Infants constituting the final sample ranged in age from 12 
months, 00 days to 12 months, 29 days (mean age =12 months, 17 days). All were 
full-term healthy babies and had no known visual or auditory abnormalities. Two 
infants sat on their parents’ lab for the duration of the experimental session. 
 
 
9.3 Stimuli 
 
Experiment 4 used the PowerPoint-Presentations of Experiment 2 with one 
critical modification. In order to provide infants with spatiotemporal information a 
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slide in which both objects appear beside the left and right side of the occluder was 
inserted into the presentation. After the baseline phase and the introduction of the 
screen the ball jumped out to the left and the box moved to the right on a linear path. 
This scene was repeated right before the second familiarization. The timing of ball 
and box movement was coordinated and both objects remained in sight for 5 seconds 
before a transition was made to the familiarization phase via a black slide. Due to the 
additional slides before each familiarization phase the presentation contained 63 
slides instead of the original 59 slides and had a total length of 4 minutes and 23 
seconds compared to 3 minutes and 83 seconds. 
 
 
9.4 Procedure 
 
Even though order of outcome has a hard to interpret influence on infants 
looking times, for reasons of comparability the order of events was the same as in 
Experiment 2 besides in respect to one important difference. The task started out with 
the baseline phase in which the one- and two-object outcomes were shown. This 
presentation was followed by the introduction of the screen. Thereafter, a scene in 
which the occluder stood in the center of the slide and both objects moved 
simultaneously to the left and the right of the occluder was shown (spatiotemporal 
information slide). After 5 seconds in which the objects remained in sight without any 
motion the presentation proceeded with the familiarization phase. After test trial one 
the spatiotemporal information slide was repeated before the experiment continued as 
described before (see Experiment 2, p. 106). The order of outcomes (1_2 versus 2_1) 
as well as the kind of single object (ball versus box) was randomized between 
subjects. 
 
  
9.5 Scoring 
 
The coding procedure was identical to Experiment 2. 
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9.6 Data Analysis 
 
The statistical analyses of Experiment 4 were based on a final sample of 20 
infants. As in the other experiments only infants who saw at least one complete 
sequence (i.e., emergence and return of both objects) over the course of the 
familiarization phase were included in the final sample. The dependent measure was 
again infant’s looking time, as indexed by the cumulative duration of their visual 
fixation to each of the baseline and the test slides. Analyses were completed with the 
mean looking times of coder A and B. Inter-observer reliability for baseline and test 
looking times was assessed by Person r. The reliability for the coding times in 
Experiment 4 was r = .98. This correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 33. 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 
As in the preceded experiments preliminary analyses were performed to check 
for gender effects, and a possible influence of counterbalanced factors in the design 
(order of outcomes (1_2 versus 2_1) and the kind of single object in the one-object 
displays (ball in the one-object display versus box in the one-object display). Again 
no gender effects34 were found. Preliminary analyses checking the impact of the 
counterbalanced factors revealed an influence of both factors, which subsequent 
analyses will examine. 
 
 
9.7 Results 
 
Main Analysis 
  
A 2 (trial) x 2 (number of objects) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to determine if the provision of spatiotemporal information 
affects infants expectations regarding the number of objects in an object individuation 
task. If this was the case 12-month-old infants’ would be expected to show a different 
pattern of results as in Experiment 2. Trial (baseline versus test) and number of 
                                                
33 All statistical tests reported in Experiment 3 are two-tailed. 
34 Thus, male and female infants were combined for all analyses. 
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objects (one versus two objects) served as within-subject factors. Looking times to the 
one- and two-object display obtained in baseline trials were compared with the ones 
retained in test trials. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for trial F(1, 19) 
= 15.35, p = .001, ?2 = 0.45  and one for number of objects F(1, 19) = 19.33, p ? .000, 
?2 = 0.50. Overall, infants watched the test trials longer compared to the baseline 
trials and preferred to look at the two-object display altogether  (cf. Table 6 and 
Figure 16). This outcome is in accordance with previous findings in this set of studies. 
 
 
Table 6: Mean Looking Times (in seconds) and Standard Deviations of Experiment 4: 
Main Analyses with Trial and Number of Objects as Within-Subject Factor 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation N 
Baseline 
1 Object 
6,28 2,32 20 
Baseline 
2 Objects 
7,79 3,34 20 
Test 
1 Object 
8,13 2,73 20 
Test 
2 Objects 
10,59 3,91 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Object Individuation 130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Results of Experiment 4 (N = 20): Mean looking times of 12-month-old 
infants to the 1 Object versus 2 Object display in Baseline and Test 
 
 
Subsequent Analyses 
 
The influence of the factors order of outcomes and kind of single object was 
assed by a 2 (trial) x 2 (number of objects) x 2 (order of outcomes) x 2 (kind of single 
object) repeated measures mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial 
(baseline versus test) and number of objects (one versus two objects) as within-
subject factors and order of outcomes (1_2 versus 2_1) as well as kind of single object 
(ball in the one-object display versus box in the one-object display) as between-
subject factors. In addition to the main effects of trial F(4, 16) = 14.99, p = .001, ?2 = 
0.48 and number of objects F(4, 16) = 19.44, p ? .000, ?2 = 0.55 this calculation 
generated a marginal three-way interaction between trial, number of objects, and 
order of outcomes F(4, 16) = 3.54, p = .078, ?2 = 0.18. Follow up T-Tests suggested 
that infants looked longer at the two-object display in test when the order of outcome 
was 2_1. Table 7 shows mean looking times and standard deviations for these 
analyses.  
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Table 7: Mean Looking Times (in seconds) and Standard Deviations of Experiment 4: 
 Subsequent Analyses with Trial and Number of Objects as Within-Subject 
Factors and Order of Outcomes and Kind of Single Object as Between-
Subject Factors 
 
 Order of 
Outcomes 
Single Object 
Kind 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
Ball 6,49 2,00 5 
Box 5,30 1,25 5 12 
Total 5,89 1,69 10 
Ball 8,72 2,37 5 
Box 4,61 1,52 5 21 
Total 6,67 2,87 10 
Ball 7,60 2,38 10 
Box 4,95 1,36 10 
Baseline 
1 Object 
Total 
Total 6,28 2,32 20 
Ball 7,33 3,02 5 
Box 8,26 4,92 5 12 
Total 7,80 3,88 10 
Ball 9,49 2,60 5 
Box 6,06 2,22 5 21 
Total 7,78 2,91 10 
Ball 8,41 2,89 10 
Box 7,16 3,78 10 
Baseline 
2 Object 
Total 
Total 7,79 3,34 20 
Ball 8,43 2,45 5 
Box 7,34 1,73 5 12 
Total 7,88 2,08 10 
Ball 10,12 2,63 5 
Box 6,64 3,29 5 21 
Total 8,38 3,35 10 
Ball 9,27 2,56 10 
Box 6,90 2,50 10 
Test 
1 Object 
Total 
Total 8,13 2,73 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Object Individuation 132 
Ball 9,36 4,74 5 
Box 8,33 2,89 5 
 
12 
Total 8,85 3,74 10 
Ball 13,23 2,21 5 
Box 11,46 4,37 5 21 
Total 12,34 3,39 10 
Ball 11,29 4,04 10 
Box 9,90 3,86 10 
 
 
 
 
Test 
2 Objects 
Total 
Total 10,59 3,91 20 
 
 
The following Figures 17 and 18 chart the findings of Experiment 4’s subsequent 
analyses. 
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Figure 17. Results of Experiment 4 with order of outcome and kind of single object as 
between-subject factors (N = 20): Mean looking times of 12-month-old infants to the 
1 Object versus 2 Object display in Baseline and Test depending on kind of single 
object in order of outcome 1_2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Results of Experiment 4 with order of outcome and kind of single object as 
between-subject factors (N = 20): Mean looking times of 12-month-old infants to the 
1 Object versus 2 Object display in Baseline and Test depending on kind of single 
object in order of outcome 2_1. 
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Besides these within-subject effects the between-subject factor kind of single 
object reached marginal significance F(4, 16) = 3.857, p = .067. Overall, infants 
tended to look more when the ball rather than the box constituted the single object in 
the one-object display.  
 
 
9.9 Discussion of the Results 
 
 The findings of Experiment 4 make clear that even when spatiotemporal 
information is provided 12-month-old infants do not solve the individuation task at 
hand. Consistent with the previous experiments, infants prefer to look overall longer 
at the two-object display instead of showing surprise when only one object is present. 
In light of the literature on object individuation it is unlikely that infants cannot use 
the spatiotemporal information given in this task. When presented with 
spatiotemporal information provided by seeing two objects simultaneously before the 
familiarization emergences began in Xu and Carey’s (1996) event-mapping task both 
10- and 12-month-old infants succeeded. A wealth of studies differing in stimulus 
material and procedure provide evidence that infants as young as 3.5 months of age 
are able to establish the number of objects participating in an event by means of 
spatiotemporal information (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002; Spelke, et al., 1995; 
Wilcox, Schweinle, & Chapa, 2003). How can this failure be explained then? The 
speculative assumption that infants do not engage in object individuation but rather 
process the information under the aspect of animacy/ agency might not be as false 
after all. The absence of longer looking times to the one object display in test could 
hint that the domain-specific motion information expressed through the objects’ 
distinct external and internal movements overrides the intended individuation task. 
Instead of being concerned about the number of objects present infants might reason 
about animate-inanimate relations. The familiarization phase might not build up the 
expectation that there are two objects involved in the motion event, which in turn 
would lead to a surprise in case only one object is present behind the screen. Rather 
the motion sequences might lead to expectations about animate and inanimate objects. 
The following general discussion will take up this idea again and present research in 
favor for this hypothesis as well as methodological considerations that might likewise 
lead to the existent pattern of results. 
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9.10 Summary 
 
Twelve-month-old infants did not show any sign of object individuation in 
Experiment 4. Thus, even under circumstances where spatiotemporal information is 
provided infants who normally individuate objects at this age and with the 
information given were not bale to do so in the present task. Possible reasons for the 
obtained results are discussed alongside with conclusions and future directions in the 
following chapter. 
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IV INTERPRETATIONAL PART 
 
 
CHAPTER 10 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of the present work was to investigate 10- and 12-month-old 
infants’ application of domain-specific motion patterns in the process of object 
individuation. The main question concerned whether infants could use kind 
information, i.e. animate and inanimate motion characteristics to guide their 
identification of the number of entities involved in an event. In particular, the 
hypothesis implied that 10- and 12-month-old infants’ would show the ability to 
individuate objects on the basis of kind information if such information taps on 
underlying conceptual knowledge about objects and thus, provides essential aspects 
about the subjacent differences of distinct kinds of things. The assumption that infants 
as young as 10 months of age are able to determine the number of objects in an event 
by means of their domain-specific motion patterns was based on the central role of 
motion information for object perception as well as its relevance for the conceptual 
distinction of animate and inanimate objects from early on. Xu and Carey’s (1996) 
results indicated that infants under the age of 1 year are unable to identify objects on 
the basis of non-spatiotemporal properties. This in turn is viewed to be the reason why 
infants fail to exploit property changes for the purpose of object individuation. 
However, since motion activates concepts about object kinds already under the age of 
1 year (cf. Chapter 3.2), it could be that younger infants assign kind information about 
animate and inanimate objects to entities they experience in events. Hence, the 
relation between animate-inanimate motion features and the distinction of living and 
non-living entities should guide 10- and 12-month-old infants’ looking behavior to a 
one- or two-object display depending on the information available about the objects. 
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10.1 Discussion of Results 
 
In sum, the results of the present set of studies do not speak for a contribution 
of motion information to the individuation capacity of 10-month-old infants. 
Surprisingly, neither upon the presentation of a combination of featural appearance 
and domain-specific movement properties in form of distinct moving realistic looking 
toy replicas (Experiment 1) nor under conditions in which motion alone represented 
the critical kind difference (Experiment 2) did 10- and 12-month-old infants prove 
that they were able to establish the number of objects involved in the motion 
sequences. Both age groups failed to demonstrate successful object individuation in 
the present task. The discussion of Experiment 1 lead to the conclusion that object 
complexity put constrains on infants information-processing capacities. Thus, in order 
to diminish distraction, object features were reduced to a minimum in Experiment 2 
by removing animate and inanimate form attributes. Kind information was solely 
presented through movements, typifying animate and inanimate entities. Self-
propulsion, irregular path, and pulsating inside were the hallmarks for the animate 
object. Onset of motion upon contact, linear path, and motion less inside were the 
properties signifying the inanimate object. Besides the variations in motion 
characteristics, no additional information was given that allowed conclusions 
regarding object kind. Especially in Experiment 2 the ability to individuate simple 
objects according to their domain-specific kind information represented by distinct 
motion characteristics should have become apparent at least in 12-month-old infants. 
However, just like in Experiment 1, 10- and 12-month-old infants showed an overall 
preference for the two-object display. The assumption that the presentation of the one- 
and two-object display during the baseline phase might have adversely affected 
infants’ looking behavior during test trials, was weakened by Experiment 3. Even 
without the presentation of the baseline outcomes 12-month-old infants preferred to 
look at the two-object display in test. Further, the looking patterns did not change 
under conditions of a between-subject comparison. This does not rule out, however, 
that a baseline preference for the two-object outcome as evident in some experiments 
influences infants’ ability to individuate objects (Xu & Carey, 1996). It is possible 
that infants do use domain-specific motion information for object individuation but 
they have difficulties to demonstrate object individuation in the present experiments. 
Consistent with this reasoning are the results of Experiment 4: the application of 
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spatiotemporal information did not alter infants’ reaction to the test outcomes. Maybe 
the method implemented here was not sensitive enough to measure the application of 
motion kind information in object individuation. Particularly, infants’ failure to make 
use of spatiotemporal information in Experiment 4 could be an indication for 
methodological problems leading to a theoretical explanation concerning the 
utilization of motion information as kind information in this task. Several lines of 
argumentation consisting of reasons that potentially account for the results obtained in 
the set of studies are proposed. These arguments focus on methodological as well as 
theoretical aspects. The following questions need to be answered: Did the task test 
what it intended to test? Do these results show that infants are unable to individuate 
objects by means of domain-specific motion information? What additional data might 
be needed to sufficiently answer this question? These issues are consecutively 
discussed in the following section. 
Above all, let us point to some procedural difficulties and limitations of the 
method used in the current study, which may have contributed to the absence of 
results conform to the hypothesis. The methodological argumentation is two-fold and 
addresses issues of (1) experimental procedure, and (2) task-demands. First, as 
discussed in Experiment 3 it is unlikely that the within-subject baseline caused the 
failure of infants to individuate the objects. Even without prior information about the 
possible number of objects behind the occluder, infants were not surprised when just 
one object was visible during test after viewing two objects engage in domain-specific 
movements during a motion event. On top of this, there was no shift in looking time 
toward the unexpected one-object outcome in a between-subject comparison. 
However, strong order of outcomes effects through out the series of experiments 
might point to an influence of the information given during the first test trial on 
infants’ looking times in the second test trial. The second familiarization phase might 
have been not sufficiently long enough to avoid such an influence. Previous studies 
by Xu and her colleagues or Wilcox and Baillargeon and their fellows did not report 
such order of outcome effect (e.g., Xu & Carey, 1996; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b). 
Several reasons could account for this. One is that some of these studies presented and 
compared different outcomes between subjects (e.g., Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b). 
This eliminates the impact of the order of outcomes factor. In the studies on hand both 
outcomes are presented to infants. More importantly though motion information as 
specified in the current studies was not involved in other investigations. As discussed 
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below, the special motion attribute in this line of research might have caused certain 
expectations that were either fulfilled in the first test trial or not. Depending on the 
outcome infants’ prospects regarding the second test trial might have changed (see p. 
144 for further explanation). 
Second, the current set of studies researched the role of kind-specific motion 
information on object individuation in an event-mapping task. Despite concerns of 
high-processing demands this type of task was chosen for this investigation because 
the goal of the studies was to test the role of conceptually relevant kind information 
(domain-specific motion characteristics) on the process of object individuation. The 
event-mapping task proved to measure such sources of information (e.g., Krojgaard, 
2007; Surian et al., 2004; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b, Experiment 2; Xu, 2007; Xu 
& Carey, 1996). It has been discussed elsewhere (Xu, 2007) that simplified tasks 
although less demanding tap on other sources of information for individuation (i.e., 
spatiotemporal information and property information), which were not in question in 
the current set of studies. If any spatiotemporal evidence for one object (usually 
generated by the illusion of an oscillating single trajectory)35 was given in the present 
task should have been overcome at least by 12 months of age due to kind concepts 
that strongly suggest two objects (Xu, 2007). Nevertheless, infants might have been 
overwhelmed or even confused by the amount of information available considering 
the complexity of the task itself as well as the significant volume of additional 
information (i.e., appearance (property/ featural) and/ or motion (kind) information) 
available. One way to simplify the task without changing it to an event-monitoring 
task is to reduce the reversals of trajectory (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b). Instead of 
presenting four reversals per object it might be sufficient to only have one or two 
reversals per object. Nevertheless, in contempt of all the changes between the four 
experiments a rather stable pattern of results occurred which suggests contingencies. 
Continuity of this kind speaks either for a (1) complete failure to apply the 
information provided during familiarization and to solve this task or (2) it points to 
divergent processing of the obtainable information. The subsequent theoretical 
                                                
35 The distinct motion patterns/ paths of the objects in the present task might have reduced the illusion 
of an oscillating single trajectory. However, on the other hand one cannot rule out the possibility that 
by directing attention to the path of motion such a perception might have been increased. Infants could 
have perceived the two objects as one object that changes its motion behind the screen. See arguments 
against this possibility and further explanation below. 
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discussion centers around these two possibilities and focuses on problems the nature 
of kind information, implemented in these experiments, involves. 
Could it be that infants do not distinguish the objects? Maybe strong 
spatiotemporal evidence for the presence of one-object that comes with complex tasks 
overrides the featural/ property information carried by the objects? Even though an 
investigation of this alternative remains to be done for the material used in the 
experiments on hand, other work controlled for this possible variant. For instance, Xu 
and Carey (1996, Experiment 3) directly tested whether infants noticed the property 
differences between the objects employed in their task. They found that infants 
detected the perceptual difference between each pair of objects. Apart from studies on 
object individuation, there is a vast number of investigations concerned with object 
perception, object discrimination, or object categorization that provide evidence that 
from early on infants successfully differentiate and categorize both simple forms as 
well as complex entities (see Goswami, 2008; Pauen, 2006 for overviews). Still in Xu 
and Carey’s study infants failed to use this information to infer that there were two 
objects behind the screen. The authors claimed that differentiating objects by noticing 
property variations is a conceptual different task than setting up representations of 
numerically distinct individuals (Xu & Carey, 1996). Hence, it seems natural to think 
that infants showed a similar inability to make use of the information in the present 
task. However, Wilcox and Baillargeon (1998 a, b) chose simple stimulus material (a 
ball and a box) in their studies and provided evidence for object individuation and 
thus, object discrimination in infants as young as 4.5 months. According to the 
authors infants based their reasoning on featural differences between the objects. 
Instead of being unable to use property information, Wilcox and Baillargeon (1998b) 
held task demands accountable. Nonetheless, even though an inability to make use of 
specific sources of information might not only hold for perceptual information, it 
might be applicable to conceptual information about object kind. In the present 
experiments, infants could have had trouble connecting motion information made 
available in the task and previously acquired knowledge about animate and inanimate 
objects which would lead to the conception of two objects and thus, to a violation of 
expectation in case only one object is displayed. Experimental evidence provided by 
Bahrick et al. (2002) supports the view that properties of objects are less well encoded 
than the events in which they are presented. In their study they showed that memory 
for dynamic aspects (actions) of events is more enduring than memory for static ones 
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such as the objects used for carrying out the actions, which 5.5-month-olds did not 
remember. For example, infants did not seem to notice if the actor was shown 
brushing her hair with the bubble wand instead of the hairbrush originally used. 
However, same aged infants discriminated and remember various actions such as 
brushing hair, brushing teeth, or blowing bubbles (Bahrick et al. 2002). This indicates 
that infants represented the event but not the details of the objects used in the events. 
Thus, these findings give rise to the hypothesis that infants may remember activities 
differently than objects or forms. Thereby memory may depend on whether they have 
categorized the activities and/ or the objects. Thus, when dynamic displays are used in 
infant tasks, it is possible that infants construe the events in a somewhat holistic 
fashion without attending to the particulars of the objects in the events (Mandler & 
McDonough, 1998, 2000). In a follow up study Bahrick and Newell (2008) tested an 
additional salience hypothesis. They found that discrimination for action was more 
robust in 5- and 7-month-old infants compared to dynamic faces. Faces were 
discriminable but actions were more salient and therefore competed for attention, 
which lead to the failure of discriminating and remembering faces and objects in the 
context of actions as demonstrated by Bahrick et al. (2002). A variety of studies speak 
to the contrary, though. Research on conceptual development demonstrate that during 
the second half of their first year of life, infants not only to reason about their 
environment based on acquired knowledge, but also use conceptions to make 
inferences about object properties, object relations, and object behaviors (e.g., 
Goswami, 2008 for an overview; Mandler, 2004; Träuble & Pauen, 2004; Pauen, 
2002). Besides, instead of showing humans in action, the studies on hand featured 
simple events in which the objects performed the actions themselves. Further, two 
findings in the present line of studies point to a discrimination of the stimuli as well as 
the usage of information. One is the observation that some infants jumped up and 
down in the highchair during the motion events when the ball was visible. They 
remained still in the box sequence. It is unclear what motivated infants to do so36, but 
in any case they only expected the animate object to jump and thus, not only 
discriminated the objects but applied a specific behavior to only one of the objects.  
The other finding is the different looking pattern depending on the factor of order of 
outcomes hint at infants’ application of the familiarized information.  
                                                
36 It could be that infants learned that the animate object jumps and expected it to do so again. 
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But in what way did infants use certain cues in test? Did they focus on the 
number of objects present or were they distracted by the objects’ motion directing 
them to expectations about animacy. As a package the studies raise doubts on the 
validity of the task. It is possible that not object individuation was measured with the 
procedure employed but rather infants’ expectations about object motion, animacy, or 
agency. According to Goswami (2008) animacy is most strongly perceived when 
objects change direction or speed of motion. Speed of motion was constant in the 
present experimental procedure. However, the animate object changed direction by 
reversing its trajectory without an external cause. While form of motion (self-
propulsion) as well as from of action cause (external or internal causation) are 
important criterions when distinguishing animates from inanimates (and thus, such 
actions were purposely designed), they might bring about the expectation that this 
object will move again at a later point in time. As evaluated in Chapter 3.2 self-
propelled motion is one of the most powerful signs for animacy (Gelman & Spelke, 
1981; Mandler, 2004; Premack, 1990; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). On top of 
this, researchers proposed that self-initiated movement changes are seen as intentional 
and that they activate the perception of objects as agents with goals and desires 
(Leslie, 1994; Premack, 1990). Hence, apart form being perceived under aspects of 
animacy, perceptual displays can also be seen as causal and intentional. The notion of 
agency entails an understanding of intention and goal-directedness (Leslie, 1994, 
Gergely et al., 1995).  
Is there evidence for this ability in 12-month-old or even younger infants? Can 
we assume that infants capable of goal attribution to non domain-specific, abstract 
material? Two views regarding the early reasoning about goals prevail. One account 
suggests that infants’ ability to attribute goals develops as a result of their experiences 
with human agents (e.g., Meltzoff, 1995, 2002; Tomasello, 1999; Woodward, 
Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001). Initial studies reported that 9-, 6-, and in some 
cases 3-month-old infants already perceive actions as goal directed (e.g., Woodward, 
1998; Kamewari, 2005; Somerville et al., 2005). However, although young infants 
have the competence to assign goals, they only do so to human agents and it is not 
until later that they gradually extended their knowledge to other non-human agents. 
For instance, 9- and 6-month-old infants successfully encode aspects of actions that 
are relevant to the goals of a human agent. Under certain circumstances, namely early 
action experience even 3-month-old infants are able to detect the goal structure of 
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actions supporting them in their interpretation of an agent’s goals (Somerville et al., 
2005). Therefore, this early goal attribution competence is according to this research 
restricted to human or human-like agents (Kamewari, 2005; Woodward, 1998). The 
second approach proceeds on the assumption that goal attribution is rooted in a 
specialized system of reasoning that is activated whenever infants encounter entities 
they, based on appropriate features such as self-propulsion, contingent interaction, or 
non-rigid movements identify as agents (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gergely et al., 1995; 
Johnson, 2000, 2003; Leslie, 1995; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Premack, 1990). Thus, 
ascribing agency is independent of familiarity with actors and actions but rather 
depends on whether or not evidence for the presence of an agent is available 
(teleological stance, see Csibra, 2008). Luo and Baillargeon (2005) tested these two 
notions by familiarizing 5-month-old infants with a self-propelled box approaching 
consecutively one of two objects. In test the target of action was changed and infants’ 
recovery to the events was measured. The results demonstrated that infants looked 
reliably longer to the new- than the old-goal event when given clear evidence (here 
through self-initiated motion) that the actions were internally caused and thus, 
signalized the presence of an agent (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). Studies by Gergely et 
al. (1995) as well as Csibra (2008) extended these findings to other motion cues such 
as expansion and contraction, as well as goal-directed spatial behavior. Whereas the 
studies on hand used motion characteristics to represent objects as animate and 
inanimate kinds in order to examine infants ability to individuate, Gergely and his 
colleagues incorporated simple motion cues to test infants’ attributions of agency. The 
researchers showed that 12-month-old infants generated expectations about the 
particular actions (approaching, retreating, jumping and contact with another object) 
an assumed agent was likely to perform to achieve a desired goal. Further, when 
tested on these expectations infants applied them in a way that speaks for their 
intentional causal analysis of the initial display. In a very recent article, Csibra (2008) 
reported that even infants 6.5 months of age attributed goals to an inanimate box if it 
shows variability of behavior. The results illustrate that featural identification of 
agents is not a necessary precondition of goal attribution in young infants and that the 
single most important behavioral cue for identifying a goal-directed agent is choice of 
action (Csibra, 2008; Johnson et al., 1998; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). Together, these 
studies provide support for the teleological stance, i.e. that from an early age infants 
assign goals to any entity (even an inanimate geometric object) as long as information 
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is provided that allows them to identify the object as an agent. Hence, motion 
contributes not only to the distinction of living and non-living kinds, it also tells 
agents apart from other physical objects, enabling adults as well as infants to attribute 
goals to movements and mental causes for goal-directed behavior, even if the displays 
consist of simple moving cartoon figures or geometric shapes (Csibra, 2008; Gergely 
et al., 1995; Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000, and Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000 for evidence 
in adults).  Thus, infants perceive animate beings as having intentional mental states 
that govern certain behaviors but also represent their features such as self-initiated 
movement or variability in action as cues for agency. In relation to the present 
research, infants might have analyzed the events under the premise of agency. The 
variability in jumping behavior, the self-initiated change of path, as well as the 
expansion and contraction of the ball’s inner part might have given rise to the 
presumption that the animate object is an agent. Instead of reasoning along the lines 
of a mere animate-inanimate distinction, infants might have applied an “intentional 
stance” to the ball’s behavior. Looking at the findings of the current set of studies this 
could be the case for the Experiments, which used the abstract material depending on 
order of outcomes condition. In the order of outcome 1_2 infants might have expected 
the ball but not the box to move again. Thus, infants would make use of the difference 
in onset of motion and discriminating the different motion patterns, which in turn are 
attributed to animate and inanimate behavior. In the opposite condition (2_1) this 
might have been overshadowed by the fact that the two-object display came first, 
which might have resulted in reduced expectation for the single object to move again 
after both objects did not move. However, there seemed to be an anticipation that 
something might happen when both objects appear together first in test. If the concept 
agency was triggered during familiarization and infants might have expected the 
animate objects to act on the inanimate object instead of looking for both to move 
again. 
Still such a sophisticated interpretation is highly speculative and requires 
further testing. Besides, whereas this explanation works well for the results of 
Experiment 2 and 4 it does not work out exactly in the same way for the findings of 
Experiment 1. The looking pattern in the order of outcomes 1_2/ tractor condition 
does not correspond with the ones in Experiment 2 and 4. While overall infants 
looked significantly longer to the two-object display in the condition where the bunny 
served as the single object when taking the factor kind of single object into account 
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supporting an animacy/ agency hypothesis, when the tractor made up the object in the 
on-object display infants look equally long at the displays in the order of outcomes 
condition 1_2. This speaks to the contrary because it does not show an expectation 
that something would happen in case both objects were present. However, Experiment 
1 contained natural/ complex material thought and thus, object form and detail might 
have had an influence on infants looking results as well. Although, infants just viewed 
the bunny engage in an interesting movement (jumping), which should have made up 
for differences in form, the bunny lacked detail compared to the tractor and therefore 
might have been less interesting in the static displays. Considering the results under 
the aspects of animacy and agency again, it might also be that due to the ambiguous 
onset of motion, both objects were viewed as self-propelled and thus animate. This in 
turn could have given rise to the expectation that both objects would have the ability 
to move again in test. Discrepancies of this sort, demonstrate that in spite of the 
overall consistency of the results, it is not conclusive at this point whether a failure to 
individuate can be attributed to methodological shortcomings and/ or reasoning about 
animacy, agency, or a combination of everything. The following chapter proposes a 
range of studies that would certainly be helpful for the interpretation of the results on 
hand and could contribute to a better understanding of the influence of motion on 
processes such as object individuation. 
 
 
10.2  Future Directions and Conclusions 
 
The former discussion alludes to several topics that are worth investigating in 
future research about the kind of information available for object information as well 
as the role of motion in such processes. Topics that were addressed in the previous 
discussion part are adopted and studies that cater to those issues are proposed. 
First of all, it has to be stressed that the implementation of the simple material 
as well as a clear characterization of self-propulsion were important changes from 
Experiment 1 to Experiment 2. These modifications eliminated featural complexity 
and ambiguity regarding the animate-inanimate distinction as factors that could 
influence infants looking and reasoning, thus, allowing a clear differentiation of the 
objects by means of motion cues instead of featural characteristics. Nevertheless, 
many cues remained that added variance to the task. One way to get closer to a 
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solution of what infants reasoning is to repeat Experiment 4 in which spatiotemporal 
information was provided but have the objects both move in a linear fashion and take 
away the remaining animate cues (internal pulsation and self-propulsion). If infants 
reason about animacy/ agency, looking times to the two-object display should be less 
apparent under these conditions. In fact, 12-month-old infants should be able to solve 
the individuation task because cues that indicate animacy or agency were removed 
permitting infants to focus on the question how many objects are involved in the 
event.37 To further disentangle the concepts animacy and agency an experiment would 
have to be conducted which either does not provide agency cues at all or meets 
infants’ expectations about particular actions of objects. Using the method of 
Experiment 2 such experiments could look like this. Either one removes the internal 
pulsation and emphasizes onset of motion, path of motion, and form of action cause 
or the animate object moves in test. The later possibility has to be carefully planned 
and elaborated because movement always offers the problem of catching interest. One 
would have to think of a compensation for display in which no motion is present. On 
the other hand, since such investigations move away from the original individuation 
question, it would be possible to leave the problem of object individuation aside and 
compare a test display in which the animate object interacts with the inanimate object 
after the occluder descented (expected outcome) with a test version in which the 
animate object does not interact upon removal of the screen (unexpected outcome). 
Despite the attraction due to motion infants should according to the violation-of-
expectation paradigm prefer the unexpected outcome above the expected. 
At this point let us come back to object individuation, which was the original 
concern of the present investigations and consider methodological improvements. 
Taken everything into account, it might be a difficult endeavor to test the influence of 
domain-specific motion characteristics on object individuation with the task 
implemented here. Motion information alone seems to interfere with the individuation 
process. As pointed out by Xu (2007) success or failure in establishing the number of 
objects in an event might be dependent on the source of information available. Thus, 
it is quite possible that infants concentrate on the most salient source of information 
available, which in the present case is motion. Because this type of information is not 
directly related to the object information task, expectations about the objects’ 
                                                
37 This possibility is tested right now with the according experiment being under way. 
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movements and/ or behaviors might particularly overlay computations about 
individuation in the present procedure. Further, the experiments revealed that the 
order of outcomes had an eminent effect on the results. Thus, for further research of 
that kind it is advisable to eliminate any impact of this factor. In order to realize this, 
one has to change the design layout. One option would be to carry out the task with 
two groups of infants and compare the reactions to the one- and two-object display in 
test between groups. An experiment would look as follows. Independent of the 
information provided during familiarization, one group of infants sees the one-object 
display in baseline and test whereas another group of infants views the two-object 
display in baseline and test. The expectation would be that there is a greater increase 
in looking in the one-object display condition from baseline to test compared to the 
two-object display condition. With regard to the method, one could call the film 
presentation into question after all. So far this possibility did not appear in the 
discussions because a vast number of research provides evidence for infants’ ability to 
make use of film presentations (e.g. Madole & Cohen, 1995; Mumme & Fernald, 
2003; Perone & Oakes, 2006; Seekircher, 2007; Surian et al., 2004). In this case, 
however, it could be argued that three-dimensional information might have been vital 
in transferring information. Besides Surian et al.’s (2004) study, all object 
individuation studies are presented live in a puppet stage. The substitution of three-
dimensional material through two-dimensional images might have lead to insufficient 
encoding of the familiarization sequences, which in turn made it harder for infants to 
set up stable expectations. In this regard, Csibra (2008) discusses that two-
dimensional animations might hinder infants from applying specific knowledge that 
would have been required for the evaluation of events. Thus, the pictural form of 
presentation might have impeded the activation of conceptual relevant prior 
knowledge about animate and inanimate objects in the present series of experiments. 
Findings by Pauen and Träuble (2002) speak for such an interpretation. The authors 
showed that 7-month-old infants differentiate three-dimensional toy replicas of 
animals and furniture only under conditions where they are able to visually analyze 
them as real objects. When presented as images infants fail to do so. Other 
categorization studies, however, provides evidence for a successful application of 
picture (e.g., Quinn & Eimas, 1996). No movement was involved in those studies, 
though. Johnson and Aslin (1996) demonstrated that young infants recover depth 
information through relative motion and occlusion, aspects that were part of the 
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present experiments. In general, literature on the use of depth information reveals that 
the implementation of pictural cues to infer depth on two-dimensional images starts to 
mature around 6 months of age (Arteberry, Bensen, & Yonas, 1991). In order to 
completely rule out that infants might be missing pieces of information in the two-
dimensional video displays used in the experiments on hand the create a two-
dimensional “stage” which suggest three-dimensionality because of perspective cues 
and shadows (see Csibra, 2008 for an example). In either case this would enhance the 
transfer of cues necessary for reasoning about motion events without minimizing 
standardization and accuracy in the procedure.  
 
In conclusion, despite the conflicting results, the present set of experiments 
makes valuable contributions to the study of infant cognition. The experiments on 
hand once more elucidate the immense importance of motion cues in early childhood. 
As pointed out in the discussion, motion characteristics contribute to a wide range of 
cognitive process such as object segregation (e.g., Kellman & Spelke, 1983), object 
categorization (e.g., Mandler, 2004) reasoning about intentionality (Premack, 1990), 
causality (e.g., Leslie, 1994; Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1995; Träuble, 2004), or 
agency, (e.g., Csibra, 2008; Gergely & Csibra, 2006). Thus, it can be concluded that 
motion is one of the most important information available to infants. It guides their 
perception and their understanding of events in the world and it seems to have the 
ability to override other information be it featural or kind information. Even though 
the role of movement on the object individuation process remains an open question at 
this point and requires further investigation, the notion that motion information is so 
powerful leaves exciting possibilities for future research on cognitive development. 
In addition, the present work not only sets a starting point for further 
promising studies but more importantly it points out how absolute essential detailed 
analyses and specifications of the employed information are. Sometimes less is more 
when it comes to the information available for making inferences. Thereby, simply 
reducing task demands and then demonstrating capabilities at an even younger age 
does not necessarily bring us closer to the underlying processes of cognitive abilities 
nor does it provide us with a better understanding of how they develop. Different 
mechanisms might be at work and various sources of information might contribute to 
an infants’ reaction/ behavior. Certainly, however, clear definitions of the information 
and tasks with which certain competences can be measured will help design 
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experiments that will answer the questions of developmental psychologists. As 
research on early cognition shows, infants are able to represent physical laws such as 
cohesion, solidity, continuity, and contact, as well as spatial relations and occlusion 
events. Besides, they judge objects’ numerical, causal, and animate relations, and they 
reason about events, others’ actions, intentions, and mental states (see Goswami, 2008 
for an overview). Still there are many open questions about the underlying processes 
of these phenomena and how they interact. Continuous investigation through cleverly 
designed behavioral experiments as well as neuroscience approaches will not only 
bring us closer to explaining processes such as object individuation but also to 
understanding the origins of thought and human development in general. 
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APPENDIX A – PROCEDURE EXPERIMENT 1 
 
BASELINE PHASE 
 
One-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
 
Two-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAMILIARIZATION PHASE A 
(4 Presentations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST A 
 
One-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAMILIARIZATION PHASE B 
(2 Presentations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST B 
 
Two-Object Display 
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APPENDIX B – COURSE OF PRESENTATION EXPERIMENT 1 
SEQUENCE PRESENTATION DURATION 
BASELINE A 
? Black Screen 
? Fade in 
? Occluder descents plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display 
? Fade out 
4 seconds 
2 seconds 
2 seconds 
20 seconds 
2 seconds 
BASELINE B 
? Fade in 
? Occluder descents plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display 
? Fade out 
2 seconds 
2 seconds 
20 seconds 
2 seconds 
 
FAMILIARIZATION 
A 
? Black Screen  
? Fade in plus Sound 
 
? Occluder 
? Bunny comes out from behind the occluder and 
jumps to the right 
? Bunny jumps backwards and disappears behind 
the occluder 
? Occluder 
? Tractor rolls out from behind the occluder to 
the left 
? Tractor rolls back behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
 
SEQUENCE PRESENTED 4 TIMES 
4 seconds 
2 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
6 seconds 
 
6 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
6 seconds 
 
6 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
 
TEST A 
? Occluder descents plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display 
? Fade out 
2 seconds 
20 seconds 
2 seconds 
FAMILIARIZATION  
B 
? Fade in plus Sound 
 
? Occluder 
? Bunny comes out from behind the occluder and 
jumps to the right 
? Bunny jumps backwards and disappears behind 
the occluder 
? Occluder 
? Tractor rolls out from behind the occluder to 
the left 
? Tractor rolls back behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
 
SEQUENCE PRESENTED 2 TIMES 
2 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
6 seconds 
 
6 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
6 seconds 
 
6 seconds 
4 seconds  
 
 
TEST B 
? Occluder descents plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display 
? Fade out 
2 seconds 
20 seconds 
2 seconds 
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APPENDIX C – PROCEDURE EXPERIMENT 2 
 
BASELINE PHASE 
 
One-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
Two-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION OF SCREEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAMILIARIZATION PHASE A 
(4 Presentations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST A 
 
One-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
FAMILIARIZATION PHASE B 
(2 Presentations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST B 
 
Two-Object Display 
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APPENDIX D – COURSE OF PRESENTATION EXPERIMENT 2 
SEQUENCE PRESENTATION DURATION 
BASELINE A 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display 
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
BASELINE B 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display 
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
INTRODUCTION 
OF SCREEN 
? Black Slide 
? Descent of Screen plus Sound 
? Ascent of Screen 
? Descent of Screen plus Sound 
? Ascent of Screen 
  2 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
FAMILIARIZATION 
A 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
 
? Occluder 
? Ball appears to the left, pulsates, jumps further 
to the left, pulsates  
? Ball jumps back toward the occluder, stops 
before it disappears behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
? Box slides out from behind the occluder and 
moves to the right 
? Box hits pole and slides back behind the 
occluder 
? Occluder 
 
 SEQUENCE PRESENTED 4 TIMES 
2 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
 
 
TEST A 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display  
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
FAMILIARIZATION  
B 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
 
? Occluder 
? Ball appears to the left, pulsates, jumps further 
to the left, pulsates  
? Ball jumps back toward the occluder, stops 
before it disappears behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
? Box slides out from behind the occluder and 
moves to the right 
? Box hits pole and slides back behind the 
occluder 
? Occluder 
 
SEQUENCE PRESENTED 2 TIMES 
2 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
 
TEST B 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display  
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
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APPENDIX E – PROCEDURE EXPERIMENT 3 
 
INTRODUCTION OF SCREEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAMILIARIZATION PHASE A 
(4 Presentations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST A 
 
One-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAMILIARIZATION PHASE B 
(2 Presentations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST B 
 
Two-Object Display 
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APPENDIX F – COURSE OF PRESENTATION EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 
SEQUENCE PRESENTATION DURATION 
INTRODUCTION 
OF SCREEN 
? Black Slide 
? Descent of Screen plus Sound 
? Ascent of Screen 
? Descent of Screen plus Sound 
? Ascent of Screen 
  2 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
FAMILIARIZATION 
A 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
 
? Occluder 
? Ball appears to the left, pulsates, jumps further 
to the left, pulsates  
? Ball jumps back toward the occluder, stops 
before it disappears behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
? Box slides out from behind the occluder and 
moves to the right 
? Box hits pole and slides back behind the 
occluder 
? Occluder 
 
 SEQUENCE PRESENTED 4 TIMES 
2 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
 
 
TEST A 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display  
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
FAMILIARIZATION  
B 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
 
? Occluder 
? Ball appears to the left, pulsates, jumps further 
to the left, pulsates  
? Ball jumps back toward the occluder, stops 
before it disappears behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
? Box slides out from behind the occluder and 
moves to the right 
? Box hits pole and slides back behind the 
occluder 
? Occluder 
 
SEQUENCE PRESENTED 2 TIMES 
2 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
2 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
2 seconds 
 
TEST B 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display  
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
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APPENDIX G – PROCEDURE EXPERIMENT 4 
 
BASELINE PHASE 
One-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
Two-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION OF SCREEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESENTATION OF SPATIOTEMPORAL INFORMATION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAMILIARIZATION PHASE A 
(4 Presentations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST A 
One-Object Display 
 
 
 
 
PRESENTATION OF SPATIOTEMPORAL INFORMATION 
 
FAMILIARIZATION PHASE B 
(2 Presentations) 
 
TEST B 
Two-Object Display 
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APPENDIX H – COURSE OF PRESENTATION EXPERIMENT 4 
SEQUENCE PRESENTATION DURATION 
BASELINE A 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display 
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
BASELINE B 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display 
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
INTRODUCTION 
OF SCREEN 
? Black Slide 
? Descent of Screen plus Sound 
? Ascent of Screen 
? Descent of Screen plus Sound 
? Ascent of Screen 
  2 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
4 seconds 
PRESENTATION OF 
SPATIOTEMPORAL 
INFORMATION 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of both objects aside the screen 
2seconds 
10 seconds 
 
FAMILIARIZATION 
A 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
 
? Occluder 
? Ball appears to the left, pulsates, jumps further to 
the left, pulsates  
? Ball jumps back toward the occluder, stops before it 
disappears behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
? Box slides out from behind the occluder and moves 
to the right 
? Box hits pole and slides back behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
 
 SEQUENCE PRESENTED 4 TIMES 
2 seconds 
  
  2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
2 seconds 
 
 
TEST A 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display  
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
PRESENTATION OF 
SPATIOTEMPORAL 
INFORMATION 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of both objects aside the screen 
2 seconds 
10 seconds 
FAMILIARIZATION  
B 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
 
? Occluder 
? Ball appears to the left, pulsates, jumps further to 
the left, pulsates  
? Ball jumps back toward the occluder, stops before it 
disappears behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
? Box slides out from behind the occluder and moves 
to the right 
? Box hits pole and slides back behind the occluder 
? Occluder 
 
SEQUENCE PRESENTED 2 TIMES 
2 seconds 
  
  2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
 
2 seconds 
4 seconds 
 
4 seconds 
2 seconds 
 
 
TEST B 
? Black Slide plus Sound 
? Presentation of one- or two-object display  
2 seconds 
15 seconds 
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APPENDIX I 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the procedure employed by Xu and Carey 
(1996).  
Figure 2: The physical reasoning account. From Baillargeon (2004). 
Figure 3: The object indexing system. From Leslie et al. (1998). 
Figure 4: Infant Object Indexing by Shape: A Circle and a Triangle Are Shown 
Sequentially. From Leslie et al. (1998). 
Figure 5:  Model on how infants determine numerical according to the Identity 
Theory by Meltzoff & Moore (1998). The bold boxes indicate the five 
major components. 
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